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i		
Abstract 
 
The main question that this thesis seeks to examine is whether the United Kingdom 
complies with its substantive and procedural obligations under International Human 
Rights Law in the deportation and removal of migrants and ancillary to the above, is 
whether the United Kingdom complies with its treaty obligations in the detention of 
migrants pending deportation. The thesis explores the substantive and procedural 
application of immigration legislation with respect to deportation and/or removal of 
migrants in the United Kingdom within the framework of International Human Rights 
Law in the context of liberal democracies. To that effect, it queries the availability and 
the exercise of rights of migrants in the face of deportation and/or removal.  
 
The standards established for the protection of the rights of individuals in the State’s 
territorial jurisdiction with specificity to detention and deportation will be employed to 
measure the United Kingdom’s compliance with its obligations with emphasis laid on 
the safeguards provided by international legal instruments and extending to the right of 
legitimate expectation, in addition to the demands, salient features and values 
established by liberal democracies. 
 
The thesis concludes by asserting inter alia that prolonged detention-indefinite 
detention, pending deportation and/or removal as practiced by the United Kingdom is at 
variance with its status as a liberal democracy and its obligations under International 
Human Rights Law which illuminates the finding that through their laws and practices, 
liberal democracies rather than comply with their commitments and obligations appear 
to wield unbridled power against migrants in enhancing deportation and/or removal. 
The thesis raises the query as to whether legislation associated with deportation and 
removal are in an unconstrained manner, constantly enacted, revised and re-enacted to 
achieve deportation and/or removal in contrast to the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
encapsulated under the principle of legal certainty. In addition, the research found that 
crimmigration heightened the velocity of deportation by expanding deportability 
grounds by way of triggering broader, harsher, and more frequent criminal 
consequences leading to conviction, thereby creating a suitable avenue for deportation 
and reducing the scope for challenging deportation decisions. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction, Purpose and Methodology 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Immigration control is arguably, a ‘necessary feature in the maintenance of liberal 
democratic states that implies two capacities: one is to block the entry of individuals to 
a state and the other is to secure the return of those who have entered’.1 In essence, the 
notion that every State by reason of its territorial supremacy is competent to exclude 
non-nationals partly or wholly from its territory is supported by international law,2 the 
sovereign power to deport is an extension of the sovereign right to exclude.3 Therefore 
the fundamental principle of State sovereignty is that States enjoy the discretion over 
the admission, residence and expulsion of non-nationals from the State-exercising 
jurisdiction.4 Although the prerogative authority of States in this regard exists, it is 
rather subject to a cluster of international law and treaty obligations.5 In short, while it is 
conceded that States can maintain sovereignty over their internal affairs, they are 
nonetheless accountable to upholding acceptable principles and standards under 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) in the exercise of sovereignty thus inviting a 
reconciliation of sovereignty with universality of human rights law.6  
 
‘Citizens, unlike non-citizens, typically are not usually deported or expelled as they 
have the right to leave and enter the state at will’,7 therefore the nature and scope of the 																																																								
1 Matthew Gibney and Randall Hansen, 'Deportation and the liberal state:the forcible return of asylum 
seekers and unlawful migrants in Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom' New Issues in Refugee 
Research  Working Paper No.77  <http://www.unhcr.org/3e59de764.pdf > accessed 14 August 2015 
2 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn, Longman 1992) 849; 
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public international Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 105-113, see generally 
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandani v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471 para 67; Vilvarajah v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 
248 para 102; Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 449 
3  Bridget Anderson, Matthew J Gibney and Emmanuel Paoletti, 'Citizenship, deportation and the 
boundaries of belonging' (2011) 15 Citizenship Studies 547 
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) 1950, CETS no 005 Art 1 requires State parties to ‘secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’.  
5 Ian Bryan and Peter Langford, ‘The Lawful Detention of Unauthorised Aliens under the European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights’ (2011) 80 Nordic Journal of International Law 193, 194 
6 Ryszard Cholewinski and Patrick Taran, ‘Migration, Governance and Human Rights, Contemporary 
Dilemmas in the era of Globalization’ (2010) 22 Refugee Survey Quarterly 1, 3 
7 Matthew Gibney, 'Precarious Residents: Migration Control, Membersip and the Rights of Non-citizens' 
(2009) UNDP Human Development Reports Research Paper 10; See Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘’Temporary 
Exclusion Orders’ and their Implications for the United Kingdom’s International Legal Obligations’  
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/GSGG-
Counter_Terrorism_JCHRFinal.pdf> accessed 25 March 2015; <http://www.ejiltalk.org/temporary-
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right of states to control the admission of non-citizens to their territory is one that 
engages the attention of this research even as refusal of entry, deportation and/or 
removal sit uneasily with liberal principles.8 Moreover, the further question of 
obligations owed to those already in the state in the context of immigration lying in a 
continuum with the protection of the interest of its citizens is even thornier and requires 
anxious scrutiny.9 The debate is that it is legitimate for migrants to claim rights of 
residence in the host State under certain conditions either by way of liberal philosophy 
of fairness and/or as an exercise of their fundamental human rights.10  
 
The thesis therefore examines the legality of deportation and removal of migrants in the 
United Kingdom (UK) within the context of liberal democracy, which invites the 
question as to whether the UK complies with its substantive and procedural obligations 
in the deportation and removal of migrants. Ancillary to the above is the question of 
whether the UK complies with its treaty obligations under International Human Rights 
Law (IHRL) in the detention of migrants for the purpose of deportation and/or removal. 
 
I.1 Hypothesis and Problem Statement 
 
The argument has been made that the growing popularity of exclusionary measures 
against migrants amongst liberal democratic states is common.11 Therefore, the research 
would test whether contemporary deportation and/or removal regime in the United 
Kingdom is the emergence of a new legal framework of State power. 
 
I.2 Research questions   
 
1. Does the United Kingdom comply with its treaty obligations under International 
human Rights Law (IHRL) in the deportation and removal of migrants? 
 
a. Does the United Kingdom as a liberal democratic state comply with its substantive 
and procedural obligations in the deportation and removal of migrants? 																																																																																																																																																																		
exclusion-orders-and-their-implications-for-the-united-kingdoms-international-legal-obligations-part-ii/> 
accessed 25 March 2015  
8 Gibney and Hansen (n1) 5 
9  Home Office, ‘Fairer, Faster and Firmer -A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/264150/4018.pdf> 
accessed 05 May 2014 
10 D  Jackson and others, Immigration Law and Practice (4th edn, Tottel Publishing 2008) 973 
11 An idea first canvassed by Gibney and Hansen, 'Deportation and the liberal state’ (n1) 2, 6  
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b. Are immigration laws in the UK constructed in an unconstrained manner, which as a 
consequence enhances deportation and/or removal? 
 
2. Ancillary to deportation and removal is the power to detain. Does the United 
Kingdom comply with its treaty obligations under International Human Rights Law in 
the detention of migrants for the purpose of deportation and/or removal? 
 
a. Are the United Kingdom detention practices at variance with its liberal democratic 
ideology of fairness? 
 
b. Can necessity of detention be defined devoid of rationality and due diligence? 
 
1.3 Terminology 
 
Migrants or aliens: These may be used interchangeably to describe non-citizens of a 
State. It may be extended to include refugees (except when the term refugee is 
specifically used) for the purpose of analysis of outsiders within a State’s territorial 
jurisdiction. 
 
Deportation: Deportation in the United Kingdom refers to a process where a non-
citizen can be forcibly removed from the UK and prohibited from returning unless the 
deportation order is revoked.12 A distinguishing feature of deportation from other 
compulsory or forced removal is that deportation brings a particular application or entry 
to an end but may create further difficulties for a migrant seeking future re-entry. 
 
Removal: Removal on the other hand refers to all enforced departures thus describing 
the actual embarkation, which is preceded by a removal direction.13 With the coming 
into force of the 1999 Immigration Act, s 10, removal became known as ‘administrative 
removal’, which strictly speaking distinguishes removal from deportation. This is 
embedded in the fact that prior to the coming into force of the 1999 Act, deportation 
applied to persons who had leave to enter or remain whom the Secretary of State 																																																								
12 Immigration Act 1971, Section 5 (1) and (2) and paragraph 362, as a process where a non-citizen can 
be forcibly removed from the UK by virtue of an order and prohibited from returning unless the order is 
revoked.  
13 Immigration Act 1971 Sch 2, para 9  
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intended to remove or those recommended for deportation by a court following criminal 
conviction, whereas administrative removal applied to those who had no leave to enter 
or irregular migrants.14  
  
Expulsion:  This is a generic term used in this research to describe either deportation or 
removal of migrants, which is the act of expelling someone from a State. Expulsion is 
used when necessary to describe either deportation or removal but with the 
understanding that all successful deportation or removal results in the actual removal of 
a migrant from the territory of the State. 15   
 
Detention: Detention as a matter of law means deprivation of liberty.  
 
Legality: Legality is a principle of law binding on States as per ECHR standards with 
the purpose of protecting individuals against arbitrary State action and allows for 
accountability of the State in the exercise of its powers. It ensures that States make laws 
that have foreseeable legal basis for its action without inhibiting the power of the courts 
to check the display of arbitrary power.16  
 
Legal certainty: In this thesis, legal certainty is used to describe the rule of law as 
possessing the characteristics of procedural and legal transparency in addition to 
predictability in order to avoid arbitrariness given that certain laws may still be legal but 
arbitrary.17 
 
Legitimate Expectation: This is described as an aspect of legal certainty where an 
individual is said to hold a public authority accountable to its words and actions to the 
extent that the public authority cannot be allowed to change its mind having led the 
individual to believe that a certain decision would be made.18 The doctrine of legitimate 
expectation operates as a control over the discretionary powers conferred upon a public 
authority.19  
 																																																								
14 David Jackson and others, Immigration Law and Practice (4th edn, Tottel Publishing 2008) 974 
15 Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti  (n3) 549 
16 John Wadham and others, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 (OUP 1999) 32 
17 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251 
18 A W Bradley and K D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (14th edn, Pearson 2007) 753 
19 Philip Sales, 'Legitimate Expectations' (Lecture for ALBA, Legitimate Expectation, London, 7 March 
2006) 1 
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Crimmigration: Crimmigration was developed by the American Migration 
jurisprudence to connote the ‘convergence of two critical regulatory regimes-criminal 
justice and immigration control where the two systems intersect at multiple points 
notably at points that violations of the immigration laws trigger broader, harsher, and 
more frequent criminal consequences even leading to migrants and/or refugees being 
prosecuted for illegal [irregular] entry’.20 ‘Crimmigration narrows the decision whether 
to exclude the migrant out of the State to a single moment in time-the moment of crime, 
compelling enough, to trigger the potential for deportation or detention for an 
immigration offense’.21 
 
1.4 Purpose of study and Key Research Aims 
 
This research will explore the substantive and procedural application of human rights 
with respect to deportation and/or removal of migrants in the UK within the context of 
liberal democracies. Furthermore, ancillary to the power to deport is the power to detain 
hence the depth given to the examination of detention by this thesis. As it has been 
expressed, ‘the burgeoning phenomenon of immigration-related detention sits 
uncomfortably on the fault line separating the prerogatives of State sovereignty from the 
rights of non-citizens regardless of the broad discretion of States to control 
immigration’.22 It will be argued that, there is in existence, a tension between the right 
to liberty of migrants against the broadly unfettered rights of States to control the 
admission and expulsion of migrants conferred on States by national and international 
law.23 In this connection, the research will seek to unravel the legitimacy of detention 
and the extent of its unlawfulness, if at all, thereby querying the availability of the rights 
of migrants in the face of deportation and/or removal and any attendant obstacles 
militating against the exercise of these rights.24 This thesis contends that the legality of 																																																								
20 Nora V. Demleitner, ‘Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the 
"War" on Terrorism’ (2002) 51 EMORY Law Journal 1059, 1059; Daniel Kanstroom,  (2004) 29 North 
Carolina Journal of Int'l Law and Commercial Regulation 639, 640 
21 Juliet P. Stumpf, ‘Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law 
Review 1705, 1710 
22 Michael Flynn, ‘Who Must Be Detained? Proportionality As A Tool For Critiquing Immigration 
Detention Policy’ (2012) 31 Refugee Survey Quarterly 40, 40 
23 This right is entirely unfettered, see G Goodwin-Gil, ‘The Limits of the Power of Expulsion in Public 
International Law’ (1975) 47 British Yearbook of International Law 55, 156; cf the dictum of Lord 
Atkinson in AG for the Dominion of Canada v Cain [1906] AC 542 [546] on supreme State power; see 
generally Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandani v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471EHRR 471; Soering v UK (1989) 
11 EHRR 449; Vilvarajah v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 248; Amur v France (1996) 22 EHRR 533 
24 Reference to removal or deportable migrants is to undocumented migrants, irregular migrants, 
precarious migrants, stranded migrants or those with criminal convictions. 
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detention requires that the law, which authorizes detention, must accord with 
international human rights law standards and in view of that, presents the argument that 
a State wishing to detain migrants must do so in conformity to international human 
rights standards. This invites the need to examine the legality of detention both from the 
substantive and procedural limbs, as a law may be substantively sound but procedurally 
unfair, giving rise to the tension between substantive legality and procedural illegality 
or impropriety. The idea is to assess whether the UK’s detention practices pending 
deportation and/or removal are in compliance with its treaty obligations as one of the 
key questions set out to be answered in this thesis. In short, detention is a precursor to 
deportation and/or removal. 
 
This thesis prefers the expression ‘irregular migrant’ or ‘undocumented migrant’ as 
against ‘illegal immigrant’ given that State boundaries that delineate citizens and non-
citizens do not justify the ‘illegal immigrant’ stereotype.25  
 
In addition, the research will critically appraise the nature and legal basis for decisions 
bordering on deportation and removal and their effects on migrants with a view to 
unravelling whether such decisions are in conformity to the United Kingdom’s 
international treaty obligations and other applicable international legal instruments. As 
Macdonald and Toal opined, ‘of the numerous international human rights instruments, 
to which the UK is a party, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) had 
already become the most significant and the most frequently cited source of rights 
outside the common law […]’26. Therefore the various ways in which courts may have 
regard to international obligations are relevant for this study. This is accentuated on the 
understanding that Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union requires the Union to 
respect fundamental human rights as guaranteed by the ECHR which result from the 
constitutional conditions common to the Member states as general principles of the 
Union’s Law.27  
 
																																																								
25 Julian M Lehman, ‘Rights at the Frontier: Border Control and Human Rights Protection of Irregular 
International Migrants’ (2011) 3 Goettingen Journal of International Law 733, 739; Antje Ellerman, 
‘Undocumented Migrants and Resistance in the Liberal State (2010) 38 Politics & Society 408 
26 I Macdonald and R Toal, Macdonald’s Immigration Law & Practice (7th edn, LexisNexis 2008) 400 
27 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht [2002] OJ C 325/5 Article 6 
(2); Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C 306/01 Article 6 (3) 
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 In the light of the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations, the research will 
assess compliance by the UK to international legal instruments such as the International 
Bill of Human Rights notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
1948,28 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1976.29 
Further references will be made to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) 198430 and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 1965.31 
The emphasis will be on the safeguards provided by these instruments vis-à-vis the 
rights of migrants. With specificity to the interplay of the right of liberty and detention, 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) 1950,32 will be relevant while mention will be made of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 196933 as applicable. Of further relevance will 
be international soft laws such as the U.N. Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 1988,34 the U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 195535 and Guidelines on the Applicable 
Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to 
Detention 1999 and the 2012 Guidelines.36 It is re-emphasized that the above legal 
instruments do not guarantee a right to be free from detention, deportation and/or 
removal but provide and impose acceptable standards, procedural safeguards and limits 
in the exercise of sovereign power.  
 																																																								
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR)  
29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) 
30 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 
10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 (CAT) 
31 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD) 
32  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (ECHR) 
33 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 
OAS Treaty Series No 36 
34 UNGA, ‘Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment 1988 (76th plenary meeting 9 December 1988) UN Doc No A/RES/43/173 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r173.htm accessed 14 November 2012 
35 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the 
Economic and Social Council by its resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 
1977  (13 May 1977) UN Doc E/5988 
36 UNHCR ‘Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers’ (Geneva 1999) 
www.unhcr.hr accessed 26 August 2012. This Guideline has now been replaced by UNHCR ‘Guidelines 
on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to 
Detention’ (Geneva 2012) < http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/503489533b8.html > accessed 14 
November 2012 
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The research will discuss some of the legal rights that irregular long term resident 
migrants and other irregular migrants possess in the United Kingdom by virtue of being 
in the host State as against those possessed by citizens or legal residents as rights cannot 
simply be forfeited on account of irregularity.37 In general, the rights of migrants in a 
State includes but are not limited to security of person and fair hearing (effective 
remedy) and extends to legitimate expectation as an aspect of legal certainty, procedural 
and substantive due process rights as encapsulated under the ECHR.  
 
The effect of crimmigration (over-criminalization), an intersection between criminal 
and immigration law, which creates deportability via criminal convictions culminating 
in sheer increment of deportation targets and numbers, is further explored by the 
research.38  
 
The research will contribute to scholarship and knowledge in the area of migration as it 
concerns international human rights law given that wider matters within the boundaries 
of immigration and nationality laws do have effect on individual possession of rights to 
be in the United Kingdom, by way of lawful presence or as a matter of discretion.39 
Gaps do exist on the legality of deportation and removal as being practised by liberal 
democracies and this research aims to fill it. This research will contribute to debates on 
deportation, removal and detention and by so doing will espouse the vagaries of human 
rights issues incidental and ancillary to immigration decisions such as proportionality 
and margin of appreciation and their effect on international treaty obligations.  
 
With the heat generated by recent trends in immigration control across liberal 
democracies, this research will readily become a major reference material for everybody 
who works on immigration, providing a guide for academics and practitioners, the offer 
of invaluable insights into likely developments in this dynamic and expansive area of 
law.  																																																								
37 Joseph H Carens, 'The Rights of Irregular Migrants' (2008) 22 Ethics & International Affairs 163, 166 
38 Jennifer M Chacon, ‘Managing Migration Through Crime’ (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 
135, 136; Nora V. Demleitner, ‘Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in 
the "War" on Terrorism’ (2002) 51 EMORY Law Journal 1059, 1059; Daniel Kanstroom,  (2004) 29 
North Carolina Journal of Int'l Law and Commercial Regulation 639, 640; Juliet P. Stumpf, ‘Doing 
Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law Review 1705, 1710  
39 See generally Tom Hickman, ‘The Courts and Politics after the Human Rights Act: A Comment’ 
(Spring 2008) Public Law 1, 84; Alice Donald, Jane Gordon and Philip Leach, The UK and the European 
Court of Human Rights (Human Rights & Social Justice Research Institute 2012) 25, 44, 120; Eric Fripp, 
Rowena Moffatt and Ellis Wilford (eds) The Law and Practice of Expulsion and Exclusion from the 
United Kingdom (Hart Publishing 2015) viii 
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This research is limited to legality of deportation and removal of migrants in the United 
Kingdom and does not extend to the treatment of migrants in the country of destination, 
which will require a change of research methodology from qualitative to quantitative.40 
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
This research will apply the doctrinal research methodology in focusing on International 
Human Rights law with respect to deportation and/or removal. Doctrinal research is 
library-based and reliance will be placed on primary and secondary materials such as 
legislations, case laws, soft laws on the one hand, and textbooks, journals, articles, legal 
encyclopaedia, databases and many valuable websites on the other hand. The method of 
data collection would be the use of the above-mentioned primary sources and secondary 
sources of law.  
 
Hutchinson defines doctrinal research as ‘research which provides a systematic 
exposition of the rules governing a particular category, analyses the relationship 
between the rules, explains the areas of difficulty and, perhaps predicts future 
development’.41 Doctrinal research is concerned with the ‘formulation of legal doctrines 
through the analysis of legal rules usually found in statutes and cases within the 
common law jurisdiction which do not in themselves provide a complete statement of 
the law in any given situation but may be ascertained by applying the relevant legal 
rules to the particular facts of the situation under consideration’.42 It is qualitative rather 
than quantitative and qualitative legal research is non-numerical. By applying legal 
doctrines, in doctrinal research, ambiguities within rules are clarified which thus places 
them in a coherent structure and by so doing describe their relationship to other rules.43  
 
In essence, the doctrinal research method is colloquially described as ‘black-letter law’ 
due primarily to the study of legal texts which ultimately is concerned with the 
discovery and development of legal doctrines for publication in textbooks or journal 
articles and its research questions take the form of asking ‘what is the law?’ in particular 																																																								
40 Matt Henn, Mark Weinstein and Nick Foard, A Short Introduction to Social Research (Sage 2006) 1 
41 Terry C. Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (2nd edn, Thomson Lawbook Co 2006) 7 
42 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds) Advanced research 
methods in the built environment (Blackwell Publishing 2008) 29 
43 ibid 
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contexts,44 thus identifying applicable legal rules. For Kelsen, legal rules are normative 
in character given that they dictate how individuals ought to behave, making no attempt 
either to explain, predict, or even to understand human behaviour but only function to 
prescribe it.45 Epistemologically theorizing, Hart stressed that doctrinal research is not 
typically concerned ‘about law at all, rather it is concerned with ‘what is the law?’ 
thereby taking an internal, participant-orientated epistemological approach to its object 
of study’.46 The doctrinal research is simply research into the law and legal concepts 
lying at the basis of common law.47 
 
By applying this methodology, I will examine the relevance of international legal 
instruments to the protection of migrants’ rights mentioned above, in addition to 
legislation, case laws, journal articles and written commentaries. This is aimed at a 
proper analysis of the law and how it has been implemented; bearing in mind that it is 
possible to make a law but the implementation may go against the spirit and letter of it 
or against the intention of the lawmakers. By so doing, I will aim to provide an analysis 
of Immigration law to demonstrate how it has developed in terms of judicial reasoning 
and legislative enactment within the remit of International Human Rights Law.48 
Therefore, consideration of the existing practice in the deportation and removal regimes 
as currently practiced by the United Kingdom will be followed by consideration of 
issues emanating from the implementation of the law and if there are substantive or 
procedural defects with the implementation of the law, the research could reach a 
tentative conclusion or recommendations for a change in either the law itself or 
enforcement. 
  
It has been argued that the doctrinal research methodology has the limitation of only 
analysing factual materials and legal issues without sometimes the discussion of 
																																																								
44 ibid 
45 Kelsen, H, The Pure Theory of Law (M Knight tr, University of California Press 1967) 20; see also 
Kelsen H ‘The pure theory of law: Part II’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 517; Kelsen H, ‘The pure 
theory of law: its method and functional concepts’ (1934) 50 Law Quarterly Review 474 
46 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of the Law (Clarendon Press 1961) 1, 18, 27; see also W.T Murphy and S 
Roberts, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on Legal Issue on Legal Scholarship’ (1987) 50 (6) Modern 
Law Review 677, 678; Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (1996) 45 (1) The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52,56 
47 Duncan N.J and Hutchinson T, ‘Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal legal research’ (2012) 
17 (1) Deakin Law Review 83, 85 
48 Wing Hong Chu, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2010) 47 
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contributions of empirical research to legal issues.49 This can however be overcome by 
somewhat reliance on anecdotal evidence (involving personal experience of the affected 
people derived from some empirical research as documented by other studies) in order 
to critically evaluate the attendant legal issues relevant for our study.  
 
References in this thesis will equally be made to three other selected liberal democratic 
states-the United States of America, Australia and France whose deportation reality 
offers significant similarities with the UK in immigration control, detention pending 
deportation and/or removal. This is in order to put the analysis of deportation issues in 
the UK within the broader context of other liberal democracies by way of convergence, 
divergence, diffusion and dilemmas of practices in immigration control. The reason for 
the above selection is that the UK, USA, Australia and France are major receiving 
countries in terms of immigration. They are equally liberal democratic countries given 
their constitution and democratic practices. While USA and Australia are outside the 
European Union, the UK and France are within the European Union.  It has been argued 
that Europe over time has become the western target of immigrant flows. As a result, 
migration policies seem to have increased rapidly with the reaction that they have 
adopted deportation and detention as standard practices.50  
 
Furthermore, the issue of deportation and removal cuts across jurisdictional divides, 
which therefore turns on the analysis of the implementation of these laws in order to 
determine whether the behaviour of these States is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
The identification of common themes across these different legal systems given that 
deportation has international dimensions and/or a determination of whether a law 
reflects a consistent manner of dealing with issues, necessitated the selection of the 
United States, Australia and France.51  
 
1.6 Research Framework and Chapter Outline  
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Having discussed the general introduction in this 
chapter One, Chapter Two discusses the legal framework of the research in general and 																																																								
49  ibid  
50 Kees Groenendijk, Espeth Guild and Halil Dogan, Security of Residence of Long-term Migrants: A 
comparative study of law and practice in European Countries (Council of Europe 1998) 20-58 
51 Robert Cryer and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart Publishing, 
2011) 28 
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in doing so, explores the normative background for the recognition of individual rights 
given that the legality of deportation and/or removal of migrants cannot be fully 
addressed without a commensurate understanding of individuals’ rights and the 
corresponding obligations of IHRL incumbent on States. Therefore, the standards 
established by IHRL for the protection of the rights of individuals in the State’s 
territorial jurisdiction with specificity to detention, deportation and/or removal will be 
employed to measure the UK’s compliance with its obligations as represented by 
treaties, conventions, case law and soft law. The idea is to critically appraise the nature, 
character, rationality and legal basis for any decision affecting the rights of migrants 
thus unraveling whether such decisions are in conformity with the UK’s international 
treaty obligations and other applicable international legal instruments.  
 
With regards to liberal democracy, the chapter conceptualizes liberal democratic 
ideologies as producing liberal norms-a sine qua non in fostering integration and 
securing migrants’ rights whilst arguing that the rule of law is the lifeblood of any 
liberal democratic State. It discusses that liberal democracies emphasize the importance 
of the rule of law and sees itself as inseparable from international human rights with the 
aim of applying the rights effectively and properly matched with individual and 
collective responsibilities.52 In essence, the rights of migrants with respect to detention 
pending deportation cannot be secured if the rule of law is not respected given the 
vulnerable nature of such migrants in detention pending deportation.  
 
The chapter further discusses the liberal democratic paradox-the analysis of tension 
between respects for international human rights on the one hand and the protection of 
citizenship on the other hand which places the liberal state in a difficult position to 
make decisions between the respect of public opinion against the deportation of aliens 
and due process.53  On that plank, it will be argued that the relationship between 
sovereignty and external legal commitments for a liberal democracy should lie in a 
continuum amplified by the fact that liberal democracies are required to comply with 
their obligations in international law whether deriving from treaty or customary 
international law. See chapter two of this thesis for full details of this discussion in 
particular and the discussions on the legal framework of the research in general. 																																																								
52 Bertrand Ramcharan, The Fundamentals of International Human Rights Treaty Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
2011) 63 
53 Gibney and Hansen, (n1) 1 
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Chapter Three considers the interplay of immigration control and the exercise of 
sovereignty noting that the fundamental principle of State sovereignty is that States 
enjoy the discretion over the admission, residence and expulsion of non-nationals in its 
territorial jurisdiction but that such a discretion is not unfettered.54 This is given that 
States remain accountable to upholding certain principles and standards in the exercise 
of sovereignty- a reconciliation of sovereignty with universality of human rights law, a 
point further canvassed by the UN General Assembly.55  The UN General Assembly 
had reaffirmed that ‘the rights of States to enact and implement migratory policies and 
border security measures must be in tandem with their compliance to their obligations 
under international law, including international human rights law, in order to ensure full 
respect for the human rights of migrants’.56 The chapter therefore chronicles 
immigration control thematically with the purpose of laying the background for the 
discussion of why and how deportation and its corollary detention became a weapon of 
immigration control. This raises the argument that immigration control has a strong 
reliance on spectacle for the State to act powerfully in the defense of its borders,57 but 
little attention is paid to their international human rights obligations,58 hence the debate 
on the bifurcation and firewall argument.59 
 
Chapter Four engages the issue of detention as ancillary to the power of immigration 
control. The discussion revolves around the contours and detention powers, legality of 
detention in the light of the principles of necessity, due diligence, arbitrariness and 
proportionality within the remit of liberal democracy. It argues that detention is now 
used far more routinely than before, to discourage entry and for immediate practical 
purposes with the building of new detention centres, a development that has led to a 
tension between the right to liberty of migrants against the broadly (supposedly) 
unfettered rights of States to control the admission and expulsion of migrants conferred 
on States by national and international law. It discusses that the legality of detention 																																																								
54 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandani v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471 
55 Ryszard Cholewinski and Patrick Taran, ‘Migration, Governance and Human Rights, Contemporary 
Dilemmas in the era of Globalization’ (2010) 22 Refugee Survey Quarterly 1, 3 
56 UNGA Res 61/165 (19 December 2006) UN Doc A/Res/61/165 
57 Bridget Anderson, “Illegal Immigrant”: Victim or Villain? (2008) ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy 
and Society Working Paper 64/2008, 3  
<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working_papers/WP_2008/WP0864%20Bridg
et%20Anderson.pdf > accessed 17 January 2014 
58 Steve Peers, ‘Free Movement, Immigration Control and Constitutional Conflict’ (2009) 5 European 
Constitutional Law Review 173 
59 Joseph Carens, ‘The Rights of Irregular Migrants’ (2008) Ethnic and International Affairs 163, 166 
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requires that the law, which authorizes detention, must accord with international human 
rights law standards.  
 
It further argues that an assessment of legality of detention should encompass a broader 
test of substantive arbitrariness to include decisions which are unreasonable, unjust, 
delayed and unpredictable which hitherto turns on the issue of proportionality 
underpinning the ECHR in Art 8-11 ECHR with respect to the ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ test. The chapter in turn highlights the test for the legality of 
detention in congruence to substantive and procedural duties that gives rise to the 
tension between substantive legality and procedural illegality or impropriety.  
 
The debate on the necessity of detention is illuminated where the ECtHR attempted to 
separate notions of necessity from arbitrariness and proportionality, a development that 
tilts to deference to state sovereignty than legitimacy.60 The chapter therefore presents 
the argument that Strasbourg jurisprudence seems to have thrown proportionality to the 
winds by its decision in Saadi v UK despite the fact that proportionality is in essence a 
balancing exercise underpinning the ECHR in Art 8-11 ECHR with the ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ test.  
 
Chapter Five discusses the deportation and/or removal regime and the contrivance of 
deportability and/or removability. It situates the debate within the remit of grounds and 
rationale for deportation and removal, the trends and turns in contemporary deportation 
regimes. An inquiry was made as to whether contemporary deportation regime in the 
United Kingdom and by extension in liberal democratic states is the emergence of a 
new legal framework of State power. In doing so, the chapter discusses the role of the 
ECtHR on removal in order to ascertain their relevance in promoting or inhibiting 
removal of migrants in a liberal democracy given the necessary in a democratic society 
adjunct. The purpose is to test whether deportation and/or removal practices conform to 
the rule of law and minimum procedural safeguards as encapsulated by international 
human rights law. The putative question in the debate is whether the United Kingdom 
complies with its treaty obligations under International Human Rights law in the act of 
deportation and removal of migrants? 																																																								
60 See Saadi v UK (2008) 47 EHRR 17; Galina Cornelisse, ‘Human Rights for Immigration Detainees in 
Strasbourg: Limited Sovereignty or a Limited Discourse?’ (2004) 6 European Journal of Migration and 
Law 93, 110, see also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (CUP 2005) 
433; Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law (Sijthoff Leiden 1972) 148 
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In order to answer the question, analysis will be made of recent increase in deportation 
and the conditions in which migrants are deported or removed, submitting that the 
conditions of deportation are sometimes inhumane and degrading which have led 
directly to a number of deaths in recent years, yet the United Kingdom and other liberal 
states continue the practice of deportation and removal with more force than ever.61 The 
trend in deportation is exemplified by the construction of deportable subject using the 
springboard of securitization, criminalization and race,62 which according to the chapter, 
gives rise to the setting of deportation targets. This, in turn, raises crucial questions for 
the preference of deportation and/or removal by States well and above their compliance 
with substantive and procedural safeguards as required by international human rights 
law. The chapter discusses that laws on deportation and/or removal must be fair, 
precise, sufficiently clear and proportionate to aims pursued, which as argued, remains a 
mirage. 
 
On the contrivance of deportability and/or removability limb, the chapter queries 
whether legislation associated with deportation are constantly enacted, revised and re-
enacted, in an unrestrained manner to achieve deportation in contrast to the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation encapsulated under the principle of legal certainty. The chapter 
discusses legitimate expectation as an aspect of legal certainty where an individual is 
said to hold a public authority accountable to its words and actions and the extent where 
the public authority cannot be allowed to change its mind having led the individual to 
believe that a certain decision would be made.63 It contends that State contrivance of 
deportability or removability is anchored on clear violation of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation through the instrumentality of laws (legislative architecture) or mass 
volumes of case laws (judicial activism) regarding immigration matters, which gives 
rise to deportation, and/or removal of migrants from the State. The debate is that the 
more the ‘laws’ are enacted, the easier it becomes to achieve deportation and 
or/removal, the more complex the laws, the easier it becomes to attract violation. 
																																																								
61  Liz Fekete, ‘Analysis: Deaths during Forced Deportation’ (2003) Institute of Race Relations 
<http://www.irr.org.uk/news/analysis-deaths-during-forced-deportation/ > accessed 30 June 2013 
62 Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti, (n3) 552 
63 A W Bradley and K D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (14th edn, Pearson 2007) 753 
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Therefore ‘migrant irregularity is produced and sustained as an effect of the law within 
the realm of discursive formation and lived through a palpable sense of deportability’.64 
 
To heighten the velocity of deportation, the chapter further discusses the criminalization 
of immigration (hereinafter ‘crimmigration’) its effects and implication for the migrant 
in a deportation regime. It posits that a primrose path to the contrivance of deportability 
is crimmigration.65  
 
In addition, the chapter analyses the growing nature of deportation and/or removal in 
liberal States and constructs that liberal states by way of convergent and divergent 
practices as exemplified by either legal transplant or policy transfer accomplish 
deportation enforcement goals. The conclusion is that States through the display of 
keenness in meeting deportation targets and quotas indulge in the enactment of laws, 
albeit arbitrarily, in disregard to its international human rights obligations. The 
unfettered discretion to control immigration fettered by its obligations under 
international human rights law queries the source and rationality of the emergence of 
this new legal framework of State power. 
 
Chapter Six presents the conclusions and findings of the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
64 Nicholas P. De Genova, ‘Migrant “Illegality” and Deportability in Everyday Life’ (2002) 31 Annual 
Review of Anthropology 419, 439 
65 Jennifer M Chacon, ‘Managing Migration Through Crime’ (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 
135, 136 
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Chapter 2. Research Background and Legal Framework of the Research  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The notion that every State by reason of its territorial supremacy is competent to 
exclude non-nationals partly or wholly from its territory is supported by international 
law.66 Therefore the fundamental principle of State sovereignty is that States enjoy the 
discretion over the admission, residence and expulsion of non-nationals from the State-
exercising jurisdiction.67 Although States’ prerogative authority in this regard exists, it 
is rather subject to a cluster of international law and treaty obligations.68 While it is 
conceded that States can maintain sovereignty over its internal affairs, they are 
nonetheless accountable to upholding acceptable principles and standards under 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) in the exercise of sovereignty thus inviting a 
reconciliation of sovereignty with universality of human rights law.69  
 
The recognition of human rights to all persons and not only to citizens of a State has 
been expressed in the United Nations Charter, which in its Art 55 provides for a duty to 
promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion’.70 Art 1 
ECHR on its part requires State parties to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms as defined in the Convention’.71 In essence, States are required 
to ‘respect and ensure rights to all individuals’.72  
 
The obligations of States under IHRL do also apply extraterritorially. This statement 
finds steam in the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) assertion that the enjoyment of 
the Covenant’s rights to all individuals regardless of their nationality ‘applies to those 
within the power or effective control of the forces of a State party acting outside its 																																																								
66 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn, Longman 1992) 
849; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public international Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 105-113; Abdulaziz, 
Cabales and Balkandani v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471 para 67, Vilvarajah v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 248 para 
102 
67 ECHR (n4) Art 1, see also D v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 423, para 48, 
68 Ian Bryan and Peter Langford, ‘The Lawful Detention of Unauthorised Aliens under the European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights’ (2011) 80 Nordic Journal of International Law 193, 194 
69 Ryszard Cholewinski and Patrick Taran, ‘Migration, Governance and Human Rights, Contemporary 
Dilemmas in the era of Globalization’ (2010) 22 Refugee Survey Quarterly 1, 3 
70  United Nations ‘Charter of the United Nations’ (adopted 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI Article 55 (c)   
71 ECHR (n4) Art 1  
72 ICCPR (n29) Art 2 
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territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was 
obtained’.73 The HRC had held severally that the ICCPR has extraterritorial effect.74 In 
Loizidou v Turkey the ECtHR stated ‘although Article 1 (art. 1) sets limits on the reach 
of the Convention, the concept of "jurisdiction" under this provision is not restricted to 
the national territory of the High Contracting Parties’.75 In essence, under the 
extraterritorial effect of the ECHR as it has been suggested, whenever a State exercises 
its authority abroad, it leads to accountability of its officials.76 Scholarly debates abound 
on the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘territory’ and the extent to which States Parties 
owe their human rights obligations abroad. These will be discussed further at section 
2.3 of this chapter. 
 
The thesis in itself investigates the legality of deportation and removal of migrants in 
the UK within the context of liberal democracy, which invites the question as to 
whether the UK complies with its substantive and procedural obligations in the 
deportation and removal of migrants. Ancillary to the above is the question of whether 
the UK complies with its treaty obligations under International Human Rights Law 
(IHRL) in the detention of migrants for the purpose of deportation and removal.  
 
In this connection, this chapter will show that the legality of deportation and removal of 
migrants cannot be fully addressed without a commensurate understanding of 
individuals’ rights and the corresponding obligations of IHRL incumbent on States. 
Therefore, the standards established by IHRL for the protection of the rights of 
individuals in the State’s territorial jurisdiction with specificity to detention, deportation 
and/or removal will be employed to measure the UK’s compliance with its obligations 
as represented by treaties, conventions, case law and soft law. The idea is to critically 
appraise the nature, character, rationality and legal basis for any decision affecting the 
rights of migrants thus unraveling whether such decisions are in conformity with the 																																																								
73 HRC ‘ CCPR General comment no. 31: The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant’ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004) para 10 
74 See the Committee’s conclusion regarding Israel’s responsibility for human rights abuses in the 
Occupied territories in HRC, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel’ 
CCPR/CO/78/ISR (21 August 2003) para 11, See also the Committee’s decision regarding the USA’s 
detention camp in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba in HRC, ‘Concluding Observations: US’ 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (15 September 2006) para 10, cf CAT, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted By State 
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Comments by the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against 
Torture’ CAT/C/GBR/CO/4/Add.1 (8 June 2006) para 13  
75 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 90 para 62 
76 ibid 
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UK’s international treaty obligations and other applicable international legal 
instruments.  
 
In the main, the recognition of rights accorded to individuals under international human 
rights law (IHRL) appears to have emerged from four different law-building stages77 
namely: the international concerns expressed about human rights in the U.N Charter78; 
the recognition of those rights in the UDHR79 and the expansion of those rights in the 
ICCPR80; and the ICESCR.81 Other applicable human rights instruments include but are 
not limited to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT)82 and the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).83   
 
The normative background provided by the UDHR for the recognition of these rights 
will be discussed at section 2.2 of this chapter. For the purpose of this thesis, general 
discussions will be made of the normativity of Art 3,84 Art 5,85 Article 8,86 Article 9, 87 
in addition to Art 12 of the UDHR. 88  As will be shown subsequently, the purpose is to 
examine the contribution of the UDHR to the protection of IHRL as a blue print for the 
recognition by States that individuals have rights because they are human beings. This 
will include the exploration of how the UDHR has opened the way in the recognition of 
its rights in the legally binding treaties such as the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
 
In the light of the above, this chapter will explore the interpretation and scope of 
application of the right to liberty as enshrined in Art 5 ECHR and in Art 9 & 10 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).89  																																																								
77 Louis B. Sohn, ‘The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than 
States’ (1982-1983) 32 American University Law Review 1, 12 
78 United Nations ‘Charter of the United Nations’ (n70) 
79 UDHR (n28) Art 3 & Art 9 
80 ICCPR (n29) 
81 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR)  
82 CAT (n30) 
83 ICERD (n31) 
84 UDHR (n28) Article 3 UDHR states: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’  
85 Article 5 UDHR provides: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’. 
86 Article 8 UDHR: ‘Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law’. 
87 Article 9 UDHR: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’. 
88 Article UDHR 12 provides: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family 
home or correspondence […]’ 
89Article 9 (1) ICCPR provides ‘everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
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Furthermore, the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
as enshrined in Art 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)90 will be examined alongside the interpretation and 
scope of the principle of non-refoulement in Art 3 CAT-the prohibition of expulsion of 
persons to another State where they would be in danger of being subjected to torture.91 
Art 7 ICCPR92 on its part makes provision relating to the prohibition of torture or to 
cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. All of these provisions are 
relevant for this study.  
 
Other international soft laws such as the U.N. Body of Principles for the Protection of 
All Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 198893, the U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 195594 and Guidelines on the Applicable 
Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to 
Detention 1999 and 2012 are of key importance.95     
 
Against this background, this chapter will assess whether the UK’s detention practices 
are in compliance with its treaty obligations as one of the key questions set out to be 
answered in this thesis. In advancing the argument that detention may be provided by 
law but arbitrary if it is not in compliance with acceptable international standards, the 
above instruments will be of relevance in providing answers to the question of legality 
of detention pending deportation. This is with the objective of assessing whether 
detention as practiced by the UK meets the requirement of the principles of legality, 
necessity and proportionality.  																																																																																																																																																																		
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention’ Article 10 (1) provides ‘All persons deprived of their liberty 
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’. 
90 ECHR Art 3 provides: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. 
91 Art 3 (1) CAT states ‘No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture’, see also Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (OUP 2007) 9 
92 Art 7 ICCPR provides ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment […] 
93  UNGA, ‘Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment 1988 (n34) Principle 1: ‘All persons under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be 
treated in a humane manner and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’. Principle 2: 
‘Arrest, detention or imprisonment shall only be carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions of 
the law and by competent officials or persons authorized for that purpose’. Principle 8: ‘Persons in 
detention shall be subject to treatment appropriate to their unconvicted status. Accordingly, they shall, 
whenever possible, be kept separate from imprisoned persons’. 
94 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (n35) 
95 Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers (36) 
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In addition, by applying standards laid down under Article 8 of the ECHR (right to 
private and family life) the thesis will argue that mere irregularity of the migrant does 
not necessarily warrant deportation as other factors such as the length of residence, 
proportionality, insurmountable obstacles should be considered in the balancing 
exercise required in the assessment of Article 8 ECHR. 
 
Consideration will be had to domestic legislation regarding detention and deportation. 
The idea is to examine how immigration laws in the UK bring their provisions to bear 
on the detention and deportation of migrants. The provisions that lay down entry and 
stay of non-nationals in addition to penalties for irregular entry will be examined.96The 
criminalization of immigration offences as grounds for deportation will be extensively 
discussed in the light of State practice given that the power to deport a non-national 
convicted of a criminal offence is adjudged to be conducive on grounds of public good. 
The UK Borders Act 2007 (2007 Act) s 32 makes provisions for the commission of 
criminal offences that may lay grounds for deportation (automatic deportation).97  
 
With specificity to detention, attention will be paid to the norms and legislations 
forming part of State practice governing the detention of migrants with a view to 
examining their application in the context of fairness and arbitrariness. This 
examination is supported by the position that prior to the coming into force of the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 the detention of migrants was not subject to 
supervision by the courts as there was no presumption of a right to bail in comparison to 
someone charged with criminal offence who has right to bail.98 Furthermore, while the 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (2006 Act) increased the immigration 
officers’ powers of arrest; the UK Borders Act 2007 (2007 Act) gave them increased 
powers of detention.99 The concern therefore is how to ensure that the UK’s State 
practice and legislation regarding detention conforms to acceptable international 
standards.  
 
Furthermore, the consideration of the legality of detention pending deportation and or 
removal of migrants in the UK in the context of liberal democracy demands a 																																																								
96 See Immigration Act 1971, s 24 on immigration offences. 
97 See also Immigration Act 1971 s 3 (5) regarding deportation on conducive grounds of public good. 
98  Gina Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law (4thedn, OUP 2010) 16 
99 See UK Borders 2007, Act s 2 and s 36  
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discussion on liberal democratic ideologies. The idea is to restrict the exploration of 
such matters within the confines of liberal democratic ideologies. To achieve this, this 
chapter discusses liberalism in order to identify the defining elements of a liberal 
democracy. The definition of these elements will lead into the categorization of the UK 
as a liberal democratic state. It will then assess the UK’s deportation practices within 
the meaning of liberal democracy. This will involve a discussion of the rule of law as an 
indispensable part of a liberal democracy in the light of its normative value on the 
international plane and specifically for liberal democracies. The analysis will equally be 
relevant in answering the question as to whether the UK in an unconstrained manner 
creates migrant irregularity through State practice regarding deportation.  
 
The Chapter will also argue that in a liberal democracy, tension exists in establishing 
boundaries between individual and collective rights. This is with respect to international 
human rights (relating to detention, deportation and/or removal of migrants for our 
purposes) on the one hand and the protection of the rights of others on the other hand. 
The tension therefore is between the right of individuals and the protection of the rights 
of others such as the protection of society as a whole. This, as I will argue, places the 
liberal state in a difficult position when making decisions affecting the rights of non- 
nationals, which may be deemed incompatible with acceptable standards under the 
IHRL in the context of the exercise of sovereignty resulting from immigration control. 
Gibney and Hansen have argued that the restrictiveness of the liberal State’s policy 
towards non-nationals attempting to secure their immigration status in the State ‘can be 
seen as flowing from the liberalism (intentional or otherwise) of its policy towards 
foreigners inside the state. Inclusion and exclusion are two sides of the same liberal 
coin’ (emphasis added).100  
 
2.2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a Blueprint for the 
Development of Human Rights 
 
The UDHR is unarguably the foundation of much of the post-1945 codification of 
human rights and the ‘international legal system is replete with global and regional 
																																																								
100 Gibney and Hansen, 'Deportation and the liberal state’ (n1) 
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treaties, based in large measure on the Declaration’.101 The preamble of the UDHR 
explains that it was adopted as a ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and 
all nations’ exerting moral, political and legal influences.102 The UDHR was not viewed 
as imposing legal obligations on States at the time of its adoption by the General 
Assembly in 1948 but it ‘remains a primary source of global human rights standards, 
and its recognition as a source of rights and law by states throughout the world 
distinguishes it from conventional obligations’.103 As McDougal and Bebr stated 
‘despite the UDHR’s lack of status as enforceable treaty obligation or even as an 
authoritative interpretation of such obligation and despite the imprecision of some of its 
language, the UDHR, due to its authoritative community origin and eloquent 
formulation of growing common demands of peoples throughout the world, exercised 
an important influence on subsequent decision making and prescribing in many world 
arenas’.104  
 
The 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights described the UDHR (including the 
UN Charter) as ‘the source of inspiration and the basis for the United Nations in making 
advances in standard setting as contained in the existing international human rights 
instruments’.105 Eleanor Roosevelt, the Chair of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
during the drafting of the Declaration emphasized that ‘the Declaration is not a treaty, or 
an international agreement rather a declaration of principles of human rights and 
freedoms which will serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all 
nations’.106Against this background, ‘rights historically seem to emerge in contexts of 
extreme and widespread violations where radical forms of human dignity have created 
human rights as a discursive pattern’107 as some big States such as the US, USSR and 
the UK in the opinion of Buergenthal, ‘all had serious human rights problems of their 																																																								
101 Hurst Hannum, ‘The UDHR in National and International Law’ (1998) 3 (2) Health and Human 
Rights 144, 145; Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The Mid-Life Crisis of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’ (1998) 55 WASH & LEE L. REV 781 
102 See the Preamble of the UDHR   
103 Hannum, ‘The UDHR in National and International Law’ (n101) 146 
104 Myres S McDougal and Gerhard Bebr, ‘Human Rights in the United Nations’ (1964) 58 The American 
Journal of International Law 603, 614 citing Schwelb, ‘The Influence of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights on International and National Law’ (1959) Am. Soc. Int'l L 217 
105 UNGA, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights’ (25 
June 1993) UN Doc No A/CONF.157/23  
106 Hannum (n101) citing M. M Whiteman, Digest of International Law (Dept of State Publication 1965) 
243, see also Mary Glen Johnson, ‘The Contribution of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the 
Development of International Protection of Human Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 19, 20 
107 Jochen von Bernstorff, ‘The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law’ (2008) 19 The European 
Journal of International Law 903, 907 
24		
own at the time and were therefore not prepared to agree to strong commitments in the 
area of human rights’.108 This is contrary to the position of smaller States that favored 
the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Charter even though they lacked the political 
influence to prevail which to him explains why the human rights provisions of the 
Charter, as adopted in San Francisco, were purposefully drafted to be weak and 
vague’.109   
 
But evidence suggests that the UDHR was intended differently. The travaux 
preparatoires revealed that the moral outrage about human rights violations of World 
War II and the Holocaust specifically was a recurring decimal on the drafters’ mind 
forming the real catalyst for the UDHR.110 An examination of the travaux preparatoires 
will assist in the understanding of the scope and application of Art 8 & Art 9 UDHR. 
Art 8 of the UDHR111 deals with effective remedy while Art 9112 deals with detention. 
During the discussions on detention, it was emphasized that ‘every one detained should 
have the right to immediate judicial determination of the legality of his detention stating 
that the State has a duty to provide adequate procedures to make this effective’.113 The 
discussions of Art 8 UDHR114 dealing with the right to effective remedy focused on two 
issues namely whether the judiciary should be authorized to review decisions of the 
executives and whether the article had any international implications.115 In essence, the 
UDHR was a negotiated text constructed with great deliberation even with Small states 
remaining very vocal and emphasizing universality during the proceedings of the 
General Assembly’s Third Committee.116 Therefore universality of human rights as 
canvassed at the time became part of the Declaration as captured under Art 2 UDHR.117  																																																								
108 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human Rights’ 
(1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 703, 706 
109 ibid 
110  Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origin, Drafting, and Intent 
(Philadelphia 1999) 12 cited in Antoon De Baets, ‘The Impact of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights on the Study of History (2009) 48 History and Theory 20, 21 
111 See Art 8 UDHR (n28) 
112  ibid Art 9 UDHR  
113 Panama asserted this which emanated from the American Law Institute, see David Weissbrodt and 
Mattias Hallendorff, ‘Travaux Preparatoires of the Fair Trial Provisions-Articles 8 to 11 - of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 1061, 1084 
114 Art 8 UDHR (n28) 
115  Nehemiah Robinson, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its Origin, Significance, 
Application and Interpretation (World Jewish Council 1958) 114 see also Weissbrodt and Hallendorff 
(n117) 1090-1093  
116 Susan Eileen Waltz, ‘Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 44, 55 
117 Art 2 UDHR states: ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind […]’, see Susan Waltz, ‘Reclaiming and rebuilding the history of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2002) 23 Third World Quarterly 437,444 
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2.2.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a Reflection of International 
Customary Law 
 
At the time of its adoption, the UDHR was merely an international agreement on 
common standards with primarily moral authority, but with time, the UDHR acquired 
for itself significant legal status.118 As Henkin remarked, ‘some see it as having given 
content to the pledges in the Charter, partaking thereof of the binding character of the 
Charter as an international treaty. Others see both the Charter and the Declaration as 
contributing to the development of a customary law of human rights binding on all 
States’.119 Brownlie adds that some of its provisions either constitute general principles 
of law or a representation of elementary consideration of humanity.120 He further 
observed that the adoption of the UDHR by the General Assembly was in order to 
clarify the content of the Charter of the United Nations.121  In the view of Cassidy, the 
UDHR has ‘provided evidence of, and has helped to crystallize emerging principles of 
customary international law recognizing individual human rights in international 
law’.122 The UDHR in the opinion of Sohn is an authoritative recognition of human 
rights, which has become a basic component of international customary law, binding on 
all states (due to its customary nature) regardless of their membership of the United 
Nations (emphasis added).123  
 
Arguably, the nature and character of the UDHR can be said to reflect international 
customary law. Some scholars agree that some violations of the UDHR are simply 
violations of international law. In this regard, Ramcharan has argued that some parts of 
the UDHR represent international customary law.124 He asserts that the UDHR provides 
the United Nations General Assembly's interpretation of human rights and that some 
parts of the UDHR and the International Convention represent international customary 
law and, to that extent, remains binding upon all States.125 Furthermore, the constant 																																																								
118 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press 1990) 19 
119 ibid 
120 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 559 
121 ibid 
122 Julie Cassidy, ‘Emergence of the Individual as an International Juristic Entity: Enforcement of 
International Human Rights’ (2004) 9 (2) Deakin Law Review 534, 555 
123 Louis B Sohn, ‘The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than 
States’ (1982-1983) 32 American University Law Review 1, 17 
124 B G Ramcharan, ‘The Legal Status of International Bill of Human Rights’ (1986) 55 Nordic Journal 
of International Law 366, 380 
125 ibid 
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and widespread recognition of the UDHR in the opinion of Robertson and Merrils 
means that many of its principles can now be termed as part of international customary 
law.126  
 
Humphrey in support argues that abundant references in later UN documents and State 
practice meant that the UDHR has gradually acquired the status of international 
customary law.127  These discussions bring together congruent of ideas affirming that 
the UDHR has succeeded in laying down acceptable standards of IHRL, and with the 
subsequent creation of the ICCPR and the ICESCR as offshoots of the UDHR, precise 
obligations with binding effects on States who are parties to the treaties such as the 
United Kingdom were created.128 The ICCPR appears to be more specific in the 
delineation of rights and even stronger in its statement of the obligation to respect the 
specified rights. This, as can be found at Art 2 (1) ICCPR makes a firm stipulation 
requesting State parties to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant.129 The 
ICESCR’s obligations as Brownlie observes, is “programmatic and promotional” except 
in the case of provisions relating to trade where Parties are required to undertake steps 
to the achievement by progressive realisation, the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant.130  
 
In short, as much as it cannot be said that the UDHR is in itself customary international 
law but some of its provisions such as prohibition of torture might have acquired the 
status of customary international law. As Glendon observed, ‘though the Declaration as 
such is not binding, most of its rights had already received a significant degree of 
recognition by 1948 in the constitutions of many nations if not in their practices’.131 
 
																																																								
126 AH Robertson and J G Merrils, Human Rights in the World (3rd edn, Manchester University Press 
1989) 27 
127 John Humphrey, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Judicial 
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130 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (n120) 566; and ICESR Art 8 (1)  
131 Mary Glendon, ‘The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2004) 2 
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2.3 The Territorial Reach and Application of International Human Rights Law 
 
The obligations of States under IHRL as has been contended, do apply extraterritorially 
and the determination of whether such obligations apply to a particular area usually 
require questions of subject matter of the obligations and the State’s connections in 
meeting the responsibility norms.132 As Wilde stated, ‘determining whether State 
obligations apply to a particular area of activity usually involve asking whether the 
activity in question falls within the scope ratione materiae (subject matter) of the 
obligations in question, and whether the connection between the State and activity 
meets the requirements of the relevant responsibility norms’.133 When the activity in 
question takes place outside the State’s territory, this requires a further question as to 
whether the obligations apply to the State at all given the extraterritorial nature of the 
location.134 Given that a State has jurisdiction over its own territory, the underlying 
issue is to unravel the limits of the territorial scope of a State’s jurisdiction for the 
purposes of IHRL. Therefore the nexus to the State in the form of jurisdiction must be 
established before the State’s act or omission can give rise to responsibility.135  
 
Furthermore, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Soering v UK136 confirms that acts 
done by public authorities in the United Kingdom may have consequences if such acts 
are attributed to the United Kingdom even if they take place by the action of another 
State in a territory not under the jurisdiction of the UK.  In a case concerning the alleged 
violations of human rights committed by the UK in Iraq during the invasion by Allied 
forces in 2003, the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) in Al-Skeini and Others v 
Secretary of State for Defence137 held that the victim Mousa, killed in detention at a 
British military base in Southern Iraq came under the jurisdiction of the UK in the light 
of Art 1 ECHR. The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber similarly found that the UK exercised 
jurisdiction under Art 1 ECHR regarding all the applicants including those killed 
																																																								
132 See the introductory part of this chapter at section 2.1 
133 Ralph Wilde, ‘Triggering State Obligation Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human 
Rights Treaties (2007) 40 (2) ISR L Rev 503 
134 ibid 
135 Ralph Wilde, ‘Legal “Black Hole”? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil 
and Political Rights’ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 740, 798 
136 (1989) 11 EHRR 439 paras 83-87,111; see also Sarah Joseph, ‘Scope of Application’ in Daniel 
Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds) International Human Rights Law (OUP 2010) 
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outside the prisons, which were attributed to the UK.138 Therefore the ECtHR confirmed 
that jurisdiction could exist by virtue of Art 1 ECHR outside the territory of a member 
State.139  
 
It therefore follows that where the detention and/or detention pending deportation of a 
non-national will trigger the breach of his/her rights even outside the UK, provided such 
consequences are attributed to the UK, it then follows that the UK will be in breach of 
its obligations under IHRL. In short, an examination of IHRL ratione personae 
(personal reach of the State’s jurisdiction) and that of ratione loci (territorial reach-
extraterritorial effect) will be made as tensions generated in the literature by the terms 
‘jurisdiction’ and ‘territory’ demand examination.  
 
The ICCPR requires States to respect and ensure the Covenant’s rights ‘to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’.140 The HRC has 
interpreted this to mean that the Covenant’s obligations apply to all individuals 
regardless of their nationality in the discussion of the extraterritorial scope of the 
meaning of jurisdiction under its Art 2. In its General Comment 31, the HRC remarked 
that ‘the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but 
must be made available to all individuals regardless of nationality and statelessness, 
such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find 
themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party. This principle 
also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party 
acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or 
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a 
State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement 
operation’.141  
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In the Lopez Burgos142 and Celiberti143 communications, the HRC stated that ‘the 
“jurisdiction” test for the applicability of ICCPR Art 2 does not imply that the State 
cannot be held accountable for violation of rights under the Covenant which its agent 
commit on the territory of another State whether with the acquiescence of the 
Government of that State or in opposition to it’. The HRC justified this position by 
relying on its Art 5 (1) ICCPR, which restrain States from the destruction of the 
Covenant’s rights.144 The HRC therefore concluded in line with the above that, it would 
be unconscionable to interpret the responsibility under its Art 2 permitting a State to 
perpetrate violations it could not perpetrate on its territory.145  
 
As Wilde observed, the non-nationality basis of conceiving human rights is relevant in 
the consideration of whether IHRL should apply extraterritorially.146 He argued that 
‘given that the majority of such individuals affected by extraterritorial State actions are 
aliens, to conceive “jurisdiction” only territorially when a State has taken extraterritorial 
action would in consequence produce a distinction in protection between nationals and 
aliens’.147 For him, such will inadvertently produce unequal treatment between nationals 
and non-nationals which will be of arbitrary nature running contrary to the general 
concept of human rights based on humanity rather than nationality.148 King argues that 
‘where a State has lawful competence to act in relation to a person under international 
law principles, that person is within its ‘jurisdiction’ for human rights purposes and the 
State has a commensurate obligation to respect and ensure his or her rights’.149 This 
means that States also bring persons who are affected by their unlawful acts abroad 
within their jurisdiction for human rights purposes.150 In the case of Hirsi Jamma and 
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Others v Italy151 the extraterritoriality was engaged. In that case, some two hundred and 
fifty Somali and Eritrean migrants were travelling from Libya to reach the Italian coast. 
They were intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and sent back to Tripoli, Libya 
without the examination of their case, which as it was argued, exposed them to a risk of 
ill treatment, and amounted to a collective expulsion. Even though, the applicants 
objected to been handed over to Libyan authorities, they were forced to leave the Italian 
ship that took them from Italy to Libya. (Two of the applicants died in unknown 
circumstances while fourteen were granted refugee status by the Office of the UNHCR 
in Tripoli by October 2009). The ECtHR found that the applicants were within the 
jurisdiction of Italy for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. The court in 
addition found that there had been two violations of Article 3 of the Convention because 
the applicants had been exposed to the risk of ill treatment in Libya and of repatriation 
to Somalia or Eritrea as well as violation of violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 
(prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens). The Court further held that there had 
been a violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 and with Article 4 of 
Protocol No.4. In view of that, the Court awarded each applicant fifteen thousand euros 
in respect of non-pecuniary damage as well as one thousand, five hundred and seventy-
five euros and seventy-four cents in total in respect of costs and expenses. 
 
Therefore, a trigger for the application of extraterritorial concept of jurisdiction in IHRL 
is largely based on spatial concept of territorial control.152 This is reflective of the 
principle of State responsibility in international law generally as expressed by the ICJ in 
the Namibia opinion153 when South Africa was unlawfully occupying Namibia. The 
court emphasized that ‘South Africa would be accountable for any violations of the 
rights of the people of Namibia’. In essence, the ICCPR was intended to have 
extraterritorial effect. Zilli recounted that ‘the drafters of the ICCPR and their 
representatives who adopted it, understood from the beginning that the language of Art 
2 (1) would have the effect of limiting the ICCPR to a State’s party’s territory and 
seriously considered editing the language to allow the Covenant to apply 
extraterritorially’.154 As McGoldrick recalled, those who objected to the proposed Art 2 																																																								151	Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (23 February 2012) 
152 Wilde, ‘Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially’ (n133) 504 
153 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) (Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276)  (Advisory Opinion) 1971 ICJ Rep 16 (June 
21) para 118 
154 Aldo S Zilli, ‘Approaching the Extraterritoriality Debate: The Human Rights Committee, the U.S. and 
the ICCPR’ (2011) 9 (2) Santa Clara Journal of Law 399, 412 
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(1) regarding extraterritoriality queried whether limiting the ICCPR to the territorial 
boundaries of a State would be in conflict with other provisions of the Covenant such as 
freedom of an individual to return to his or her home country.155 Even though the phrase 
“within its territory” was retained, the Covenant as has been argued was primarily 
meant to apply extraterritorially.156  
 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) in its Art 2 contains provisions regarding ‘jurisdiction’ and 
‘territory’.157 Additionally, Art 3 (1) CAT regarding refoulement expresses the fact of 
extraterritoriality of consequences attributed to the State.158  
 
2.4 The Right to Liberty and Security, Prohibition of Torture, Right to Private and 
Family Life in the Deportation and Removal Context 
 
As discussed above, IHRL applies to all individuals regardless of their nationality and 
the extraterritorial effect of IHRL imposes obligations on States for breaches of the law 
that are attributable to them. The Human Rights Committee further stated that the 
general rule is ‘that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without 
discrimination between citizens and aliens [non-nationals] […]’.159 The ECHR on the 
other hand has been described ‘as a comprehensive bill of rights on the Western liberal 
model born of the Council of Europe where contracting parties have undertaken to 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 
of the Convention’.160 
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For the purposes of this thesis, the rights of non-nationals (migrants) will be examined. 
The aim is to present these rights as entrenched by the applicable international 
instruments and in subsequent discussions, to unravel whether the UK complies with its 
substantive and procedural obligations in the respect of these rights especially as it 
concerns detention pending deportation and/or removal. The discussions will be 
restricted to the migrant’s right to liberty and security; the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman treatment; the right to private and family life that imposes a procedural duty 
upon signatory States to provide ‘effective remedy’ within their domestic procedures 
against violations of such rights and freedoms as entrenched in the applicable 
international instruments under evaluation.  
 
2.4.1 The Right to Liberty and Security 
 
From time immemorial, the right to liberty and security occupies an important niche in 
the history of human rights, which underlines efforts made by common law to establish 
basic and effective safeguards against detention. The pillars of these safeguards are 
entrenched in the Magna Carta 1215 which provides that ‘No free man shall be taken or 
imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or 
send against him, except by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land’.161 
The Petition of Right 1628, seen as the second pillar of normative procedural device 
safeguard was designed to prevent the abuse of detention powers.162 It has indeed been 
posited that freedom from arbitrary detention could be termed the oldest of human 
rights.163 
 
The normative standard of the right to liberty and security as provided in UDHR Art 3 
& 9 164 has been codified in Art 9 & 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 165 and Art 5 ECHR. In the main, Art 5 ECHR will be considered 
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in addition to international legal instruments mentioned above.166 The Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment on the issue of right to liberty and security specifically 
includes immigration control.167 
 
The protection of the right to liberty is important to the ECHR and Strasbourg 
jurisprudence has emphasized ‘the protection of the individual against arbitrary 
interferences by the State with his right to liberty’.168 The ‘judicial control of 
interferences by the executive with the individual’s right to liberty is an essential feature 
of the guarantee embodied in Art 5 ECHR which as the ECtHR stated is one of the 
fundamental principles of a democratic society that a State must observe the rule of law 
while interfering with the right to liberty’.169 Art 5 ECHR lists six reasons allowed by 
the ECHR that allow for the deprivation of individual liberty.170 Amongst these six, 
only one, Art 5 (1) (f), which is related to immigration, will be fully examined. The 
discussion will focus on the contours of detention, legality of detention in the light of 
the principles of necessity, due diligence, arbitrariness, proportionality, detention 
conditions and equality of arms within the remit of liberal democracy. These will be 
discussed in full at Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
 
In any event, the supervening question is whether detention is in accordance with the 
law and permissible under Art 5 (1) (f) and what factors are engaged in deciding the 
legality of detention. Detention under Art 5 (1) (f) is permissible in two situations (two 
limbs): one is to prevent the migrant from ‘effecting an unauthorized entry into the 
country’ and the other is ‘where action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition’ of a non-national (migrant) who has entered the country. That being said, 
Art 5 ECHR aims to ensure that no one is deprived of his liberty in an arbitrary manner, 
which emphasizes the security of the person.171  
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Arbitrary Detention 
 
It might be argued that what is in accordance with the law cannot be arbitrary.172 
According to Goodwin-Gill, an infringement of personal liberty such as detention may 
be arbitrary not only in accordance with procedures established by law but extends to 
the provisions of the law contrary to liberty and security of the person.173 This evidently 
embraces not only what is illegal but also what is unjust. O’Nions contends that a 
broader test of substantive arbitrariness should include decisions which are 
unreasonable, unjust, delayed and unpredictable.174 The concept of arbitrariness is also 
expressed in the UNHCR’s guidelines on the detention of asylum seekers, which sees 
freedom from arbitrary detention ‘as a fundamental human right’.175  The UNHCR 
Guidelines 4 reaffirms that arbitrariness is interpreted broadly to include not only 
lawfulness but includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of 
predictability which demands for necessity in an individual case, reasonable in the 
circumstance and proportionate to a legitimate purpose. For Cole, ‘Their very 
arbitrariness makes them indefensible, and defending them highlights the incoherence 
of attempting to justify views according to which citizens can enjoy better or worse life 
prospects by virtue of their relative location with respect to an arbitrarily erected 
border’.176 
 
In the protection of a person against arbitrary detention, the ECHR had further 
determined that an avoidance of arbitrariness either in motivation or effect also 
encompasses cases of bad faith where detention is not consistent with the restrictions as 
enshrined in Art 5 ECHR. 177 The issue of bad faith was discussed in Bozano v France 
178; where an Italian national was convicted in his absence by an Italian court, forcibly 
taken by French police to the Swiss border and handed over to the Swiss custody in 
what later was adjudged an unlawful deportation order undertaken to circumvent a 
French court’s ruling. The ECtHR held that the deprivation of liberty was arbitrary in 																																																								
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35		
motivation and unlawful given that the detention was obviously for the purpose of 
deportation but in reality was a disguised illegal extradition. The ECtHR also 
determined that arbitrariness might occur where an applicant is denied adequate reasons 
for the detention. According to the court, this obligation continues as detention may 
therefore become unlawful if the reason given initially ceases to apply.179 
 
The HRC had similarly considered the issue of arbitrary detention as a breach to right to 
liberty and security. In A v Australia180 the HRC dealt with a communication 
concerning the detention of a Cambodian asylum seeker where it noted that the notion 
of arbitrariness must not be equated with ‘against the law’ but has to be given a broad 
interpretation to include inappropriateness and injustice. The Committee remarked that 
remand in custody could be considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all 
circumstances. In Hugo van Alphen v Netherlands181 the Committee emphasized that 
detention may be lawful but arbitrary which could constitute a gross breach of Art 9 
ICCPR.  
 
Given that lack of due diligence results in arbitrariness, consideration will be given to 
the importance of due diligence in detention. In Chahal v UK 182 the ECtHR limited the 
power of detention under the limb of Art 5 (1) (f) with the proviso that detention would 
only be lawful as long as the underlying deportation proceedings were being pursued 
with due diligence. The court further remarked that even where the said proceedings 
were diligently pursued, they would become arbitrary if they continue for an 
exceptional length of time without explanations being provided. In Lynas v Switzerland 
183 it was held that while Art 5 (1) (f) sets no reasonable time limit on the length of 
detention, proceedings had to be pursued with due diligence. This can be contrasted 
with the decision in Kolompar v Belgium184 where regardless of detention taking place 
for almost three years due to delayed proceedings by the applicant, no breach of Article 
5 (1) (f) was found. Nonetheless, it has been emphasized that absolute maximum period 
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of detention should be specified in national law.185 For a detailed discussion on arbitrary 
detention, see specifically chapter 4.4.1 of this thesis. 
 
Necessity of Detention 
 
It has further been argued that the legality of detention requires a determination of its 
necessity and proportionality. Necessity will be discussed first. This is against the 
backdrop of the debate that detention appears to produce a harmful effect on liberal 
ideologies by way of deterioration of liberal policies but may at the same time act as an 
indicator of deeper and more insidious change.186 In fact, it has been posited that States 
have resorted more frequently to detention for longer periods as a response in part to 
large volume of migrants entering their territories.187 Wilsher is of the view that the 
Guidelines allow for detention in order to determine the elements of the claim but 
stressed that such detention is justifiable if it is within a prescribed period.188 In that 
connection, the UN Working Group suggested that necessity was important to avoid the 
issue of arbitrary detention because the detention of migrants in general or asylum 
seekers in particular is not prohibited.189  
 
Following that reasoning is Hathaway who is of the opinion that short-term detention 
only aimed for administrative purpose can be said to be necessary even though it is not 
specifically governed by the Guidelines.190 Grahl-Madsen, however opinionates that 
detention should be used to ascertain identity and for investigative purposes and limited 
by necessity but he specifically rules out the legitimacy of detention for administrative 
purposes.191 In Field’s view, the consideration of non-custodial alternatives is a ‘pre-
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requisite for satisfying the principle of necessity in relation to lawful detention’.192 That 
accords with my argument that even if properly motivated and otherwise lawful, a 
deprivation of liberty may become arbitrary in effect if it is found to be disproportionate 
to the pursued aim. 
 
Further discussion on necessity requires the examination of detention rules. In the 
European Union, detention rules can be found in the common standards and procedures 
in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.193 Art 15 of the 
Directive requires Member States to apply less coercive measures in detention for a 
third country national subject to removal even when there is a risk of absconding or the 
third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the 
removal process’.194  Even though the United Kingdom is not bound by its provision or 
application in its entirety but the important thing to note is that the Directive established 
standards which must be followed within the confines of “necessary in a democracy” 
test as adumbrated by the ECHR.195 Put differently, limitations on human rights must be 
necessary in a democratic society with established standards incumbent on it. The 
Executive Committee’s Conclusion on detention of refugees and asylum seekers on its 
part stressed the need for necessity to be related to legitimate aims.196 The Committee 
stated that ‘detention should be a measure of last resort with liberty being the default 
position’.197  
 
Proportionality of Detention 
 
Proportionality as the most crucial element of the necessity test involves a search for a 
fair balance between the demands of the general interest of community and the 
requirements of protection of the individual’s human rights.198 In Daly 199, the House of 
Lords adopted a three stage approach to establish proportionality: i) the legitimate 																																																								
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objective should be of sufficient importance justifying the limitation of a fundamental 
human right; ii) the measures designed to meet the objective must be rationally 
connected to it; iii) the means used to impair that right must be no more than necessary 
to accomplish the objective. The principle of proportionality presupposes that where an 
action to achieve a lawful objective is taken in a situation where it appears to restrict a 
fundamental right, the effect on the right must not be disproportionate to the public 
purpose sought to be achieved.200  
 
However, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR appears to have applied a different 
parameter in discussing the issue of necessity and proportionality in the case of Saadi v 
the UK.201 The ECtHR attempted to separate notions of necessity from arbitrariness and 
proportionality. It stated, ‘to avoid being branded as arbitrary […] such detention should 
be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing 
unauthorized entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention 
should be appropriate […] and the length of detention should not exceed that reasonably 
required for the purpose pursued’.202 Cornelisse thinks that the court’s approach was 
simply cautious and argued that the cautious approach adopted was simply deference to 
state sovereignty, which led the court to reason that the detention of migrants including 
asylum seekers should confer a broader discretion than detention under other exceptions 
in Art 5 (1).203 She adds that the judgment exemplifies the ‘limits and blinds-spots’ of 
the European human rights system when it comes to those who are ‘out of place’ in the 
global territorial order.204 O’Nions comments that the outcome of this case legitimizes 
reasonably brief periods of detention for administrative convenience provided it is not 
seen as arbitrary.205 In Chahal v UK206 the ECtHR held that proportionality does not 
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apply to immigration detention regardless of the length of detention (the applicant 
Chahal was detained for six years).  
 
The issue of proportionality has also been viewed from the lens of the physical sites of 
detention centres. Flynn posits that the physical sites of the deprivation of liberty are 
critical factors in an effort to assess the proportionality of detention practices.207 He 
remarked that, this accounts for the reason why the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 
created standards relative to detention of aliens.208 The CPT provides that ‘care should 
be taken in the design and layout of [immigration detention facilities] to avoid as far as 
possible any impression of a carceral environment’.209 Proportionality will inadvertently 
take into account the general characteristics of detention centres such as facility type 
even as Rule 94 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
prohibits restriction or severity of liberty greater than necessary.210 Silverman and 
Massa however add that even though international law regulations stipulate that 
detention must be proportionate and legal; but given that the standards are poorly 
defined and the rarity of immigration detention watchdogs, the said regulations are 
difficult to enforce.211 According to them, the difficulty creates a disadvantage for 
detainees in the state’s attempt to balance the basic rights of non-citizens with the 
sovereign imperative of immigration control.212 For further discussion on necessity and 
proportionality, see chapter 4.4.2 of this thesis. 
 
The Conditions of Detention 
 
As stated above, while detention under Art 5 (1) (f) may be lawful, an assessment of 
whether the conditions of detention comply with the appropriate standards is 
required.213 The treatment of detainees may give rise to a breach of the right to liberty if 
certain conditions are not met. This is in view of Principle 2 UNHCR Guidelines that 
stated that asylum seekers should not be detained or as an exception under certain 																																																								
207 Michael Flynn, ‘Who Must Be Detained? Proportionality as   a Tool for Critiquing Immigration 
Detention Policy’ (2012) 31 Refugee Survey Quarterly 40, 47 
208 ibid 
209 CPT, The CPT Standards, Council of Europe, (2009) 37-55; (CPT Standards, 38) 
210 Rule 94 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (n35)  
211 Stephanie Silverman and Evelyne Massa, ‘Why Immigration Detention is Unique’ (2012) 18 
Population, Space and Place 677, 678  
212 ibid 
213 See section 2.4.1 above 
40		
conditions,214 a reflection of the U.N. Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under any Form of Detention 1988215, and Article 10 of the ICCPR.216 In 
addition, Guideline 10 of the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention 
of Asylum- Seekers require that conditions of detention should be humane thus 
advocating for the avoidance of the use of prisons for detention etc.217 In this wise, 
Strasbourg jurisprudence has firmly established that the conditions in which a person is 
detained may give rise to the engagement not only of Article 5 but also of Article 3 
ECHR- torture and degrading treatment even if there is no intention on the part of the 
State to do so.218  This will be discussed below in the context of Art 3 and not only of 
Article 5 ECHR at section 2.4.2 below with further details at chapter 4.4.4 of this thesis. 
 
Length of Detention 
 
Regarding length of detention, it has been argued that the length of detention could 
amount to a breach of the right to liberty and security. Johnston remarked that the 
importance of liberty both to the individual and society is too great to justify indefinite 
detention.219 Bosworth argues strongly that a period of detention neither changes the 
detainee nor prepares them for eventual return; rather what detention does is to confirm 
their identity. 220  
 
Further commentaries have been made as to the undesirability of indefinite detention 
and its implication for the right to liberty. Gurd posits that indefinite detention is a 
failure given that it is increasingly seen as a symptom of a fundamentally dysfunctional 
detention system and an example of the UK’s treatment of unwanted migrants.221 For 
her, there is an impasse between the sanctity of liberty and the interplay of the statutory 
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purpose of effecting removal.222 In essence, the legality of detention requires that the 
law, which authorizes detention, must accord with international human rights law 
standards.  
 
In the words of Grant, ‘immigration detention is an area in which there are particular 
tensions between international and regional human rights law and State practice. 
Although the State decides who enters and who should be removed from its territory, it 
must at the same time comply with fundamental human rights principles including the 
right to liberty’.223 This will be discussed further at chapter 4.4.5 of this thesis. 
 
2.4.2 Prohibition of Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment-Non-Refoulement 
 
The right not to be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment is an 
unqualified right that can never be balanced against competing considerations. Art 3 of 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading punishment 
(CAT) expressly prohibit States from removing an individual in a manner where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he/she will be in danger of being subjected to 
torture (non-refoulement).224 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem argue that the principle of non-
refoulement has acquired the status of customary international law and noted that the 
customary status of both the prohibition of torture and of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment is clear.225  Simply put, the prohibition against torture is a jus 
cogens-a binding obligation in international law.226   
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Non-Refoulement as Jus Cogens 
 
Non-refoulement, which simply means ‘forbidding to send back’, was noted to have 
appeared first as a requirement in history in the work of international societies of 
lawyers, at the 1892 Geneva Session of the Institute de Droit International (Institute of 
International Law).227 Article 16 of the 1892 Regles internationals sur l’admission et 
‘expulsion des etrangers stipulated that a refugee, should not by way of expulsion, be 
sent back to another state that sought him except under certain observed stipulated 
conditions.228 As time went by, especially with the tensions generated during the two 
world war periods, the principle of non-refoulement started appearing explicitly in 
predominant number of international conventions, reemphasizing that refugees must not 
be returned to their countries of origin, with the United Nations giving vent to the 
consolidation of this principle in international law.229 This became universal by virtue 
of Article 45 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians 
Persons in Time of War which provided that ‘in no circumstances shall a protected 
person be transferred to a country where he or she may have a reason to fear persecution 
for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs’.  This later metamorphosed into the 
grant of broader rights by the application of Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees that stipulates:  
 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member- ship of a 
particular social group or political opinion.  
 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community 
of that country.230  																																																								
227 Tamas Molnar, ‘The principle of non-refoulement under international law: Its inception and evolution 
in a nutshell’ (2016) 1 (1) Courvinus Journal of International Affairs 51, 51 
228 Feraud-Giraud et Ludwig von Bar, (Rapporteurs) Regles internationals sur l’admission et l’expulsion 
des strangers  (Institut de Droit international Session de Geneve, 1892) 
229 Tamas Molnar (n227) 52 
230 See the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 2545 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 
April 1954) 
43		
 
In addition, with the development of international protection of human rights, the 
application of non refoulement was further enlarged as it grew beyond the framework of 
refugee law exemplified by international legal instruments, as can be inferred from the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7 which 
prohibits a person from being transferred to where they would be subjected to torture, or 
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.231 In essence, the 
principle of non-refoulement is considered to be international customary law, implying 
that all states regardless of being parties to the applicable human rights and/or refugee 
conventions, which prohibit refoulement, are required not to return a person to a country 
where the person’s life will be in danger.232 As Duffy recounted, non-refoulement 
having been accepted by 90 percent of world’s sovereign state in some shape or form 
shows its normative worth and ‘the incorporation of this principle into key international 
instruments is also testament to consistent practice and a strong opinion juris which 
contributes to the creation of a customary norm’.233 In this connection, the Office of 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees opines that regardless of the 
exception in Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention 1951, the principle of non-
refoulement has become a rule of customary international law based on state practice on 
the one hand and states’ opinion juris on the other hand.234   
 
Having briefly examined the customary basis of the norm of non-refoulement, I will 
now move to the question of whether this customary norm is recognised as jus cogens, 
if so, what are the implications? The notion of jus cogens came into the lexicon of 
international law through the 1969 Vienna Conventions of the Law of Treaties, Articles 
53 and 64. These provide for the termination or invalidation of treaties even after 
ratification if their content does conflict with a peremptory norm of general 
international law, ‘accepted and recognised by the international community of States as 
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a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted’.235 As Allain pointed out, the 
international community had determined two types of laws that regulate their behavior 
namely jus cogens and jus dispositivum, where jus dispositivum are laws which States 
may derogate or deviate from while jus cogens do not allow for such deviations as they 
are higher norms which do not permit violation.236 In essence, ‘peremptory norms limit 
the actions and interactions of States on the international plane’.237  
 
That said, the question worth examining is how to identify the norms of jus cogens and 
whether the prohibition against refoulement meets those standards. To this end, several 
scholars have argued that non-refoulement is indeed jus cogens. Allain expresses the 
view that a jus cogens is identifiable where there is sufficient state practice and if the 
rule is recognised by opinion juris not only as custom but also as jus cogens.238 In 
reaching this conclusion, he relied on the 1982 Executive Committee Conclusions, 
which observed that non-refoulement was ‘progressively acquiring the character of a 
peremptory rule of international law’.239 Allain treats non-derogability and jus cogens as 
functional equivalent, this, has been challenged by Castello and Foster as incorrect as a 
matter of law.240 They argued that ‘while non-derogability is one of the formal indicia 
of a jus cogens norm (along with universality and peremptory character) that in itself is 
not sufficient’.241 They pointed out that the statement that non-refoulement is non-
derogable is an integral part of its acknowledgment as jus cogens but not total in 
conferring that character on a norm.242 Orakhelashvili sees non-refoulement as jus 
cogens from the point of view of Art 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention of the Status of 
Refugees stated above which according to him is a peremptory norm related to right of 
an individual, supported by its inseparable link with certain freedoms-right to life and 
freedom from torture, stating that the EXCOM Conclusion No.25 attests that the 																																																								
235 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT), Art 53 
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principle of non-refoulement amounts to a norm of jus cogens.243 Farmer on his part 
expresses that ‘whereas non-refoulement has gained broad acceptance as a fundamental 
norm of refugee law, its exceptions have not garnered similar status’.244 His thesis is 
that even though there is an exception in refugee treaties, no exceptions are found in 
Convention Against Torture (CAT), the ICCPR and the ECHR which protects 
individuals from refoulement in cases of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.245 For him, public order does not necessarily require the existence of a fixed, 
exhaustive catalogue of jus cogens, or peremptory norms, rather, certain criteria exist to 
identify these norms which the international community as a whole accept as norms 
which permit no derogation.246 
 
In addition, some regional and domestic orders treat non-refoulement as jus cogens, 
such as the Cartagena Declarations on Refugees247, the Organization for African Unity 
Convention248 and quite recently the Brazil Declaration of December 2014 for Latin 
American and Caribbean governments249, in addition to the dictum of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy where he stated that ‘the prohibition of 
refoulement is a principle of customary international law, binding on all States, even 
those not party to the UN Refugee Convention or any other treaty for the protection of 
refugees […]’ that permits no derogation due to is peremptory nature which disallows 
reservations.250 
 
Regardless of the above position treating non-refoulement as jus cogens, some scholars 
doubted the conclusion without critical examination. Duffy treats non-refoulement as 
custom but argues that evidence about its jus cogens status is less convincing.251 
Wouters does not accept that non-refoulement in general is jus cogens, but accepts that 																																																								
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the prohibition against torture does have the character of jus cogens.252 Having reviewed 
the various positions, Castello and Foster, applying their ‘customary international law 
plus’ analysis take the view that non-refoulement is ripe for recognition as jus cogens on 
the basis that practice and opinio juris demonstrate its virtually universal scope and non 
derogability is evident in the language of relevant UN General Assembly resolutions.253 
As Lauterpacht and Bethlehem stated, ‘non-refoulement is expressly protected in 
standard setting conventions that are concerned with extradition in addition to 
widespread and representative participation in the conventions said to embody the 
putative customary law’.254  
 
In the light of the above analysis, there is overwhelming evidence pointing to the 
establishment of non-refoulement as a norm of customary international law with wide 
acceptance by the international community of the prohibition of torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, as jus cogens.  
 
Non-Refoulement and Human Rights Law 
 
Neuman thinks of non-refoulement as a rule concerning State responsibility where 
States must refrain from refoulement in order to avoid complicity in serious human 
rights violation committed by others. He asserted that ‘a state that knowingly (or with 
awareness of sufficient risk) compels an individual to return to a country where their 
rights will be violated is not merely neglecting to protect them, but helps in causing the 
violation. This approach emphasizes the active character of refoulement’.255 As Lehman 
observed in the case of Saadi v Italy256 ‘non-refoulement obligations are applicable 
where the return of an individual to a territory where he would be at risk of subjection to 
treatment that falls within the ambit of the principle and where such treatment is 
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attributable to the State’.257 After the decision in Saadi v Italy, Strasbourg’s 
jurisprudence in A v Netherlands258 and N v Sweden259 amongst others had consistently 
re-emphasized the absolute nature of refoulement. 
 
In view of the above and consistent with the recommendations of the Committee 
Against Torture, the UK government had accepted that the government would not 
remove a person under immigration powers where this would lead to treatment contrary 
to Art 3 CAT or Art 3 ECHR, while assuring that all removals may be appealable to the 
UK courts.260 This assurance by the UK to the CAT, evidence suggests, appears to be at 
variance with UK’s State practice in deportation and removal as discussed at chapter 5 
of this thesis.  
 
The provision against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is also contained in 
Art 7 ICCPR.261  In Lehman’s view, ‘although the prohibition of expulsion in the 
ICCPR is confined to aliens lawfully on the territory, the HRC has not excluded that in 
theory any right of the Covenant may lead to a non-refoulement obligation for any 
individual within the state’s jurisdiction’.262 In A.R.J v Australia, the HRC stated that ‘if 
a State party deports a person within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction in such 
circumstances that as a result, there is a real risk that his or her rights under the 
Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, that State party itself may be in 
violation of the Covenant’.263  
 
As stated supra, Art 3 ECHR prohibits torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Torture is not specifically defined in the ECHR but implies a deliberate 
infliction of suffering of particular intensity and cruelty.264 In essence, the ECHR as a 																																																								
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living instrument applies the purposive approach in interpreting Art 3 rights to the 
extent that what was classified as inhuman treatment could now be classified as torture 
in the light of the rising protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.265 In 
Tyrer v UK266 the ECtHR concluded that the judicial corporal punishment inflicted on 
the applicant amounted to degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 3 (art. 3) 
of the Convention’. As Rohl observed, ‘because of its absolute protection against 
inhuman treatment “whatever the source” Article 3 ECHR considerably widens the 
international protection against refoulement compared to other refugee law and human 
rights instruments’.267 
 
By and large, Art 3 ECHR is an absolute right that cannot be balanced with competing 
considerations neither does it permit derogations under any circumstance. As the 
ECtHR stated, Art 3 ‘enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies, 
prohibits in absolute terms torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
irrespective of the victim’s conduct’.268 However, in Soering v UK 269 the ECtHR 
remarked that ‘what amounts to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" 
depends on all the circumstances of the case’. The Soering case attracted a lot of 
commentaries where majority are in agreement with the ratio while others think 
otherwise.270 Mole observes that for Art 3 ECHR to be engaged, ‘it must be shown that 
the applicant is at risk of treatment prohibited by that article and such a risk must be real 
and would involve a determination of what is risked and the necessary threshold of 
severity must be met’.271  
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In Thampibillai and Venkadajalasarma v Netherlands272 the ECtHR noted that the 
applicant who left Sri Lanka in 1994, almost four years ago on the basis of the killing of 
his father by the army and after being arrested, detained and released by the army, 
cannot rely on facts of the case, to prove that he was at a real risk of return. In the 
determination of what is a risk, an evaluation of whether the risk reaches the necessary 
threshold of severity is required. In view of this, in Cruz Varas v Sweden273 the ECtHR 
noted that the ‘ill treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within 
the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, 
relative; it depends on the circumstances of the case […]’. 
 
In essence, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of 
the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights’.274  The second part of this 
statement “a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community 
[…]” may appear to suggest a kind of balance to be struck between competing interests, 
which would have removed the absolute nature of Art 3, but the ECtHR was quick to 
explain it in subsequent paragraphs and specifically in Chahal when it emphasized that 
there is no room for balancing the risk of ill treatment against reasons for expulsion in 
order to determine whether a State’s responsibility under Art 3 is engaged.275  
 
As MacDonald pointed out, the UK as a third party intervener in Saadi v Italy 276 
attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the ECtHR to revisit the Chahal principle stated 
supra, arguing that the government should be able to balance the risk to the individual 
consequent on removal against the gravity of the threat posed by that individual to the 
community.277 But the argument did not find favour with the Court as it reaffirmed that 
the principles afforded by Art 3 was absolute given that ‘the concepts of “risk” and 
“dangerousness” in this context do not lend themselves to a balancing test because they 
are notions that can only be assessed independently of each other’ meaning that the 
conduct of the individual however undesirable or dangerous could not be taken into 
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account.278 The examination of this right for the purposes of this thesis will be in the 
context of detention and/or deportation of migrants with respect to torture in the context 
of removal proceedings, torture in detention and torture in the country of destination. 
 
The Concept of Safe Country in relation to Non-refoulement 
 
Having examined non-refoulement as jus cogens in the previous part, ‘safe country’ 
notion will now be briefly discussed. The notion of safe country has been explained as 
‘a procedural mechanism for shuttling asylum seekers to other States said to have 
primary responsibility for them, thereby avoiding the necessity to make a decision on 
the merits because another country is deemed to be secure’.279 Simply stated, the 
concept of ‘safe country’ was an invention aimed at returning asylum seekers back to 
where they came from on the ground that they have already found protection or there 
will be protection in that country which is deemed safe. The fundamental question 
which is being engaged is whether the application of the notion of ‘safe country’ 
violates the principle of non-refoulement, which means, whether there is effective or 
adequate protection in the so called ‘safe’ country both as matter of law or State 
practice.280 Foster refers to ‘safe country’ as ‘protection elsewhere policy’- ‘a situation 
in which a State or agency acts on the basis that the protection needs of a refugee should 
be considered other than in the territory of the State where the refugee has sought or 
intends to seek protection’.281 These have been described with different labels notably 
‘country of first asylum’, ‘third safe country’ ‘safe country of origin’ (an integral part of 
eligibility procedure in Europe) but the core question is to ensure protection and 
whether the State deviates or deflects from its obligation by transferring a refugee to 
another State,282 within the objective concept of protection against expulsion.283 
 
Gil-Bazo expressed that ‘the most sophisticated mechanism developed by States to 
embody the ‘safe third country’ notion is currently contained in the so-called Dublin III 																																																								
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Regulation of the European Union (EU)- a third generation instrument aimed at 
determining the EU Member State responsible to examine an asylum application on 
behalf of all other EU Member States’.284 Gil-Bazo opined that as much as many 
scholars have focused on the issue of effective protection explicit in the discussion of 
the notion of ‘safe third country’, many have not queried its lawfulness, given that 
asylum is not discretionary but a right under international law.285 Gil-Bazo had argued 
that ‘the status of refugees under international law is defined […] by the interaction of 
the different legal orders that may be applicable to any refugee in any given 
circumstances, both of universal and regional scope’.286 She remarked that when a State 
transfers responsibility to another State, even by the acceptance or admission that the 
receiving State is a ‘safe third country’ this raises crucial issues of state responsibility 
regarding the fulfilment of all obligations under the regime of both international refugee 
law and human rights law with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction.287 In this context, 
prior to the determination of asylum claim, a Member State must verify the existence of 
a safe country which the applicant may be returned, which follows that the principle of 
the responsible state has been turned upside down to the extent that expulsion to a third 
state is no longer the exception but the rule.288 
 
In the United Kingdom, safe third country provisions are found in Schedule 3 of the 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 that maintains an 
‘active’ list of 28 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) with the exception 																																																								
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of Liechenstein’.289 By virtue of this provision, which refers to section 77 (4) of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, countries are deemed safe on Refugee 
Convention grounds-Articles 1(A) 2 and 33 or on human rights grounds- Articles 3 and 
8 ECHR emphasizing that anyone who falls to be returned to an European country, may 
not appeal against the decision unless the Secretary of State is persuaded that such a 
decision, would arguably be, a breach of human rights by the UK in doing so. 
 
The ‘safe third country’ and ‘country of first asylum’ owe its background to the 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (EXCOM Conclusion) 
58 (XL) that addresses the position of asylum seekers and refugees, moving away from 
the country in which they have already found protection in order to seek asylum or find 
permanent resettlement elsewhere.290 This EXCOM Conclusion permits the return of 
individuals to which they have already found protection, which States aim to facilitate 
through bilateral and multilateral agreements, although it does not define the meaning of 
protection.291 Prior to this time, the EXCOM Conclusion No 15 (XXX) has expressed 
support for a nascent ‘safe country of asylum’ notion, stating that if a person who 
requests asylum has a connection or close links with another State, he may, if it appears 
fair and reasonable, to be called upon first to request asylum from that State.292 The 
assumption therefore is that so long as Art 33 of the Refugee Convention is not violated, 
the State is at liberty to transfer a refugee to a third State but not to avoid its obligations. 
The issue of avoidance of obligations was noted by the ECtHR when in TI v UK, the 
court observed that a sending State cannot avoid its obligations incurred under the 
human rights treaties vis-à-vis refugees within territory by engaging in their transfer 
under the Dublin Convention nor can it ‘contract out’ its legal obligations.293 The 
ECtHR noted: 
 
The Court finds that the indirect removal in this case to an intermediary 
country, which is also a Contracting State, does not affect the 
responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the applicant is not, 
as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to 
Article 3 of the Convention. Nor can the United Kingdom rely 
automatically in that context on the arrangements made in the Dublin 																																																								
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Convention concerning the attribution of responsibility between 
European countries for deciding asylum claims. Where States establish 
international organisations, or mutatis mutandis international 
agreements, to pursue co-operation in certain fields of activities, there 
may be implications for the protection of fundamental rights. It would be 
incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention if 
Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under 
the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such 
attribution.294 
 
This has been re-echoed by the European Parliamentary Resolution 1569 where States 
were reminded that the transfer of refugees offshore cannot absolve a State from its 
responsibilities.295 Therefore, where there is evidence that the asylum seeker or refugee 
will be subjected to ill treatment on transfer under a third country arrangement and/or 
agreement, the sending State is prohibited from carrying our such transfers under 
international law. Foster argues that as much as Article 33 of the Refugee Convention is 
key in this regard against refoulement (direct), the violations of rights in the third State 
(indirect refoulement) can be of significance to the analysis of Article 33.296 She posits 
that the conditions of treatment meted out to refugees in the third State (indirect 
refoulement) in fact amount to persecution in the context of race, religion and 
nationality viewed not only from a more traditional method of persecution such as 
violence but in the context of the violation of socio-economic rights.297 It is her case 
that a violation of socio-economic rights in the third country may amount to 
constructive refoulement, if in particular; those conditions were to lead to the serious 
likelihood of risk in returning home rather than the toleration of harsh conditions.298 
Thirdly, she notes that the reception conditions afforded to refugees in the receiving 
State may be such as to engage fair and effective asylum procedure, which has a direct 
connection to refoulement.299 Gil-Bazo, in analyzing the issue of burden sharing 
obligations reflected in the nature of third State agreements, noted that ‘there is a 
difficulty of the effective articulation of concerted inter-State action in such a manner 
that guarantees the adequate fulfillment of States’ obligations’.300 
																																																								
294 ibid 
295 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1569 (2007) on Assessment of Transit and 
Processing Centres as a Response to Mixed Flows of Migrants and Asylum Seekers (01 October 2007) 
para 13.6 
296 Michelle Foster, ‘Responsibility Sharing or Shifting? “Safe” Third Countries and International Law’ 
(n282) 69 
297 ibid 
298 ibid 
299 ibid 
300 Gil-Bazo (n284) 9 
54		
 
By and large, the determination of whether a country is safe requires ‘anxious 
scrutiny’301 and ‘rigorous examination’302 and part of that assessment relates to 
procedural safeguards which a sending State must take note of in addition to the issue of 
‘internal flight alternative’ and ‘internal relocation’. In Januzi v SSHD, the concept of 
internal relocation was engaged where the then House of Lords (now Supreme Court) 
denied granting refugee status to certain applicants on the ‘grounds [that] there is 
another place, within the country of the appellant’s nationality, where he would have no 
well-founded fear of persecution, where the protection of that country would be 
available to him, and where in all circumstances he could reasonably and without undue 
harshness expected to live’.303 Furthermore, in AH (Sudan) v SSHD, the Court held that 
the assessment of ‘internal relocation’ required that the conditions in the country of 
relocation be compared against normal standards of life within the whole country of 
origin and in doing do so, found that it would be reasonable and not unduly harsh for 
three non-Arab men from Darfur to relocate to Khartoum.304  
 
However, in AMM (Somalia) v SSHD, the UK Upper Tribunal in applying the ratio of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in Sufi and Elmi v UK305 found that it ‘would be unreasonable 
to return anyone to an Internally Displaced Persons camp in Afgoye Corridor except the 
person concerned would be able to achieve the life styles of those better-off inhabitants 
of the Afgoye Corridor settlements’.306 From the foregoing as distilled from these cases, 
a return to a safe part of a country of origin is lawful under international law, provided 
that admission and effective protection can be guaranteed. 
 
Strasbourg jurisprudence has illuminated the horizon in the discussion of safe country 
notion with its fluctuating decisions hereunder analyzed. It did this by the application of 
the obligations incumbent on the High Contracting Parties by virtue of Art 1 ECHR 
charged with securing everyone within its jurisdiction, the rights and freedoms defined 
in Section 1 of the Convention and this gave vent to the extraterritorial principles as 
discussed fully in Chapter Two of this thesis.  In TI v UK307 (above), the ECtHR refused 																																																								
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302 Nasseri v SSHD [2008] EWCA 464 [18]  
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to admit an application made by a Sri-Lankan national and failed asylum seeker, on the 
question of his return from the UK to Germany under the springboard of the then 
Dublin Convention. The Court accepted that based on assurances from the German 
government, the applicant would be considered for protection in Germany even if 
discretionary. Similarly, in K.R.S v UK 308, the applicant Iranian national was facing 
transfer from the UK to Greece under the Dublin Convention. The applicant presented 
reports showing that Greece in the majority of cases did not meaningfully examine 
asylum claims by applying ‘anxious scrutiny’ and ‘rigorous examination’. The ECtHR 
however held that when the matter is not about refoulement but about the conditions 
under which the asylum claimant is treated in Greece, the appropriate course would be 
that the applicant be returned to Greece and if unsuccessful, he is at liberty to bring a 
complaint against Greece, if he so wishes, thereby declining to address the applicant’s 
claim that Greece did not, as a matter of fact, comply with its obligations with regards 
to procedures established by law.309 
 
However, in M.S.S v Belgium and Greece310 the ECtHR took a different approach to the 
transfer of a Dublin case, a departure from its position is K.R.S above.  In the M.S.S 
case, the Court explained prior to the ordering of a Dublin transfer, that the sending 
State, in the instant case, Belgium, must ensure that Greece is in a position to consider 
the asylum claim and to apply fairness in all ramifications. The Court reasoned that 
Belgium knew or ought to have known that the applicant has no guarantee that his 
application was going to be fairly treated, if so, Belgium was in breach of Article 3 
ECHR due to the fact that the applicant was exposed to conditions of detention and 
living that amounted to degrading treatment by the mere fact that the applicant was 
returned to Greece. In her analysis of the case, Lambert espoused that Belgium, by 
knowingly exposing the applicant, to deleterious conditions in Greece, exposed him to 
conditions tantamount to degrading treatment and it was incumbent on Belgium to have 
verified how Greece applied their legislation in practice and not simply to assume that 
M.S.S. would be treated in conformity to ECHR law and EU law.311 The ECtHR equally 																																																								
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found that the extreme urgent procedure adopted by Belgium, which seems to have 
drastically reduced or obliterated the right of the defence and the examination of the 
case to a minimum does not meet the requirements of Article 13 ECHR with respect to 
the right of effective within the meaning of rigorous examination by the competent 
authority.312 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is responsibility of acts taking place extraterritorially 
engaging indirect non -refoulement. In Sufi and Elmi v UK313, the ECtHR had the 
opportunity of considering the provisions of EU law in its interpretation of Article 3 
ECHR within the remit of armed conflict. The Court found that returning anyone to 
Mogadishu at the time will be violation of Article 3 ECHR as the person or persons will 
be subjected to degrading treatment due to the general and extreme violence in 
Mogadishu. Having found Mogadishu unsafe, the Court had to consider whether 
another part of Somalia would be safe in terms of internal relocation but found the 
living conditions in main refugee camps in Somalia and even neighbouring Kenya to be 
extremely dire that it will be unsafe to return anyone there.314  
 
Similarly in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy315 another case concerning 
extraterritoriality principles regarding removal that may lead to exposure of individuals 
to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, which has been discussed in Chapter Two of 
this thesis, the Court applied the ‘knew or should have known’ test as discussed in 
M.S.S v Belgium and Greece and in Sufi and Elmi v UK above. The Court concluded 
that the bilateral agreement between Libya and Italy cannot be applied to have the 
potency of absolving Italy from its responsibility under the ECHR. The ECtHR found 
that Italy knew or should have known that the irregular migrants removed would not be 
protected in Libya, but it went ahead to remove them in breach of Article 3 ECHR. 
What appears to be the trend is the use by the ECtHR of its higher threshold of 
protection standards in applying EU asylum to enhance protection within the ‘EU 
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space’ that has been applied to situations beyond the EU, driven considerations of 
humanity.316 
 
Within the EU legal framework proper, the implications of transfer under the Dublin II 
Regulation was illuminated. In this lead judgment, which will be briefly summarized, 
concerns the removal of asylum seekers from the United Kingdom and Ireland to 
Greece under the Dublin II Regulation.  The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in the joined cases of N.S and M.E317 held that there is now an obligation to 
examine an asylum application under Article 3 (2) Dublin II Regulation, if the transfer 
to the Member State which has primary responsibility under Article 3 (1) would expose 
the asylum seeker to serious risk of violation of fundamental rights as entrenched in the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The implication of this judgment is that Dublin II 
regulation no longer created a presumption that the asylum seekers fundamental rights 
will be observed by the Member State whose primary responsibility was to determine 
the application.318 In her analysis, Gil-Bazo, notes that ‘the judgment amounts to a 
reversal of the foundation of the Dublin system, namely the principle of mutual trust 
among Member States that they are all safe, and in doing so safeguards the dual nature 
of obligations that Member States have in guaranteeing the rights of individuals when 
the inter-State agreement fails to deliver on purpose’.319 
 
The bottom line of what has been discussed in this part is that a State is not excused 
from its human rights obligations by transferring, returning or removing a migrant to 
another State on the basis of agreement without actually determining whether there will 
be violations of the individual’s rights under international refugee law or international 
human rights law. So, the use of the so called safe country cannot exculpate the State 
from its obligations and whether the receiving state is actually ‘safe’ must as a 
minimum be investigated by the sending State applying ‘anxious scrutiny’ and ‘rigorous 
examination’ of the circumstances, avoiding as it should, direct or indirect refoulement. 
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Removal Proceedings and Torture 
 
Removal proceedings could give rise to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment if the 
treatment meted to deportees are incongruent with international human rights law 
standards. Therefore the debate is simply whether the treatment conforms to the 
required standards.320 In Shchukin and Others v Cyprus321 the ECtHR found a violation 
of Art 3 ECHR on grounds that the Cypriot authorities failed to investigate allegations 
of ill-treatment of an Ukrainian ship crew member during the process of deportation. 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recorded that thirteen people 
died between 1991 and 2001 during deportation.322 They stated that ‘the deaths are sad 
examples of the worst that can happen during expulsion procedures and should not 
mask the fact that foreigners awaiting expulsion are subjected in breach of the ECHR to 
discrimination, racist verbal abuse, dangerous methods of restraints and even violence 
and human and degrading treatment’.323   
 
In corroboration, Fekete agreed that the conditions of deportation are usually inhumane 
and degrading which have led directly to a number of deaths in recent years.324 The 
Institute of Race Relations has therefore identified nine cases where the general trend in 
deportation enforcement by the concerned States is the ‘free use of handcuffs during 
deportation enforcements, the use of tapes on the mouth, feet, body and nostrils of the 
deportees, partial dragging on the floor, putting deportees on luggage trollies, beatings 
even on board the aircraft with officers sitting down on deportees, and cases of clear 
suffocation thus leading to heart failure, positional asphyxia, asphyxiation and 
ultimately death’.325  
 
In the UK, the death of Jimmy Mubenga illustrates the use of extreme coercion 
employed in the deportation enforcement process. Jimmy Mubenga was a 46-year-old 
Angolan who died in October 2010 on a stationary aircraft at Heathrow during an 
attempt by the authorities to deport him from the United Kingdom, having restrained 																																																								
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him with excessive force during the deportation attempt.326 Klein and Williams in 
general gives a description of the arrest and detention of migrants in the UK, finding 
‘bewildering experiences that contradict their senses of selfhood, their notions of natural 
justice, and their expectations of how a just society should treat its members’.327 During 
arrest and prior to detention, some detainees recounted the way they were arrested thus 
feelings of indignation prevailed, ‘indignation about the way they were arrested being 
asked to come to the police station under false pretenses and arrested and detained, 
spending over 24 hours in a police cell’.328  
 
In short, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment in detention is deemed unlawful either 
through the conditions of detention and where certain treatments that are being meted 
out to detainees fall below acceptable standards. This brings the detainee within the 
purview of absolute nature of Art 3 ECHR and not only Art 5 of the ECHR.329  
 
Torture and Detention Conditions 
 
In the general pattern and trend that exists concerning the conditions of detention, the 
ECtHR had cause to determine the detention and subsequent deportation of a five-year-
old child. In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium330 the ECtHR held that 
the detention and subsequent deportation of a five-year-old child in ‘an adult world’ 
where liberty was restricted thereby exposing her vulnerability was a violation of Art 3 
ECHR.331 In Hurtado v Switzerland 332 (a case that predated Mayeka) the ECtHR had 
held that not providing an applicant with the opportunity to change his clothes is 
degrading treatment and that failure to provide adequate medical treatment following a 
violent arrest was inhuman treatment. Furthermore the ECtHR in Ribitsch v Austria333 																																																								
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held that severe bruises while in detention in police custody suggests ill treatment as 
much as shaving off of detainees’ hair also constitutes degrading treatment contrary to 
Article 3.334 The above cases illustrate to a great extent that the conditions of detention 
could give rise to a violation of Art 3 ECHR if the required standards are not adhered to.  
 
Torture in the Destination Country 
 
The prohibition against torture in the destination country raises the question as to 
whether there is a real risk of exposure to ill treatment to the proposed destination. 
Where the applicant has been removed, the existence of the risk must be assessed with 
reference to fact that the deporting State ought to know. As the ECtHR stated in Cruz 
Varas335 ‘the Court is not precluded from having regard to information which comes to 
light subsequent to the expulsion’. In Soering v United Kingdom336 the court had to 
consider torture in the country of destination. The applicant German national was 
accused of killing his girlfriend’s parents in Virginia the United States (US) and was 
arrested in the United Kingdom. The US sought his extradition to the US where the 
death penalty could be imposed after conviction. In addition, he could be subject to the 
death row phenomenon where prisoners spend up to six and eight years on the death 
row prior to execution. Soering claimed he could face death penalty and the death row 
phenomenon if extradited, and the court agreed that the death row could amount to 
inhuman treatment, which will violate Art 3 ECHR.337 The issue being that the 
applicant having fled the US for the UK was in the jurisdiction of the UK, but the 
treatment if carried out will be done in the US by the US authorities.  
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The UK argued that the Convention should not be interpreted as to impose 
responsibility on a Contracting State for acts, which occur outside its jurisdiction.338 
The court disagreed and emphasized that a Contracting State incur liability for actions 
taken by it that has consequences of exposing an individual to the proscribed ill 
treatment, therefore the nexus or crucial link has been established. Furthermore, 
‘extradition in such circumstances would, according to the Court, 'plainly be contrary to 
the spirit and intendment of the Article' and would 'hardly be protection against 
expulsion under Art 3 ECHR compatible with the underlying values of the 
Convention’.339 
 
Similarly in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium340 the ECtHR found 
that the applicant’s subsequent deportation to a destination country after her detention at 
the host country (as above) was unlawful. The court specifically held that the Belgian 
authorities’ decision to deport the applicant without the provision of adequate 
preparation, supervision and safeguards at the destination country was unlawful. 
However, in Vilvarajah and Others v UK341 the applicants’ asylum seekers were 
deported from the UK but there were undisputed evidence that they will be ill-treated in 
Sri-Lanka but the ECtHR nevertheless did not find a violation of Art 3 ECHR reasoning 
that the UK could not have foreseen without convincing evidence that they would be ill-
treated as they claimed. 
 
In medical cases, torture or degrading treatment can occur in destination countries. This 
is because Art 3 ECHR has equally been held to apply to medical cases where 
deportation would result to harsh suffering for an individual due principally to 
inadequate medical treatment in the destination country. In D v UK342 the ECtHR had to 
consider the proposed removal of alien drug courier dying of AIDS to his country of 
origin, where he was said not to have accommodation, family, moral or financial 
support and no access to medical treatment. If he were deported to St Kitts, the 
treatment, which he depended upon, would not be available coupled with the fact that 
he had no family or relations to support him. The ECtHR held that given the fact that 																																																								
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the applicant has entered into the fatal stages of the illness, removal at this stage would 
hasten his death thereby exposing him to the risk of dying under most distressing 
circumstances; thus inhuman treatment.343 The focus therefore was ensuring a dignified 
death rather than prolonging life.  
 
In N v UK344 the ECtHR nuanced its earlier position in D v UK above where a different 
decision was reached. N was an AIDS sufferer from Uganda, resident in the United 
Kingdom for over five years, having been stabilized with medication, which would not 
be available in Uganda upon removal. The ECtHR held that Art 3 only usually applied 
to intentional acts or omission of a state or non state-body insisting that in medical 
cases, Art 3 applies only in very exceptional circumstances; therefore Art 3 is not meant 
to be used to address the disparity in medical care between the Contracting States and 
the applicant’s state of origin.345 The implication is that N has established a high 
threshold that applicants will cross in determining whether Art 3 is engaged in medical 
cases where removal had been proposed.346 For further details of this discussion, see 
chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
2.4.3 The Right to Private and Family Life 
 
 Article 8 ECHR guarantees the right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence. The right requires a balance given that it is a qualified right and any 
interference, which is according to the law, is permissible and such interference must be 
for a legitimate purpose.  It has been held that ‘human beings are social animals. They 
depend on others. Their family, or extended family, is the group on which most people 
heavily depend, socially, emotionally and often financially’.347 The above statement 
expresses the importance of the right to private and family life, which in immigration 
control in general and deportation in particular may come in conflict with the State’s 
exercise of sovereignty.  
 
The ICCPR makes provision for family rights and specified that ‘no one should be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 																																																								
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correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation’.348 The ECHR in 
its Article 8 guarantees the right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence.349 It is a qualified right that permits interferences in specified 
circumstances; such interferences must be in accordance with the law, for legitimate 
purpose and necessary within the context of the ECHR.350 The right to private and 
family life is more elaborately defined in the ECHR than all other international treaties 
under evaluation, in view of this; our discussion on this right will primarily be restricted 
to the scope of the ECHR in the context of immigration albeit deportation and/or 
removal.  
 
The key significance of Art 8 ECHR for the purpose of this thesis is the protection it 
affords to non-nationals against deportation and/or removal-arbitrary interference by 
public authorities. In K v UK351 the European Commission had stated that the existence 
of family life is contingent on ‘the real existence in practice of close personal ties’. The 
ECtHR further held that ‘whatever the word ‘family’ may mean, it must at any rate 
include the relationship that arises from a lawful and genuine marriage’.352 It has been 
stated in Marckx v Belgium that ‘by guaranteeing the respect for family life, Article 8 
presupposes the existence of a family… it makes no distinction between the 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate family”. Such distinction would not be consonant with the 
word ‘everyone’ [as captured by Art 1 ECHR]’. 353  It has also been determined that 
‘from the moment of the child’s birth and by the very fact of it, there exists between 
him and his parents a bond amounting to family life’.354 Other relationships outside of 
parents and siblings do exist but will depend on the strength of ties involved.355 
 
The ECHR equally protects the private life limb of Art 8 ECHR in the immigration 
context as a bar against deportation and removal. The broad scope of the private life 
limb has been highlighted in Niemietz v Germany356 where the court stated that it is not 
capable of exhaustive definition and must comprise a right to establish and develop 
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relationships with other human beings. Where an individual facing deportation had 
integrated in the host state, his level of integration may give rise to an unjustified and 
disproportionate interference.357  As the court remarked in Razgar v SSHD358 ‘elusive 
though the concept is, I think one must understand "private life" in article 8 as 
extending to those features that are integral to a person's identity or ability to function 
socially as a person’. Warbrick sees the right to private life as a freedom to make 
fundamental decisions over one’s life.359 
 
In its determination and assessment of Art 8, Strasbourg jurisprudence had been 
inconsistent as to the date when it can be said that family life has been formed so as to 
have the potency of inhibiting the deportation of a non-national. In Nasri v France360 
the ECtHR took into account events post-dating the decision as in this case, factors 
about his family and private life were taken into account in 1995 whereas an exclusion 
order was made in 1991. In Boughanemi v France,361 the ECtHR appears to have 
considered the establishment of family life, which may have been established after a 
removal order had been issued. In Konstatinov v Netherlands,362 it was held that a 
person’s precarious immigration status (not having leave to remain) might weigh 
against a breach of Article 8 at the time when family life was formed even when a 
spouse and children are involved. Furthermore in Bouchelkia v France,363 the ECtHR 
held that family life established in a period of unlawful stay could not be used as a bar 
to the deportation of the applicant. Nonetheless, where the removal of a parent will lead 
to a serious disruption of family life with his/her child or children; regardless of the 
applicant’s precarious immigrant status, the interference will be disproportionate.364 The 
point being made is that the ECtHR appears not have developed a consistent pattern of 
assessing the establishment of private and family life potential enough to bar 
deportation of non-nationals even for long term residents, rather, prefers to rely on the 
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circumstances of the individual. This approach has produced differing outcomes and has 
attracted a lot of commentaries.365 
 
Regardless of these inconsistencies as highlighted above, some clear principles may 
have nevertheless emerged from the jurisprudence of the ECHR that might be applied to 
Art 8 rights in expulsion cases regardless of whether the affected individuals are long-
term residents or not.366 In Boultif v Switzerland367 the ECtHR appears to have laid 
down guiding principles in the assessment of interference with family life and the 
question of proportionality to its legitimate aim. The Boultif criteria include amongst 
others, the nature and seriousness of the offence committed, the duration of stay in the 
host State, the time which elapsed since the commission of the offence, the applicant’s 
family situation, whether children are involved and significant obstacles to be faced by 
the applicant’s spouse in the country of destination.368 In a subsequent case that came 
before the ECtHR, the Court added two additional criteria to the Boultif ones in its 
assessment that may inhibit deportation, these are ‘the best interests and well-being of 
the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the 
applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; 
and  the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the 
country of destination’.369   
 
In the domestic context, the courts in the UK following the principles developed by 
Strasbourg jurisprudence have on their own developed principles for the assessment of 
Art 8. The key questions are whether family life exists and if so, does it require respect 
from immigration authorities, if so, is the interference justified, if so, is it necessary in a 
democratic society?370 This is otherwise referred to as the Razgar test. The first two 
questions of the test proceeds to find whether family life exists while the second appears 																																																								
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to have set a threshold for the engagement of Article 8. In AG (Eritrea) v SSHD371 the 
court of appeal explained that the threshold test is not exceptionally high one.  
 
In expanding the concept of proportionality in a removal decision, the House of Lords 
(now Supreme Court) addressed the question of whether the policy of insisting on 
departure from the UK in order to satisfy entry clearance was legitimate and 
proportionate.372 The answer was that only ‘comparatively rarely, certainly in family 
cases involving children, should an article 8 appeal be dismissed on the basis that it 
would be proportionate and more appropriate for the appellant to apply for leave from 
abroad’.373 In further addressing the issue of proportionality, in EB Kosovo (FC) v 
SSHD374 the court considered three points regarding delay by the authorities in failing to 
remove an irregular non-national during which period he would have established private 
and family life making his removal a disproportionate interference. A full discussion of 
the right to private and family as a bar to the expulsion of nationals has been examined 
at Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
2.5 Liberalism and the Defining Elements of a Liberal Democracy as a Prelude to 
the Categorization of the United Kingdom as a Liberal democracy 
 
This thesis is concerned with the UK’s practice on deportation and removal of migrants 
in the context of liberal democracy.  In this connection, ‘liberal democracy’ consists of 
two strands-liberalism and democracy.375 The word ‘liberal’ in the phrase liberal 
democracy refers not to the question of who rules but how the rule is exercised given 
that democracy itself is ‘the rule of the people’ as distinguished from monarchy (rule by 
one person), aristocracy (rule of the best) and oligarchy (rule of the few).376 A liberal 
democratic government is therefore limited in its powers and mode of acting first, by 
the rule of law and most especially by a fundamental law or constitution and ultimately 
by the rights of the individual.377 Therefore, in order to situate the UK as a liberal 
democracy, the thesis undertakes to explain liberalism in a bid to identifying the 																																																								
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defining elements of a liberal democracy. The idea is that liberal democracies have 
salient features and values, which regulate their character and behavior, therefore an 
exploration of these elements, will assist in the assessment of the UK as a liberal 
democracy. By so doing the UK’s State practice regarding deportation and removal of 
migrants will be examined within the confines of a liberal democracy.  
 
Liberalism is a line of modern political theory that begins in some sense with 
Machiavelli and continues through Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau who saw the issue of political freedom as one that pits the State against 
individuals rather than groups.378John Locke as one of the classic commentators of 
liberal principles in his Second Treaties posited that legitimate government must 
reproduce the conditions necessary for ‘perfect freedom […] and equality’ reminiscent 
of the state of nature.379 He argued that liberty and equality could still be upheld under a 
monarchy or mixed government without compromising the rule of law.380 In essence, 
‘the constitutional protection of individual liberty and equality under the rule of law has 
remained fundamental to liberal theory ever since’.381 In his contribution, Skinner was 
concerned that there still remains the danger of individuals being forcibly deprived of 
their liberty by their government, it is therefore crucial that the government of a free 
State should provide enabling environment for the enshrinement of liberty and 
equality.382 Therefore ‘liberals retain the fundamental idea that individuals have equal 
ethical standing and are society’s fundamental ethical unit’.383  
 
In essence, early liberal thinking was enmeshed with the protection of personal liberty 
where the rule of law was required to prevent the interference of the State with the 
rights of individuals in the civil society. Skinner and Paine reconstructed that the 
classical statements credited to Hobbes and Locke made reference to the absence of 
such interference as liberty, in addition, they opined that the subsequent Declarations of 
the Rights of Man embodied the same objective of protecting individuals from arbitrary 																																																								
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power.384 Mill supports their theses and argued vehemently that the only justification 
for interfering with liberty of the individual is for the prevention of harm to others.385  
 
Furthermore, liberals at the time considered that political rights are necessary but not 
sufficient to protect individual liberties and equality before the law given that the rule of 
law must itself be protected by the accountability of government to its citizens therefore 
free and fair elections were sine qua non to the enjoyment of political rights.386 The 
liberals are in agreement that liberty and equality require the provision of civil rights, 
property rights, individual rights (political rights) and by extension, minority 
rights.387Raz had stated that even though liberalism and individualism grew up together, 
they were nonetheless distinct doctrines.388 A cursory look at liberals will reveal that 
their thoughts were based on liberty and equality, accountability of the State to the 
individual as governed by the rule of law. It is important to clarify that equality does not 
connote equal treatment between citizens and non-citizens, being that objective 
differences may justify such distinctions but the State’s action must be legitimate. 
Hansen and King reveal a scenario. In their view ‘an Immigration policy may 
legitimately hold that due to pressures on housing, utilities and employment, 
immigration levels must be reduced but it should not decide on one category of 
migrants such as black migrants or migrants from country X or migrants from a 
particular sexual orientation’.389 State practice in the UK as evidenced in our discussion 
shows that certain immigration policies exist that illegitimately draws such distinctions 
and this may be necessary in the assessment of whether the United Kingdom meets the 
standards requisite of a liberal democracy.390 
 
For clarity, a distinction is drawn between liberalism and new liberalism. Liberalism is 
distinct from new liberalism (neo-liberalism). For Neo-liberals, individuals were no 
longer regarded as solely responsible for their fortunes given that the society seen 																																																								
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through the prism of the State also had a central role to play, arguing that the ‘night-
watchman state of classical liberalism was insufficient’.391 Rather what is required is for 
the State to be more active in creating a socio-economic environment within which real 
freedom can be more fully realized and where it becomes necessary, ‘intervention 
would be needed to level the playing field and to protect the vulnerable’.392 Green 
agreed and stated that ‘it is the business of the State, not indeed directly to promote 
moral goodness […] but to maintain the conditions without which a free exercise of the 
human faculties is impossible’.393 Laying a conceptual background, Harvey posits that 
‘the founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of human dignity and 
individual freedom as fundamental-central values of civilization-and in so doing they 
chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and seductive, powerful and appealing in 
their own right’.394  
 
In the opinion of Clarke, neoliberalism ‘represents a reassertion of the fundamental 
beliefs of the liberal political economy that was the dominant political ideology of the 
nineteenth century above all in Britain and the United States emerging as an ideological 
response to the Keynesian welfare state’.395 Taking an expansive and teleological 
posture, Steger and Roy see neoliberalism as a ‘broad and general concept referring to 
an economic model or ‘paradigm’ that rose to prominence in the 1980s and built upon 
the classical liberal ideal of self-regulating market which comes in several strands and 
variations’.396 They conceptualize neoliberalism as ‘three intertwined manifestations: 
(1) an ideology; (2) a mode of governance; (3) a policy package’.397Neo-liberalism 
therefore ‘emphasizes individual liberty, competition and the self-correcting nature of 
the market, and prioritizes the economic realm over the political sphere and not only 
does it differ from other versions of the tradition, it may actually operate to undermine 
other liberal values’.398 It may weaken the foundations that enable the state to uphold 
the rule of law and protect basic rights.399 As Linz and Stepan have argued, a 																																																								
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functioning and effective state is a prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy that 
it might not simply be the case that some States (transitional States) lack liberalism, but 
may suffer from a wrong kind of liberalism with such capacity to distort and limit their 
democratic potential.400 
 
Having now drawn a distinction between liberalism and neo-liberalism while de-
emphasizing the latter for the purposes of this thesis, I move on to democracy and the 
concept of liberal democracy with a view to discerning its defining elements. 
Democracy seen from a general perspective means ‘rule by the people’ which appears 
to be the common usage across borders with a long heritage dating back to the classical 
times.401 Democracy ‘implies a recognition of the duties of government and the rights of 
the people that postulates a measure of personal freedom and equal consideration for all 
classes’.402 It has been postulated that ‘the challenge of democracy lies in making 
difficult choices, such choices inevitably bring important values into conflict’.403 Some 
Scholars view democracy through a prism of contours separated and tagged 
‘procedural’ ‘substantive’ and ‘process oriented’ which appears to make democracy 
different from its classical variants.404 Others have constructed what they consider ‘a 
newer and more assessable and transparent database of democratic indices and 
indicators in measuring democracy dating back to the 1900’.405 Consideration will only 
be had to liberal democracy for the purposes of this thesis. For Rhoden, regardless of 
the qualifying adjectives, ‘if liberalism and democracy are matters of kind or degree, the 
answer is that democracy is more a matter of degree, whilst liberalism is more a matter 
of kind’.406  
 
Therefore when we speak of modern democracy in a shorthand way, it includes its 
liberal components given that contemporary nation States have both a democratic 																																																								
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component and a liberal component as there may not be in existence purely liberal or 
purely democratic regime in a strict sense.407 Zakaria in his thesis postulated that in the 
West and for almost a century ago, democracy has been synonymous with liberal 
democracy, a political system characterized ‘not only by free and fair elections, but also 
by the rule of law […]’.408 For him, liberal democracy consists of two strands, 
constitutional liberalism and liberalism itself where the two strands woven in the 
western political fabric are falling apart given that democracy is flourishing while 
liberalism is not.409 Dahl’s seminal work on Polyarchy emphasized that democracy was 
primarily concerned with ‘the continuing responsiveness of the government to the 
preferences of its citizens.410 The idea is that by making government accountable to the 
people, it presupposes that the government would guarantee to uphold the law thereby 
supplying the essential link to liberal democracy.411  
 
For a regime to be considered a liberal democracy, it must be democratic in the sense 
that it must protect the rights of individuals and minorities thus guaranteeing freedom or 
liberty of its citizens, with the guarantees expressly stated in its constitutional 
framework with the government further limited by the rule of law.412 This is in contrast 
to the notion ‘illiberal democracy’ characterized by regimes that choose their leaders 
through reasonably accepted free and fair elections but are known to be deficient in the 
rule of law and the protection of individual and minority rights.413 The practice of 
Liberal democracy in the opinion of Hansen and King enlivens a tension between liberal 
and illiberal impulses, basic liberal values being a right to fair treatment, procedural 
equality and the rule of law, equality among all individuals, competing with illiberal 
pressures and impulses such as xenophobia and racism.414  
 
Furthermore, Foweraker and Krznaric coming from a minimal and procedural 
standpoint posit that one of the ways of measuring a liberal democracy is ‘the delivery 
of democratic values or how far liberal governments achieve in practice the values to 
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which they subscribe in principle- accountability, participation, the respect of individual 
rights and the rule of law’.415 It could therefore be reasoned that democratization, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights and good governance are inextricably 
intertwined as structural aspects of liberal democracies.416 In essence, liberal democratic 
ideologies and or constitutions define the democratic character of States where the 
constitution serves as a limit on the authority of the government that delineates 
separation of powers, judicial independence and checks and balances between 
governmental organs thus emphasizing the importance of the rule of law.417 A liberal 
democracy sees itself as inseparable from international human rights with the aim of 
applying the rights effectively and properly matched with individual and collective 
responsibilities.418 Therefore a typical liberal democracy believes in certain values such 
as fundamental freedoms and the rule of law and actively promotes them.419  
 
2.5.1 Liberal Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Context of Migration in the 
United Kingdom 
 
The rule of law is the life-blood of any liberal democratic State. The rule of law has an 
efficacious character, which requires utmost respect given that a blatant disregard for 
the law and or enforcement of unjust laws may destroy its potency.  Dicey opines that 
rule of law implies that every citizen is subject to the law with specific procedural 
attributes and substantive rights required of a legal framework in order to comply with 
the doctrine.420 Raz sees the rule of law as a shorthand description of the positive 
aspects of any given political system.421 Finnis in his contribution describes it as ‘the 
state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape’.422 The ECtHR in Engel 
v The Netherlands refers to the rule of law as a tonic from which the whole Convention 
draws its inspiration.423  																																																								
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Heydon observed that the rule of law ‘prevents citizens from being exposed to the 
uncontrolled decisions of others in conflict with them where powerful citizens are not 
permitted to use self-help against other citizens so far as their arbitrary might permits 
operating as a bar to untrammeled discretionary power’.424 It does so by ‘introducing a 
third factor to temper the exposure of particular citizens to the unrestrained sense of 
self-interest or partisan duty of other citizens or institutions- an independent arbiter- the 
judges who will be allowed free hand to decide the matter’.425 He stressed that the rule 
of law preserves for citizens an area of liberty in which they can live their lives free 
from the raw and direct application of power by so doing creates a framework within 
which the creative aspects of human life can thrive, removing both the reality of 
injustice and the sense of injustice while providing actual remedies.426  
In short, the core principle of the rule of law suggests that ‘all persons and authorities 
within the State, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the 
benefit of the laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and administered in the 
courts’.427  Lord Bingham stated:  
 
1.The law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and 
predictable. 2. Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved 
by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion. 3. Laws of the land 
should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify 
differentiation. 4. The law must afford adequate protection of fundamental 
human rights. 5. Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost 
or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are 
unable to resolve. 6. Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the 
powers conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose for which 
the powers were conferred and without exceeding the limits of such powers. 7. 
Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair. 8. The existing 
principle of the rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations 
in international law. 428 
 
These sub rules in my view can be applied to illustrate the extent at which the United 
Kingdom and other liberal States apply the rule of law especially with respect to non-
nationals (migrants). As Bingham clearly stated in his first sub rule above, the rule of 																																																								
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law demands that the law must be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable.429 This 
means that everyone bound by the law should without undue difficulty see the clarity of 
the law in any course of action.  
 
The ECtHR had confirmed explicitly that the law must be adequately accessible in that 
the citizens [non-citizens] should have indications that are adequate so as to help them 
regulate their conduct.430 It further stated that the law should allow a person the latitude 
to predict or foresee within reasonable circumstances the consequences of any action 
before being taken, 431 and in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd, the UK’s House of 
Lords (now Supreme Court) stated that the law should be sufficiently clear.432 The 
ECHR further incorporates the requirements that any restrictions on the freedoms, 
which it enunciates, must be “in accordance with” or “prescribed by law”.433 This 
means that, they must be subject to the accessibility, intelligibility, clarity and 
predictability test.434  
 
In his contribution to the importance of the rule of law, the former UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan also emphasized amongst others, fairness in the application of the 
law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance 
of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency consistent with international 
human rights norms and standards.435 Therefore, there is a need for a rule of law in 
every state and agreement at the international level by all states that the rule of law 
should operate in national systems, as there are consequences for the state if the rule of 
law is not complied with.436 Therefore the rights of migrants with respect to detention 
pending deportation cannot be secured if the rule of law is not respected given the 
vulnerable nature of such migrants in detention pending deportation and/or removal.   
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It has been suggested that State practices in migration show that the operation of the 
rule of law has not been accorded adequate respect; yet it is essential that the rule of law 
operate in all aspects of migration.437 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH and others v Federal Republic of Germany438 
espouses certainty in its jurisprudence, and held that ‘the principles of legitimate 
expectation and assurance of legal certainty are part of the legal order of the 
Community’.439 As Lord Mance observed, ‘If the law is certain, individuals know what 
to expect as a precondition for legitimate expectation, the authority, which ought to 
know the law, is bound by its own specially created law’.440  
 
In the UK, the constant changes to immigration law may violate the rule of law as 
evident in the way the right to appeal an immigration decision is granted and removed at 
times even by the exercise of discretion contrary to the rule of law which demands that 
legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not 
by the exercise of discretion.441 But the history of immigration law in the UK and other 
liberal democratic states as will be seen is a history of exercise of discretion. The issue 
therefore is that the broader and more loosely textured a decision is, the greater the risk 
of abuse, the greater the risk of subjectivity and arbitrariness which is the antithesis of 
the rule of law. The point being made is that the law is conceived in such a way that a 
significant number of cases are subject to the exercise of discretion implying that 
discretion would be borderline with arbitrariness.442 
 
Further to the above, the rule of law requires that the laws of the land should apply 
equally to all save to the extent that certain objective differences justify such 
differentiation.443 It is clear that the right of citizens and non-citizens with no right of 
abode differ from each other. Citizens of a State enjoy certain privileges that non-
citizens cannot enjoy by virtue of their nationality. Nevertheless, the rule of law does 
not warrant irrelevant distinctions with respect to protection because nationals and non-
nationals within the State’s territorial jurisdiction alike require the same degree of 																																																								
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protection. Lord Scarman opines that he who is subject to English law is entitled to its 
protection, as there is no distinction between British nationals and others in terms of 
protection provided they are all in the UK’s territorial jurisdiction.444 However, part 4 of 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 provides for indefinite detention 
without charge of non-nationals suspected of international terrorism while at the same 
time exempting that liability from nationals who were qualitatively or objectively 
judged to present the same threat. Even though the resulting Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 
has now been repealed, the fact remains that the law did not apply equally between 
nationals and non-nationals with respect to protection.445 
 
Similarly Justice Jackson of the US Supreme court had observed that ‘states and the 
Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their 
inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of 
regulation, adding that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law, which officials 
would impose upon a minority, must be imposed generally the issue of no distinction in 
protection’. He added, ‘nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to 
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation 
[…] Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require 
that laws be equal in operation’.446  
 
In sum, it will be observed that a liberal democracy has features and values and such 
categorizations turn on the qualification as a liberal democracy. The threads that run 
through a liberal democracy as has been identified in this thesis includes the respect of 
international human rights law, the equality of treatment-save for objective differences, 
the respect for the rule of law as has been explained which includes legitimate 
expectation and legal certainty, accountability, transparency and the avoidance of 
arbitrariness. Therefore in the treatment of migrants, it is expected that a liberal 
democracy State such as the United Kingdom will be alive to the protection of the rights 
of migrants and for the purpose of this thesis, right to liberty and security, prohibition 																																																								
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against torture, the protection of the right to private and family life and the right to an 
effective remedy. The above will be employed to measure State practice in the UK and 
whether such State practices are ‘necessary in a democratic society’.447 The assessment 
will assist in answering the question whether the UK complies with its substantive and 
procedural obligations in the expulsion of migrants. I shall now look at the challenges 
faced by a liberal democracy in meeting with its obligations as reflected in the liberal 
democratic paradox, which will be discussed hereunder. 
 
2.5.2 The Liberal Democratic Paradox 
 
A liberal democracy has been construed, as more than the sum of its composite parts 
given that some aspects of liberal democracy conform to its stated standards while 
others nearly seem to be in conflict with each other.448  While one aspect tends to favour 
majoritarian principles the other appears to tilt towards individual rights. Therefore 
‘constructing a regime that is both more liberal and more democratic will pose a 
challenge; for these aspects will always have point of conflict’,449 which in the view of 
Plattner occurs as a democratic disorder known as populism- ‘where democracy 
excessively weakens the protection offered for individual and minority rights as against 
the aggrandizement of its liberal or anti-majoritarian side’.450 For Plattner, populism is 
often accompanied by what he referred to as ‘nativism’ or hostility to immigrants and 
immigration as the populists tend to view the people (majority) as homogenous while 
outsiders (the minority) are viewed as enemies of the people rather than allies.451 This 
tension between two competing sides is referred to as the liberal democratic paradox 
that requires the maintenance of a reasonable balance. 
 
In the immigration context, the liberal democratic paradox has been explained by 
Gibney and Hansen as the capacity to exercise border control, which is fundamental to 
liberal democracy in terms of sovereignty and the reflection of aggregate preferences of 
its citizens as against the deportation of individuals which completely and permanently 
severs the relationship between the State and that of the individual.452 For them, liberal 																																																								
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democratic paradox explains the ‘conflict between the liberal state support for the 
demos (the populace of a democracy) and its support for rights which could be 
addressed through expanded inclusion-by dismantling external measures such as visas 
or on the other hand expanded exclusion- a more frequent recourse to deportation 
thereby matching external restrictions with internal ones’.453  
 
The liberal paradox thus refers to the existence of increasingly restrictive and deterrent 
immigration policy of the State in the extending of the legal protection being granted to 
migrants within its territory.454 This is divided into ‘politics of restriction’ on the one 
hand and the ‘law of inclusion’ on the other hand. By the exercise of sovereignty, the 
State decides who is a citizen and who is not thus the State advances the interest of its 
citizen above the interest of outsiders.455 In contrast, the law of inclusion makes 
reference to the expanding levels of protection enjoyed by migrants within the 
jurisdiction of liberal democracies as required by standards imposed by law.456  
Therefore when the restriction and inclusion elements are juxtaposed, there appears to 
be a conflict where citizen rights influence restrictive entry policies as against human 
rights obligations thus restricting State discretion regarding the deportation or removal 
of migrants.  
 
The challenge faced by liberal democratic states is therefore how to reconcile these 
liberal principles with competing principles of authority, which equally transcends it. 
The tension as it has been argued, exists. Hollified in his ‘gap hypothesis’ believes that 
the tension is amplified by a growing gap between restriction policy intent and 
expansionist immigration reality.457 Tuitt argues that such disparity exposes the friction 
between the aims and objectives of international law and municipal law, which springs 
from the liberal paradox.458 The ECHR amongst other leading instruments ostensibly 
developed the protection of the rights of migrants thus undermining national 																																																								
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sovereignty and domestic order of rights distribution.459 Soysal adds that the paradox 
manifests itself as a de-territorialised expansion of rights even despite the closure of 
polities.460 
 
In a similar vein, Jacobson reasons that what gave rise to the liberal paradox are the 
separation of identity and rights, which are the two components of citizenship. He 
explains that while identity has remained territorially bounded and specific, rights have 
become increasingly abstract, but only defined and legitimated at transnational levels.461 
In affirming the existence of a liberal paradox, Joppke points to the weakness of 
international human rights law which according to him has led to erroneous dualism 
between States and an external human rights regime.462 He arrived at this conclusion 
with the belief that the protection of human rights is constitutive of and not external 
imposition on liberal democracies. Gibney on his part strongly believes that the tension 
between the law of inclusion and politics of restriction is best understood as a reflection 
of a deeper conflict between liberal and democratic values in a liberal democracy.463 
This in my view can be exemplified when the British public vote for increasing closure 
of the frontiers, which potentially engages the violation of human rights, which may be 
interpreted, as the use of democratic means to achieve supposedly undemocratic ends.  
 
As Storey argues, States avoid obligations that expressly safeguard human rights in 
such a disproportionate manner that is reflective in their pattern of legal 
commitments.464 With reference to the ICCPR, the UK placed a reservation on Art 12 
which holds that: ‘the UK reserves the right to continue to apply such immigration 
legislation governing entry into, stay in and departure from the United Kingdom as they 
may deem necessary […]’. The UK did not ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR465 
that enshrines the right of individual petition. Furthermore, the UK is a signatory to the 
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ECHR but to date has not ratified Protocols No.4466 (liberty of movement and 
prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens) and Protocol No.7 (a supposedly tight 
procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens).467 Therefore, the tension 
generated by the fact of being a liberal democracy and its attendant obligations are 
reflected in the paradox.468 For Akakpo and Lennard, ‘whereas liberal political 
philosophy is founded on a commitment to the moral equality of persons, immigration 
challenges this commitment by highlighting that the right of states to choose their 
members treats others unequally in some key respects. Attempts to reconcile the ‘liberal 
universal concern for all persons with the reality of state boundaries and their 
exclusionary policies continue to prove difficult within the limits of liberal political 
theory’.469 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The notion that every State by reason of its territorial supremacy is competent to 
exclude non-nationals partly or wholly from its territory is supported by international 
law but such prerogative authority is subject to a cluster of international law and treaty 
obligations prominent of which was the UDHR, viewed as not imposing legal 
obligations on States at the time of its adoption but remains a primary source of global 
human rights standards based on humanity rather than nationality. 
 
The obligations of States under IHRL also apply extraterritorially so that whenever a 
State exercises its authority abroad, it leads to accountability of its officials and acts 
done by public authorities in the State may have consequences if such acts are attributed 
to them even if they take place by the action of another State in a territory not under its 
jurisdiction. It would equally be unconscionable to permit a State to perpetrate 
violations it could not perpetrate on its territory for this will be contrary to the general 
concept of human rights based on humanity as against nationality. 
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The express right of non-nationals to enter, settle or to be free from expulsion in the 
host states is unknown to the ECHR but any breach of the right of migrants might be 
challenged when it involves their right to life, right to liberty and security, freedom 
from torture or degrading treatment and the right to private and family life. It follows 
that a Contracting State’s decision to deport, or to deny entry to a non-national may be 
successfully challenged where the circumstances attending the detention pending 
deportation and/or removal, or the State’s domestic procedures governing such 
proceedings give rise to a violation of the migrant’s rights as may be applicable. 
 
Liberal democracies as have been argued have salient features and values, which 
regulate their character and behavior. Having explored these elements, the UK was 
adjudged a liberal democracy implying that the UK’s State practice regarding 
deportation and removal of migrants will be examined within the confines of a liberal 
democracy. Prominently, the constitutional protection of individual liberty and equality 
under the rule of law has remained fundamental to liberalism which demands the 
protection of the rights of individuals and minorities thus guaranteeing freedom or 
liberty of its citizens and non-citizens alike in its territorial jurisdiction as expressed in 
its constitutional framework within the ambit of the rule of law. 
 
Therefore, the consideration of the legality of detention pending deportation and/or 
removal of migrants in the UK in the context of liberal democracy requires a discussion 
on liberal democratic ideologies which enlivens a tension in establishing boundaries 
between individual and collective rights, otherwise referred to as liberal democratic 
paradox. This may further be exemplified by the existence of increasingly restrictive 
and deterrent immigration policy of the State in extending the legal protection being 
granted to migrants within its territory. 
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Chapter 3. Immigration Control in the UK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Immigration control, it has been argued, ‘has a strong reliance on spectacle where the 
migration regime must be perceived as competent and for the State to act powerfully in 
the defense of its borders’.470 This is anchored on the assertion that immigration control 
unarguably remains ‘one of the central prerogatives of national sovereignty but 
international human rights obligations require States to comply with their treaty 
obligations regarding the treatment of aliens in their territory’.471  The concern for this 
thesis therefore, is to assess whether the UK’s State practice and legislation in the 
treatment of migrants conform to acceptable international standards that invites the 
examination of State practice governing the detention and subsequent deportation of 
migrants.  
 
Having laid the foundation and provided the framework for the position of international 
human rights law in the detention and expulsion of migrants in the United Kingdom in 
Chapter Two, this chapter will discuss the various sources of immigration law in form 
of Immigration Acts and its supplement, Immigration Rules that have effect on State 
practice. The discussion will be carried out thematically in order to unravel the 
revolving issues and trends in immigration control. The effect of some of these 
legislations is that they create special immigration status (precarious immigration status) 
for migrants that in turn create the enabling environment for their detention and 
subsequent deportation and/or removal, which as will be argued, are incompatible with 
liberal democratic ideals.  
 
In this chapter, references will be made to three other selected liberal democratic states-
the United States of America, Australia and France whose immigration reality offers 
significant similarities with the UK. This is in order to put the analysis of immigration 
issues in the UK within the broader context of other liberal democracies by way of 
convergence, divergence, diffusion and dilemmas of practices in immigration control. 																																																								
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As has been observed, the UK, USA, Australia and France are major receiving countries 
in terms of immigration.472 They are liberal democratic countries given their 
constitution and democratic practices.473 USA and Australia are outside the European 
Union while UK and France are within the European Union. In the views of 
Groenendijk, Guild and Dogan, ‘Europe over time has become the western target of 
immigrant flows and migration policies seem to have increased rapidly with the reaction 
that they have adopted deportation and detention as standard practices’.474 This is 
connected with the finding by a British Social Attitudes Survey, which found that 
immigration is one of the only areas in which public opinion has not become more 
liberal in the last two decades.475  
 
3.2 Immigration Control, Citizenship and the Interplay of Sovereignty 
 
As a ‘matter of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a 
State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory’.476 Therefore a 
fundamental principle of State sovereignty is that States enjoy the discretion over the 
admission, residence and expulsion of non-nationals in their territorial jurisdiction.477 
The exercise of sovereignty has over time affected the plight of non-nationals as the 
pre-twentieth-century developments illuminated the idea that ‘the alien was literally a 
non-person’.478 This changed substantially in the middle ages due principally to 
Christianity, which was the prevalent religion in the West that emphasized the inherent 
dignity and equality before God of all human beings, changing the fact that the alien 
was no more a non-person.479 This was to be followed by the rise of diplomatic 
protection in the development of international legal doctrine where cognizance was 
made of the right of the State to protect its citizens abroad- a doctrine with the 																																																								
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theoretical underpinning set by Emmerich de Vattel in his 1758 classic treatise The Law 
of Nations where he opined that ‘Whoever uses a citizen ill indirectly offends the State 
which is bound to protect its citizen’480, even though it has ‘no duty to do so if it so 
chose’.481   
 
As Dunn pointed out ‘it was not until the nineteenth century that the development of a 
body of law governing the treatment of aliens really got underway’.482 Therefore it was 
up to the State to seek redress for the wrong done to its citizens as the citizen in an alien 
country has no direct right to seek redress which exposes three possibilities namely ‘the 
attribution of injury to the home State of the injured alien; the attribution of the 
wrongful act to the State in which the alien resided; and the doctrine of the exhaustion 
of local remedies known as State responsibility’.483 
 
In the first aspect of diplomatic protection above-the attribution of injury to the home 
State of the injured alien-rather than the aggrieved individual himself, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case 
held: 
 
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect 
its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by 
another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through 
the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by 
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, 
a State is in reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its 
subjects, respects for the rules of international law.484 
 
The difficulty then is that the traditional doctrine of diplomatic protection was not very 
much about the rights of the alien, strictly speaking, but about the rights and duties of 
States more especially when the individual and the State has differences as to whether 
or not to bring a claim and given that the claim belongs to the State, its opinion holds 																																																								
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sway.485  As Lillich remarked ‘traditional international law sought to induce States to 
maintain certain minimal conditions as reflected in the international minimum standard 
by penalizing them when they fail to do so’.486 In the opinion of Sohn and Baxter, ‘the 
law has not only protected aliens but has also suggested a desideratum for States in their 
relationships with their own nationals’.487   
 
Borchard expressed that ‘while equality is the ultimate that the alien may ask of 
municipal law, which is by no means bound to grant equality, the body of international 
law developed by diplomatic practice and arbitral decision, indefinite as it may be, 
represents the minimum which each state must accord the alien whom it admits’.488 This 
is regardless of whether it is the fundamental, natural, or inherent rights of humanity in 
general or the alien in particular; this minimum standard has acquired a permanent place 
within the ambit of protection in international forums.489 What the standard did was to 
set a certain number of basic rights established under international law which States are 
under obligation to grant to aliens regardless of the treatments accorded to their own 
citizens, such that violations of this norm triggers international responsibility of the host 
State that may open the way for international State responsibility by the injured state.490  
 
By and large, the Minimum Standard of Treatment in international law can be said to 
have originated from the doctrine of denial of justice from ancient Greece that endured 
into the early 20th century and forming part of the natural law legacy of the law of 
nations.491 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
thus defines international minimum standard, as ‘a norm of customary international law 
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which governs the treatment of aliens, by providing for a minimum set of principles 
which States, regardless of their domestic legislation and practices, must respect when 
dealing with foreign nationals and their property’.492 This can be understood in 
analyzing the ratio of the 1926 decision on the Neer claims493 alongside the Roberts 
claims494; these became the landmark case for the international minimum standard.  
 
In the Neer claims495 the victim Paul Neer was a U.S. national who was murdered on his 
way back from a mine where he worked. Following this event, his wife filed a claim 
arguing that the Mexican Government had shown lack of diligence in investigating and 
prosecuting the murder. The Mexico/ U.S.A General Claims Commission496 found that 
even though the murder did not violate the international minimum standard on the 
treatment of aliens but noted that the authorities should have acted in a more effective 
way to protect the alien. In the Roberts claims,497 Roberts was a U.S. national who had 
been confined for nineteen months in a small cell along with some other men. The place 
of confinement had no sanitary facilities, no furniture and no opportunities for exercise. 
The Mexico/ U.S.A General Claims Commission then declared that although equality is 
relevant in determining the merits of a complaint of mistreatment of an alien, it is 
nonetheless, not the ultimate test of the propriety of the acts of authorities in the light of 
international law. Rather, the test is whether aliens are treated in accordance with 
ordinary standards of civilization. On facts of the case, the Claims Commission 
concluded that the treatment of Roberts was such as to warrant an indemnity on the 
ground of cruel and inhumane imprisonment. 
 
It is therefore the case that attempts have been made in emphasizing the rights of aliens, 
synthesizing as it did the concept of human rights and the principles governing the 
treatment of aliens. This arguably raised the standard, extending to 1945 developments 
concerning human rights, which have now come to provide a new content for 
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international standard that are solely based on human rights principles, becoming part of 
customary international law.498 
 
With further developments which space may not permit here, human rights norms 
factored in the UN Charter and subsequently engrained in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in concert with the International Bill of Rights as discussed in Chapter 
Two of this thesis preempted the treatment of aliens-minimum standards of treatment as 
a rule of customary international law.499 In essence, the notion that every State by 
reason of its territorial sovereignty is competent to exclude non-nationals partly or 
wholly from its territory constitute a general principle of international law which has 
been confirmed in myriads of cases in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.500  However, as 
Bryan and Langford noted ‘although States’ prerogative authority in this regard exists, it 
is rather subject to a cluster of international law and treaty obligations’.501 This is 
simply because the international legal regime and its attendant institutions presume that 
while individual States can maintain sovereignty over its internal affairs, ‘they are 
nonetheless accountable to upholding certain principles and standards in the exercise of 
sovereignty which calls for a reconciliation of sovereignty with universality of human 
rights law’.502 Herein lies the debate, which will be examined by the pages that follow. 
 
Clearly stated, international law allows States in the exercise of sovereignty to lay down 
rules governing the grant of its own nationality (citizenship).503 As Harris puts it:  
 
Nationality is a legal bond having at its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with 
reciprocal rights and duties, constituting as it may, juridical expression of the 																																																								
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Human Rights of Aliens under International and Comparative Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 2-
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fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by law, or as a 
result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected to the 
population of the State conferring nationality than with any other state’.504   
 
More so, nationality according to Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts ‘is the 
principal link between individuals and international law, the right of protection over its 
nationals abroad […] and the duty of receiving on its territory its nationals as are not 
allowed on remaining on the territories of other states’.505 Put objectively, ‘nationals 
have a special and more permanent tie with the State of their nationality and while they 
have some obligations towards the State of their nationality, they also have a right of 
abode’506 and are entitled to the protection of the State at various levels.507 Nationality is 
of ‘foremost importance in the life of an individual which will determine his or her right 
to enter a country and under what circumstances’.508 The UDHR has expressed that 
everyone has a right to nationality and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality or even denied the right to change his nationality.509  
 
In Oppenheim’s view ‘nationality of an individual is his quality of being a subject of a 
certain state, and therefore its citizen, it is not for international law but for municipal 
law to determine who is, and who is not to be considered a subject’.510 Writing on a 
submission to the UK Parliament on the government’s proposal to introduce a system of 
temporal exclusion orders intended to be applied against British citizens, Goodwin-Gill 
emphasized that the intended action ‘raises a number international legal issues including 
responsibility of the States to its citizens and the international community of states at 
large, stating that there is no justification in international law for the exclusion, even 
temporarily, of British citizens from the United Kingdom’.511  
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507 William W Bishop Jr, International Law: Cases and Materials (3rd edn, Little Brown & Co Law & 
Business Publishing 1971) 488 
508 Carmen Tiburcio, (506) 6 
509 See UDHR Art 15 
510 L Oppenheim, International Law (8th edn, Longmans, Green & Co 1955) 642 
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>accessed 25 March 2015 
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Put simply, citizenship is commonly seen as membership in a state.512 Therefore 
citizenship in the language of the British Nationality Act 1948 (BNA 1948) and 
subsequently extended by the BNA 1981 suggests that citizenship rights held by an 
individual determine his/her status and the ancillary implication in deportation and 
removal matters.513 As Gibney captures it ‘the possession of citizenship therefore offers 
a unique level of residence in a state’.514 This means that it is almost difficult if not 
impossible to deport or expel a citizen except through denationalization.515  
 
In the Nottebohm case (Liechtensen v Guatemala) 516 the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) inter alia was called upon to ‘adjudge and declare that the Government of 
Guatemala in arresting, detaining, expelling and refusing to re-admit Mr. Nottenbohm 
[…] acted in breach of their obligations under international law’.517 Mr. Nottebohm was 
a German national, born in Hamburg who later in 1939 applied for naturalization in 
Liechtenstein. In 1905, he went to Guatemala and took up residence, settling for 34 
years there making it the headquarters of his business activities, while maintaining 
business connections in Germany. He had some of his friends and relatives in Germany 
and Guatemala, whom he paid visits but he later succeeded in naturalizing and obtained 
Liechensten’s passport. In answering that question relevant to the admissibility of the 
case, the ICJ considered that different factors are taken into account and their 
importance will vary from one case to the other while giving prominence to the 
‘habitual residence of the individual concerned but also the centre of his interests, his 
family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country 
and inculcated in his children’.518   
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Despite the core attachment of nationality (citizenship) Harvey opines that 
‘international legal order tends to emphasize ‘“all human beings”, “every human being”, 
“everyone”, “anyone”, “all persons”, “no one”’519 which suggests that what is important 
is the fact of being human which in any event does not vitiate or displace the existence 
of nationality or citizenship. A further implication of the International legal order as 
emphasized by Harvey is that ‘“International bill of Rights” is generally insistent on the 
inclusive applicability and the erosion of distinctions based on citizenship simply for the 
purpose of right protection’.520  
 
In her essay, Gil-Bazo expressed the fact that in the light of the ‘more comprehensive 
nature of other international human rights treaties, notably the ICCPR and the ECHR, 
these IHRMBs [International Human Rights Monitoring Bodies] have had the chance to 
pronounce themselves on issues regarding the specific attachment-other than 
nationality-between individuals and States which may, under certain circumstances 
require the State not merely to refrain from expelling the individual but rather to take 
positive measures to ensure their stay and integration in the host country’.521  She 
asserted that the UN Human Rights Committee had had cause to ‘consider extensively 
the relationship that exists between individuals and States other than nationality, 
particularly the legal relevance of such significant attachments other than nationality’.522 
 
In short, the jurisprudence of the HRC and the ECHR have emphasized the importance 
of factors other than nationality establishing close and strong ties, enduring and durable 
connections between a person and a country, sufficient to engaging connections that 
may be stronger than that of nationality thus making the deportation of the individual 
disproportionate.523 
 
The UK’s Immigration Rules on its part reflect the importance of ties given that 
paragraph 276ADE (in force from 09 July 2012) allows a grant of settlement for those 
																																																								
519 Collin Harvey, ‘Time for Reform? Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Protection Under International 
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523 See HRC, Stewart v Canada (1996) Communication No. 538/1993; Nystrom v Australia (2011) 
Communication No 1557/2007; Beldjoudi v France App No 12083/86 (ECtHR, 26 March 1992); Boujlifa 
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who have remained in the UK for over 20 years, whether lawfully or otherwise.524 In 
addition, paragraph 276ADE (iv) allows a grant of leave for those who have remained 
in the UK for less than 20 years discounting any period of imprisonment, but having no 
ties (including social, cultural or family) in their country of origin.525 It then follows that 
ties established in the State by the migrant places the individual in an advantage for the 
grant of leave with certain other benefits enjoyed by citizens such that any expulsion 
from the State ought to take the strong and enduring connections into account. 
Similarly, Immigration Act 2014, s 19 tagged ‘Article 8 of the ECHR: public interest 
considerations’ which replaces Part 5 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002 (s117A-117B) makes it mandatory for a court or tribunal to have regard to 
“integration into society” when considering whether a decision made under the 
Immigration Acts breaches a person’s right to respect for private and family life.526 
 
It could then be surmised that the movement of persons (migration) across international 
boundaries especially non-nationals (aliens, migrants) raise issues of admission, 
residence and expulsion. The UN General Assembly has reaffirmed the rights of States 
to enact and implement migratory policies and border security measures but in doing so 
cautioned against adopting legislation or measures that restrict the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of migrant in complying with their obligations under 
international human rights law.527 Consistent with the above is the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art 12 which states that everyone is 
free to leave any country, including his own, international human rights law does not 
recognize a corollary right to enter or reside in another State’s territory,528 the 
Convention on the other hand accepts that International Human Rights Law (IHRL) 
‘imposes obligations in respect of other treatments towards migrants with respect to 
measures of border control’.529  
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3.2.1 Socio-Political Dimension of Citizenship and the Interplay of Sovereignty 
 
Viewed from a socio-political dimension, the decision to admit or expel the citizen who 
had made claim on the sovereign is the test for the performance of the sovereign.530 As 
Nyers argues, ‘the recognition of citizen/sovereign occurs not exclusively at the border 
but does include the entry and exclusion decision’.531 Citizenship is therefore a political 
identity between state, citizen and territory to the exclusion of all others; it goes beyond 
a legal status accorded to an individual by a State to active construction by State 
action.532  
 
In his contribution to the socio-political dimension, Gibney asserted that ‘migration is 
usually driven by inequalities between states and regions with the cumulative effect of 
creating non-citizens’.533 Regardless of this distinction, States under international 
human rights law (IHRL) are guided by certain standards of treatment meted to persons 
in their territorial jurisdiction, whether citizens or not. Such standards are codified under 
various international legal instruments to which states are bound and or by customary 
international law practiced by the international community.534 In words of Joppke, ‘an 
emergent international human rights regime protects migrants independent of their 
nationality, limiting the discretion of states toward aliens and devaluing national 
citizenship’.535 
 
In essence, immigration control is a central and arguably a ‘necessary feature in the 
maintenance of liberal democracies that implies two capacities: one is to block the entry 
of individuals to a State and the other is to secure the return of those who have entered 																																																								
530 Mark Salter, ‘When the exception becomes the rule: Borders, Sovereignty, and Citizenship’ (2008) 12 
Citizenship Studies 365, 375 
531 P Nyers, ‘Abject Cosmopolitanism: the politics of protection in the anti-deportation movement’ (2003) 
24 Third World Quarterly 1069, 1093; for further discussion on this issue, see Mark Salter, 
‘Governmentalities of an Airport: heterotopia and confession’ (2007) 1 International Political Sociology 
49, 50-67; S Taylor, ‘Sovereign power at the border’ (2005) Public Law Review 16, 55-77 
532 Bridget Anderson, “Illegal Immigrant”: victim or villain (2008) 64 ESRC Centre on Migration and 
Policy Working Paper 7 
533 Gibney, ‘Precarious Residents’ (n514) 1; for further discussions on this, see generally Etienne Balibar, 
We, the People of Europe? Reflections on transnational citizenship (Princeton University Press 2004) 
180; Anne McNevin, ‘Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and Strategic Possibilities for Political 
Belonging’ (2008) 31 New Political Science 163, 166; Alexander Aleinikoff and Vincent Chetail (eds) 
Migration and International Legal Norms (Asser Press 2003) 21; Paulina Tambakaki, Human Rights or 
Citizenship? (Birbeck Law Press 2010) 13 
534 This has been fully been discussed at Chapter Two of this Thesis, see particularly section 2.3 of 
Chapter Two. 
535 Christian Joppke, ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’ (1998) 50 (2) World Politics 
266, 268 
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thereby raising fundamental concerns to liberal democratic ideologies as control may 
require the forcible expulsion of persons from the national territory; this requires 
bringing the powers of the state to bear against an individual’.536 The effect might be 
‘the complete and permanent severing of relationship between the individual and the 
State’.537 Moreover, ‘physically removing individuals against their will, from 
communities in which they wish to remain, effectively cuts the social, personal and 
professional bonds created over the course of residence with connected degrees of 
hardship which cannot easily be denied’.538 The point being made is that the coercive 
power of States in expulsion destroys the ties, degree of integration, strong connections 
with the host State usually exemplified by consequent loss of social and cultural ties 
with the country of origin of the migrant due principally to the length of time in the host 
State and other relationships developed by migrants during the course of their residence 
which is not capable of exhaustive definition.  
 
In short, immigration control requires a decision on entry and exit. Gibney and Hansen 
identify three categories. ‘The first category involves those evading port or entrance 
officials or by using fraudulent documentation, the second involves those that breached 
their specific terms of entry and residence-overstaying their work permit, tourism or 
visit visas or those who have committed a crime which may then necessitate 
enforcement actions against them while the third category involves those who gained 
entrance or continued residence in the state on the basis of an asylum claim whose 
application has been rejected’. 539 The phenomenon of irregular immigration in the view 
of Joppke, reflects the ‘gap between restrictionist policy goals and expansionist 
outcomes which is not actively solicited by States compared to the legal quota of the 
classic settler nations’540 with such restrictionist policies playing out in the form of 
admission and expulsion. As Arendt observed, ‘sovereignty is nowhere more absolute 
than in matters of emigration, naturalization, nationality and expulsion’.541   
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By and large, migration albeit irregular migration, ‘is a feature of most liberal 
democratic states and it is said to be high on policy agendas particularly in relation to 
border controls where migrants use irregular and undocumented means of entry to 
accomplish their various motives and aspiration for the migration project’542 with 
consequences for international human rights law and lays the foundation for a thematic 
discussion in this chapter. Such discussions will revolve inter alia on hostility, patterns 
of control, appeal rights and right to an effective remedy, parliamentary scrutiny, 
temporary admission and precarious immigration status, convergent and divergent 
immigration practices amongst liberal democracies and the exercise of discretion. 
 
3.3 Immigration Control and Hostility 
 
In the UK, the history of immigration control through the instrumentality of the law 
‘consists of a complex body of statutes, rules and case law governing entry which did 
not exist prior to the twentieth century, rather there were numerous provisions 
controlling the movement of aliens’.543  In summary, the power to remove or exclude 
aliens during the previous 200 years required parliamentary approval whether 
temporary in effect or permanent.544 The implication here is that exclusion was a key 
issue that requires parliamentary scrutiny where executive deference in the form of 
discretion or policies was not permitted. This seems at variance today where there 
appears to be less parliamentary scrutiny with respect to the enactment of immigration 
rules.545 According to Clayton, the issue of hostility even with modern day immigration 
control in the UK can be gleaned from ‘the persecution of the Jews in Eastern Europe 
towards the end of the nineteenth century’.546 Commenting on the issue of hostility in 
the Aliens Act, albeit the 1905 Act, in its 100th anniversary in 2005, Sedon remarked 
that ‘it is depressing that there still exists so much xenophobia and so many negative 
attitudes about immigration’.547 In addition, the British Social Attitudes survey on 
public attitudes towards immigration in 2003 ‘reflected the negativity surrounding the 
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issue, with public opposition increasing sharply from the already recorded high 
levels’.548  
 
The implication for this study is that measures were put in place to secure the State from 
perceived enemies (alien enemies) and such perception led to hostility. Better still, it 
was typical that the State was hostile to aliens due inter alia to fear of migrants, 
perceived as a threat or were demonised by the general public and in a bid to control 
them, the State put in place certain measures that led to the creation of multiple rules in 
the pattern of immigration control as it will be shown.549   
 
3.4 Patterns of Immigration Control 
 
In 1793, ‘a statute was passed to control the entry of aliens, which at this time was 
directed towards travellers from France, as a result of the French Revolution that was 
said to have stirred up fervour in England.550 While some may have remained in certain 
forms in modern law, by and large the immigration law of the last 100 years as has been 
reported ‘is a very different creature from the Royal Proclamations.551 The Aliens Act 
1905 was the first major piece of modern immigration legislation that marked the 
inception of the Immigration Act and the appeal system.552 Hayter notes the significance 
of the Aliens Act 1905, given that it was the first time since the reign of Elizabeth 1 that 
proper immigration control under an established legal framework commenced. 553 As 
Block and Schuster saw it, ‘during the early part of the twentieth century, the Home 
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Office was also involved in the occasional enforced repatriation and expulsion of 
indigent sailors from Africa and Asia’.554  
 
According to Wray, the Act’s ‘commitment to exclusion was partial at the level of 
policy, law and implementation and while equivocation was more evident than in later 
periods, due to the novelty of a system of control, a constant factor is the tension 
between restriction and liberalization and the inconsistent structures and unofficial 
purposes to which this gives rise’.555 This was the beginning of tighter restrictions 
evidencing the power of the State in immigration control given that the Act has been 
framed as the major antecedent to Britain’s more substantial and enduring legislative 
moves […]’.556 Grahl-Madsen has expressed the view that the ‘Aliens Act 1905 and its 
successors of 1914 and 1919 were particularly important stepping-stones in the history 
of modern aliens legislation’557 whose effect has left a footprint on State practice in 
immigration control followed by other Acts that sustained the impetus for 
deportation.558 
 
Furthermore, an integral pattern of immigration control is the introduction and interplay 
of discretion rather than law itself. An immigration officer had a wide discretion (a 
plethora of unpublished instructions in the form of guidelines and concessions) under 
the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962 Act.559 The use of guidelines and 
concessions, as will be seen in the course of this research appears to be a peculiar 
feature of British immigration law, which relies heavily on unpublished instructions, 
guidelines and concessions. This reliance has consequences for the legality of 
deportation and removal of migrants in the UK because the State can set targets for 
detention and removal of immigration offenders without recourse to due process.  
 
In the light of the existence of wide discretionary powers during the early days, 
Chimienti thinks that, ‘liberal British migration policy has been in decline since 1962 																																																								
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because of series of Immigration Acts promulgated in order to limit the settlement of 
certain migrants’.560 But Dell ‘Olio disagrees arguing that ‘from 1948-1962, Britain 
operated one of the most liberal immigration regimes in the world, granting citizenship 
to millions of colonial subjects as part of a policy aimed to support the ties between 
Britain and the Old Dominions’.561 That argument might not hold water given that 
current UK’s State practice in immigration as will be shown in due course evidence 
tighter controls by the application of discretion as further exemplified by the 
Immigration Act 1971, s 3 (2) which states:  
 
The Secretary of State shall from time to time (and as soon as may be) lay 
before Parliament statements of the rules, or of any changes in the rules, laid 
down by him as to the practice to be followed in the administration of this Act 
for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons required 
by this Act to have leave to enter, including any rules as to the period for which 
leave is to be given and the conditions to be attached in different circumstances 
[…]562 
 
However, the courts have had to review the exercise of discretion as was aptly 
demonstrated in Padfield v Minister of Agriculture 563 where it was held that no 
discretion is unfettered and that every discretion is reviewable. Furthermore, in R v 
Environmental Secretary ex parte Spath Holme Limited 564 the issue of discretion came 
alive again and Lord Nichols considered its import and ramifications and held that the 
discretion given by Parliament is never absolute or unfettered stating specifically that 
‘powers are conferred by Parliament for a purpose and they may be lawfully exercised 
only in furtherance of that purpose’. The general trend therefore is that immigration 
control became more restrictive with the general exercise of discretion, which the 1971 
Act gave statutory footing. 
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3.4.1 Appeal Rights and Right to an Effective Remedy 
 
The limitation of appeal rights directly was another salvo fired to sustain the pattern of 
immigration control. The Asylum and Appeals Act 1993 (The 1993 Act) came into 
being as a result of concerns to enforce the appeal rights of asylum seekers, in addition 
the concept of certification which means claims without foundations.565 The 
Immigration and Nationality Act 2006 further tinkered with the right of appeal of 
migrants. The UK Borders 2007 Act went further in interfering with right of appeal for 
‘in-country’ leave to remain applications under the points based system.566 Quite 
recently, the Immigration Act 2014, s 15 (5) makes reference to section 85 (5) of the 
2002 Act and akin to the UK Borders Act 2007 and states that the ‘Tribunal must not 
consider a “new matter” unless the Secretary of State has given the Tribunal consent to 
do so’567, which has a bearing on the right to an effective remedy. 
 
The purpose of the right to an effective remedy is to safeguard the right of individuals in 
the event of breach by the State and to increase judicial protection offered to 
individuals’ complaints regarding alleged violation of their rights. The ICCPR’s regime 
on expulsion of non-nationals requires procedural safeguards against arbitrary State 
action as against the substantive grounds in ECHR Art 13.568 As Kuijer observes, the 
primary aim of Art 13 ECHR is to increase judicial protection offered to individuals’ 
complaints regarding alleged violation of their rights, which follows that the right to an 
effective remedy is an essential pre-condition and a guard to an effective human rights 
law which serves as a safety net.569  
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In my view, the relevance of the right to an effective remedy in agreement with Kuijer 
cannot be over-emphasized. Despite the fact that it serves as a ‘safety net’ it seems to 
me that the right highlights the relevance of human rights in essentially fact-finding 
nature as it provides succor and palliatives against violations of rights. The purpose of 
the right therefore is to ensure that the substance of the ECHR rights are enforced at the 
national level in any form the remedy takes in the domestic context.570 In Klass and 
Others v Germany571, the ECtHR held that Art 13 should be interpreted as requiring an 
effective remedy before a national authority for those who claim that their rights and 
freedoms under the Convention have been violated.572 The ECtHR in Boyle and Rice 
further stated that grievances under Art 13 must be arguable.573 A claim is arguable if it 
is supported with demonstrable facts and not manifestly lacking grounds in law.574  
 
In Silver v UK575, the ECtHR emphasized that ordinary discretional remedies will be 
inadequate as there must be an element of compulsion.576 The UNHRC had observed 
that the notion of an effective remedy under Art 13 requires independent and rigorous 
scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment 
contrary to Art 3 ECHR emphasizing that the remedy must be ‘effective’ and must take 
a form of guarantee.577  It follows from the above that a ‘Contracting State’s decision to 
deport, or to deny entry to a non-national may be successfully challenged only where 
the circumstances attending the deportation, or the State’s domestic procedures 
governing such deportations, give rise to a violation of one or more of the ECHR’s 
Articles or Protocols’,578 and it remains to be seen whether this right to effective remedy 
is indeed effective. 
 																																																								
570 Boyle and Rice v UK, App no 9659/82 (ECtHR, 27 April 1988) para 52 
571 App no 5029/71 (ECtHR, 6 September 1978) para 64 
572 See also Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, Art 47 states: ‘Everyone whose rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a 
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article’. 
573 Boyle and Rice (n570) para 52 
574 ibid 
575 App no 5947/72 (ECtHR 25 March 1983) 
576 ibid, para 115-117 
577 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Statement on the right to an effective remedy in relation to accelerated asylum 
procedures’: Issued in the context of the preliminary ruling reference to the Court of justice of the 
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Asylum Procedures Directive (APD); and Article 6 and 13 ECHR’, para 45  
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578 Ian Bryan and Peter Langford, ‘Impediments to the Expulsion of Non-Nationals: Substance and 
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3.4.2   Retroactive Legislation, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Immigration Rules 
 
The Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (2002 Act) engrained the principle 
of retroactive legislation given the provisions of s 76 (5) which states that ‘A power 
under Sub section (1) or (2) to revoke may be exercised- (a) in respect of leave granted 
before this section comes into force; (b) in reliance of anything done before this section 
comes into force’. This means that even if the Act came into force on 10 February 2003 
reliance can be placed on anything done before it came into force thus giving the Act 
retrospective effect.  
 
Furthermore, it has been identified that some immigration laws are passed without 
adequate and crucial parliamentary scrutiny. The 2002 Act and the Treatment of 
Claimants Act 2004 Act as report and debate in Parliament confirmed were passed 
without crucial parliamentary scrutiny for compatibility with human rights. In his 
comment during the debate, Lord Lester stated that ‘the unfortunate effect of lack of 
parliamentary scrutiny would be that the matter would open up legal challenges’.579 
Previously under the Status of Alien Act 1914 s 27, parliamentary scrutiny was a key 
issue where executive deference in the form of discretion or policies was not 
permitted.580 
 
On Immigration Rules, it has been noted that the Secretary of State makes the 
Immigration Rules consistent with the 1971 Act, s 1 (4).581 The procedure is that the 
rules must be laid before Parliament and immediately takes effect when either the 
House of Commons or the House of Lords votes, approve it.582 The full statement of 
immigration rules is the ‘HC 395’ pursuant to s 3 (2) of the 1971 Act.583 It may be made 
several times a year and when this is done, it adds, amends or completely replaces the 
previous statement.584 Since the advent of the Immigration Rules, arguments have arisen 																																																								
579 HL Deb 6 July 2004, vol 663 col 722 
580 See the discussion on this at section 3.3 of this thesis; State Papers, vol 42 (1852-1853) cited by Ian 
Macdonald and Ronan Toal, Macdonald’s Immigration Law and Practice (n235); Jessica Levy, 
Strengthening Parliament’s Powers of Scrutiny: An assessment of the introduction of Public Bills 
Committee (UCL 2009) 49; see also R Hazell, ‘The Continuing Dynamism of Constitutional Reform’ 
(2007) 60 Parliamentary Affairs 3, 25; A King, ‘Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, 
France, and the West Germany’ (1976) 1 (1) Legislative Studies Quarterly 11, 13 
581 See Immigration Act 1971, s 1 (4) 
582 Immigration Act 1971, s 3 (2) 
583  Home Office <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1012/hc17/1733/1733.pdf > 
accessed 06 December 2014 
584 ibid 
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as to the true nature and legal status of the rules; whether they are rules of law or not. 
However in 1968, the Court of Appeal seized an opportunity in Pearson v IAT 585 where 
it stated that although the immigration rules are not delegated legislation or rules of law, 
but rules of practice laid down for guidance of those entrusted with the administration 
of the Act, having the force of law for those hearing immigration appeals. According to 
Buxton LJ in Odelola v SSHD 586 the immigration rules are not ‘rules of law’ but they 
are a source of legitimate expectation that they will be applied and they now have legal 
force and the force increases as the rules become precise. In addition, they are no longer 
the rules of guidance for entry clearance or for immigration officers as ordinarily 
seen.587  
 
The conclusion is that retroactive legislation; inadequate parliamentary scrutiny and the 
elasticity of immigration rules engender the deportation and/or removal of migrants by 
systematic denial of leave where the creation of irregularity is unarguably the outcome. 
 
3.5 Precarious Immigration Status and Deportation: Conceptualization and 
Factual Matrix 
 
The UK Borders Act 2007 Act, s 32-39 introduced automatic deportation for those 
foreigners who have committed certain criminal offences. Whereas the 2006 Act 
increased the immigration officers’ powers of arrest the 2007 Act gave them increased 
powers of detention.588 The Criminal justice and Immigration Act 2008 followed this 
and makes provision for the implementation of the 2007 Act for the deportation of 
criminals under the 2007 Act.589 The Explanatory Notes to the 2008 Act uses the phrase 
‘Special Immigration Status’ to equate a ‘precarious status’ a phrase employed by 
Gibney and others in their several works in the examination of subgroup of migrants 
who possess few social, political or economic rights and are highly vulnerable to 
deportation with little or no option for securing their immigration status.590 The 2008 
Act from its enactment was inundated with the aim of creating a ‘special immigration 
																																																								
585 [1978] Imm AR 212 
586 [2008] EWCA Civ 308 [12-20] (Buxton LJ)  
587 ibid 
588 See section 53 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 and the UK Borders Act 2007 s 2 
& 36. 
589 See the preamble of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008  
590 Gibney, ‘Precarious Residents’ (n514) 1; Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti, ‘Citizenship, Deportation 
and the Boundaries of Belonging’ (n3) 547 
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status’, limbo or precarious status for migrants.591 In creating such precarious status, the 
2008 Act removed all legal rights to remain (such as revocation of their leave to remain 
of those affected) from persons who have been convicted of a criminal offence but who 
cannot be deported for legal reasons.592  
 
Section 132 (4) of the Act specifies that ‘a designated person shall not be deemed to 
have been given leave in accordance with paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration 
Act 1971 and may not be granted temporary admission to the United Kingdom under 
paragraph 21 of that Schedule’. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the law favours 
the creation of these precarious migrants convicted of criminal offences but who cannot 
possibly be deported for administrative and human rights implications. As will be seen 
later, State practice in this regard appears contrary to the tenets of liberal democracy 
since the State favours the creation of a special category of non ‘deportables’ who have 
been ostracized from society, socially and legally but who cannot be deported or 
removed.593  
 
In essence, the thin line that runs through these recent Acts are ‘that they shortened 
removal proceedings, reduced avenue for appeal of decisions and enabled fast tracking 
of asylum decisions’.594Therefore, in conceptualizing the precarious migrant status and 
its factual matrix as has been highlighted above, the preamble of the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act (2008 Act) and its explanatory notes did not mince words in 
creating this special immigration status category which follows that the Act was aimed 
at creating a status limbo or precarious status for migrants to unarguably enable their 
deportation and/or removal.595 In essence, precarious migration is exemplified by lack 
of resident rights, having no capacity to regularize their immigration position with the 
consequence of social segregation and alienation from the society as epitomized by the 
possession of no or few political, social or economic rights and are made highly 
vulnerable to deportation or removal.596 These are referred to as precarious migrants 
represented by the undocumented migrants- those who reside in the State’s territory 																																																								
591 See the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, Explanatory Notes ‘Commentary on Sections Part 
10: Special Immigration Status’  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/4/notes/division/5/1/13 > accessed 05 April 2015 
592 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 130 (Designation), s 131 (Foreign Criminal), s 132 
(Effect of Designation) s 133 (Conditions).  
593 See chapter five of this thesis on the discussion of the contrivance of deportability and removability 
594 Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti, ‘Citizenship, Deportation and the Boundaries of Belonging’ (n3) 551 
595 Joseph Carens, ‘The Rights of Irregular Migrants’ (2008) 22 Ethics and International Affairs 163, 163 
596 Gibney, ‘Precarious Residents’ (n514) 2 
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unlawfully.597 Therefore in constructing the factual matrix of a precarious migrant in the 
UK, it is expressed that the burden of being an irregular migrant is made more severe by 
this categorization of special immigration status or precariousness with no entitlement 
to benefit or support leading to vulnerabilities engendering deportation even with a 
grant of temporary admission. Temporary admission will now be examined. 
 
3.5.1 Temporary Admission and Precarious Immigration Status 
 
Temporary admission has been described by the Court of Appeal as a term of statutory 
art created by the combined effect of paragraphs 16 and 21 of Schedule 2 to the 
Immigration Act 1971, which allows for examination pending a decision to allow entry 
or detention pending deportation, or to be given temporary admission.598  Temporary 
admission may further be granted consistent with s 62 (3) of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (2002 Act) and in tandem with s 67 of the 2002 Act 
as constructed with reference to a person liable to detention.599 In R v SSHD ex p 
Khadir,600 their Lordships held that a person granted temporary admission might remain 
in that position for years even if there is no possibility of being removed.601 The UK had 
argued that those on temporary admission are not ‘lawfully present’ in the State for the 
purpose of social security and housing rules,602 given that those on temporary admission 
are not lawfully present in the UK.603  
 
In the view of Sawyer and Turpin, ‘temporary admission (also called temporary release 
where someone has previously been detained) is thus an alternative to detention, and 
remains the status of a person who is physically within the UK but either awaiting a 
decision on whether they may legally and properly enter or, having had that permission 
refused, awaiting departure’.604 Temporary admission is granted by the issuance of 
																																																								
597 ibid 
598 See R (MS, AR, FW) v SSHD [2009] ECWA Civ 1310 [2] where it was stated ‘Such people do not 
have to be detained, but they have to exist in a half-world called limbo in which they have £5 a day to live 
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require no payment.  
599 See the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s 62 (3)  
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603 See Saadi v UK [2008] 47 EHRR 17, para 65  
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‘Form IS 96 Notification of Temporary Admission to a person who is liable to be 
detained’605 to any or all of the following persons: 
 
a. An overstayer (someone who has remained in the UK more than the leave 
permits)606 
b. An individual who has breached the condition of his leave and is liable for 
removal607 
c. A individual whose asylum application has been refused and is considered for 
deportation608 
d. An individual who has been refused admission.609 
e. An individual whom the state would have removed but conditions back in his 
country has made it impossible610 
f. An individual who does not have travel documents or have not been procured 
through his Embassy or High Commission. 
 
From the foregoing, when temporary admission is granted, the standard practice is that 
the person would not be allowed to work and would also not be entitled to any benefits 
to support his/herself. The person would, in addition, be expected to live and sleep at a 
place where the immigration officers can visit for routine checks. This temporary 
admission leaves the person in a precarious position where he is not able to work, 
cannot receive benefits and may not be removed. The continuation of this status makes 
the affected individual to remain in an immigration status limbo until a further decision 
is made about the migrant’s status. In the view of Gibney, the precarious migrant ‘is a 
modern variant of stateless men and women’611 such statelessness Arendt saw ‘as the 
most symptomatic group in contemporary politics in that their plight reveals the 
emptiness of human rights because they lack the effective or formal membership in an 
actual nation state’.612  As Gibney further explained, ‘these migrants lack security, basic 
economic and political rights in the countries where they have migrated and their day to 
day activity is exemplified by lack of effective state protection that is linked to their 
being outside the country of their origin’.613  It is therefore argued that the precarious 
status of a migrant makes him vulnerable and puts the migrant in the position of being 
exploited by the State or by others in the State or agents of the State given the migrant’s 
immigration status, leading to deportation and/or removal as aftermath.  																																																								
605 This form IS96 does not have a period of validity lasting up to 3 years or more. 
606 See Para 320 (7B) of the Immigration Rules  
607 See Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s 10 1 (a) (b) (ba)  
608 See the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s 18.  
609 See Immigration Act 1971, s 3  
610 cf. category (a) on issues of Art 3 ECHR 1950 and proportionality with respect to Art 8 ECHR 
611 Gibney, ‘Precarious Residents’ (n514) 3 
612 Hannah Arendt, The Origin of Totalitarianism (Harcourt Inc 1951 reprinted 1986) 277 
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3.5.2 Stranded Migrants 
 
Grant defines stranded migrants as those ‘who become legally stranded where they are 
caught between removal from the State in which they are physically present, inability to 
return to their State of nationality or former residence, and the refusal by any other State 
to grant entry’.614 Therefore legally stranded migrants are ‘typically irregular migrants, 
without a lawful immigration status’.615  I add that the state of being legally stranded in 
the host state is one of such ways giving rise to a precarious status and ultimately 
detention pending deportation. As Grant noted ‘many are held in detention for long 
period constitutive of arbitrary detention in breach of their rights under international 
human rights law or at best some would receive temporary admission with restricted 
movement, restriction on employment and zero access to social and economic 
benefits’.616 An examination of the status of the stranded migrant, presents a foray of 
helplessness or hopelessness, a position made worse by additional burden of his/her 
condition.  
 
Their stranded nature may further be exacerbated by practical or humanitarian reasons 
that hinder their return to their home country. They may also include migrant workers or 
other economic migrants who were smuggled into the country or even trafficked, some 
are even legally stateless.617 A case in point is the USA case of Shaughnessy v US ex 
relMezei 618 that concerns a migrant who left the USA after a period of legal residence. 
Upon his return to the USA he was refused entry and held in detention, without being 
admitted by any other country, after all failed attempts, he remained in indefinite 
detention.  Furthermore, in the Australian case of Al-Kateb v Godwin619 a Palestinian 
national arrived the country without a visa, was refused admission and detained pending 
removal. Without any country of nationality, removal could not take place nor was it 
likely in the near future because he was stateless and was kept in detention under 
national legislation that requires an unlawful non-citizen be held in detention 																																																								
614 Stefanie Grant, ‘The Legal Protection of Stranded Migrants’ in Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard 
Perruchold and Euan MacDonald (eds) International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key 
Challenges (Asser Press 2007) 30-31 
615 ibid 31 
616  ibid 31 
617 Ibid 32; see also Ryszard Piotrowicz, ‘Victims of Trafficking and de Facto Statelessness’ (2002) 21 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 50, 59 
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indefinitely until either removal or grant of visa. In his case, both were impossible. He 
was therefore legally stranded without any hope of leaving the country or liberty.620  
 
The exposition on the peculiar situation of a stranded migrant finds credence in Mole’s 
work. She argues that failed asylum seekers ‘who are not granted international 
protection may not be returned to their country for various reasons that range from 
uncertain citizenship, lack of documentation as the host state may not have diplomatic 
presence in the country of origin, the logistics of returning them, including cost of 
transportation which the returning state may consider expensive, or the inability of the 
host state to locate and remove them’.621 For Mole, such circumstances will place them 
in a legal limbo with a high degree of uncertainty with consequences for their livelihood 
and that of their families.622 In tandem with this viewpoint is the Amnesty’s 
contribution to the dilemma faced by the precarious migrant, in which it argued that 
lack of entitlement to seek employment and to receive support and benefits from the 
state including education and health care is destructive of humanity. In its view, ‘the 
direct consequence is abject poverty and an infra-dignifying blockage of all avenues to a 
normal life forced into destitution with the intention of compelling them to return 
home’.623 It is not contended that States cannot remove such migrants but what is 
contended is the approach and mechanism adopted by the state prior and during the 
removal process, what standards are applied and by extension to what extent does the 
State contribute to the precarious status of migrants. 
 
3.5.3 Irregular Migrants 
 
Migrants as we have seen above, for reasons of legal expediency and jurisdictional 
control could become precarious. This precarious state flows from the issue of irregular 
migration or entry. Irregular entry in the opinion of Guild essentially refers ‘to the lack 
of the required permit enabling an individual to enter and stay within a state’s territorial 																																																								
620 Indefinite detention in the context of precarious nature of stranded migrants have been fully examined 
in Alfred de Zayas, ‘Human Rights and Indefinite Detention’ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red 
Cross 15, 17; Shyla Vohra, ‘ The Detention of Irregular Migrants and Asylum Seekers’ in 
RyszardCholewinski, Richard Perruchold and Euan MacDonald (eds) International Migration Law: 
Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges (Asser Press 2007) 49; see also this thesis’ discussion on 
detention at chapter four 
621 Nuala Mole, Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe Publishing 
2007) 106 
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jurisdiction noting that most jurisdictions define irregularity by default in contrast to 
regularity’.624 It is necessary to clarify that the aspect of irregular migration defined 
under International law is irregular entry, defined by the Smuggling Protocol as 
‘crossing borders without complying with necessary requirements for legal entry into 
the receiving state’.625 
 
Lehman adds that ‘obligations on irregularity are imposed by the United Nations 1951 
Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees that according to the 
UN 1951 Convention allows the host state to incorporate a distinction between 
presence, lawful presence, lawful stay and durable residence’.626 The practicality of this 
differentiation pertains principally to refugees in that those individuals admitted to 
asylum procedures are said to be lawfully present while those who have formally being 
recognized are said to have lawful stay.627 In essence, those individuals whose 
applications were rejected or who did not make any claims are said to have an irregular 
status.  
 
It is therefore argued that it is this irregular status that may in turn lead them to 
precariousness. Irregular migrants as remarked by Finch and Cherti ‘are generally not 
criminals other than the breaking of immigration laws and the reasons for their irregular 
status may be attributed to desperation to cling to a country that they consider safe and 
secure’.628 In their analysis, Finch and Cherti introduced the concept of ‘marginal 
irregularity’ and ‘manifest irregularity’ where marginal irregularity is explained as those 
having minor importance and little effect therefore close to the margin of regularity 
while manifest irregularity they define as the transgression of immigration laws in a 
clear and obvious ways.629 Therefore all international migrants whether refugees or non-
refugees who enter a country without the required and appropriate documentation would 																																																								
624 E. Guild, ‘Who is An Irregular Migrant?’ in Barbara Bogusz and Others (eds), Irregular Migration 
and Human Rights: Theoritical, European and International Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
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be regarded as irregular migrants. This legal position is in the light of the principle laid 
down in Saadi v UK 630 that held that until a state has authorized entry to the country, 
any entry is unauthorized and that even temporary admission is no such admission. 
 
Nonetheless, the underlying issue is that the state has a duty to respect and protect 
migrants while they remain within their territorial jurisdiction and to facilitate their 
return safely to their country or as the case may be country of former residence in 
dignity.  This is in view of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in Assanidze v Georgia631 
which explains that Art 1 of the ECHR 1950632 creates a general duty on States ‘to 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedom defined’ which 
implies that State parties are answerable for any violation of the protected rights and 
freedoms of anyone within their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, human rights are 
guaranteed irrespective of an individual’s immigration status because they are a 
function of a person’s status as a human being but not as a citizen of a particular 
State.633 In essence the basic principle underlying the protection of international human 
rights of migrants is that ‘entering a country in violation of immigration law does not 
deprive an irregular or undocumented migrant of their fundamental human rights,634 nor 
does it in any way vitiate the duty of the state to protect the rights of these migrants. 
 
3.5.4 Migrants and the Firewall [Bifurcation] Argument 
 
The firewall argument [bifurcation] as originally canvassed by Carens holds that States 
should ‘build a firewall between immigration law enforcement on the one hand and the 
protection of basic human rights on the other hand emphasizing that States should 
guarantee that individuals should be able to pursue their human rights without being 
exposed to apprehension and deportation’.635 In agreement with the above, I argue that 
irregular migrants may be compared to as uninvited guests or trespassers in the Law of 
Tort. The Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, s2 provides that the occupier extends a 
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"common duty of care" to all legal visitors, although it keeps the low duty of care 
towards illegal visitors such as trespassers. This means that even though these guests are 
uninvited they are however treated with some modicum of protection as long as they are 
on the land whether invited or not. In a similar vein, migrants possess a wide range of 
legal rights even while in the territorial jurisdiction of a state, regardless of whether they 
have lawful stay in the host State.636 These rights are basic fundamental rights not only 
possessed by citizens and lawful residents but tourists, temporary visitors, overstayers 
etc. A case in point is the right to security of person and property as it is the duty of the 
police to protect both irregular and lawful residents.637 
 
In the firewall argument, Carens argues ‘that most liberal democratic states treat 
violations of immigration laws different from violations of criminal laws as can be seen 
by the different procedural protections migrants receive when they commit a criminal 
offence compared to that granted them in immigration matters’.638 He reasons that this 
can be seen from the fact that ‘most liberal democratic states treat their own 
immigration rules as administrative matters which provide weaker procedural 
safeguards for immigration offenders than they do for defendants in criminal 
matters’.639 This is because in criminal matters irregular migrants receive same level of 
protection with citizens or legal residents such as publicly funded legal aid etc. Aside of 
these legal rights, there are other basic human rights which states are legally and by 
extension morally obliged to provide those within her territorial jurisdiction 
notwithstanding their immigration status as in a case of an emergency medical care.640 
As Gibney sees it, ‘irregular migrants may not be owed the benefits of citizenship, or 
even permanent residence, but they are simply owed a modicum of protection against 
violence, intimidation and exploitation’.641 
 
Analytically, the issue is that irregular migrants may be entitled to certain rights but do 
not actually make use of those rights. The resulting question is; of what use would 																																																								
636 See our discussion of extraterritoriality at section 2.3 of chapter two of this thesis 
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international human rights be if the rights were not to be enjoyed practically given that 
in Airey v Ireland 642 the ECtHR held that rights protected must be ‘practical and 
effective’ rather than ‘theoretical and illusory’. The emerging questions are: Would an 
irregular migrant be able to report a crime to the police knowing his precarious status? 
Would an irregular migrant be able to serve as a witness to a crime without exposing 
himself to being apprehended by immigration authorities? It is therefore argued that the 
right of the state to apprehend irregular immigrants should not affect the State’s 
obligation to guarantee their basic human rights. Engaging in the debate, Anderson 
thinks that it is important to make explicit those related rights that should be recognised 
for all migrants irrespective of immigration status. In her view, the issue can be looked 
at from a moral point of comparison in which work-related rights of irregular or visa 
holding migrants resemble or differ from those of settled migrants.643 
 
Coming from an ethical normative approach, Moan espouses that legal rights reflect 
moral principles and values which civilized societies are committed of which 
formalization the rules is created to fulfill.644 Agreeing with Carens, Moan reasons that 
the rights are meant to protect individuals against arbitrary intervention from the state, 
remarking that ‘if these rules were not applied to lawful and irregular migrants within a 
state’s territorial jurisdiction, the application would not only be arbitrary but would also 
violate the normative purpose of the rights in the belief that a right to emergency and 
life saving device is a reflection of the value the society places on respect for life in 
positive and negative obligations’.645 Therefore, it is argued that a clear distinction 
should be made between the enforcement of immigration law on the one hand and the 
respect of human rights of migrants on the other hand as it concerns deportation on 
criminality grounds. If this is not done, human rights of irregular migrants may become 
a mere linguistic expression, with sound and fury signifying nothing. The UK’s 
government recent policy of ‘deport first, appeal later’ is a reflection of the State’s 
determination to remove migrants at all costs regardless of whether or not their rights 
																																																								
642  [1979] ECHR 3, para 24 
643 Bridget Anderson, ‘Migrants and Work-related Rights’ (2008) 22 Ethics and International Affairs 199, 
200; see also Bernard Ryan, ‘The Evolving Legal Regime on Unauthorised Work by Migrants in Britain’ 
(2005) 27 Comparative Labour and Policy Journal 27, 30 
644 Marit Hovdal Moan, ‘Immigration Policy and the Immanent Critique’ (2008) 22 Ethics and 
International Affairs 205, 207-208; see further morality argument of the rights of irregular migrants in 
Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: The Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1994) 42; see also Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (OUP 1984) 
31 
645 ibid 
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are breached at the time of removal thereby making no distinction between enforcement 
of immigration law and the respect of human rights.646  
 
3.6 Immigration Realities and Similarities, the United Kingdom and other Liberal 
States-Convergence, Divergence and Trends   
 
It has been identified in this study that the Aliens 1905 Act in the UK permitted 
Immigration Service inspectors not only to detect and refuse aliens entry into the UK 
but also to deport.647 At about this time, there appears to be a convergence of practice in 
immigration control with respect to other liberal democratic States such as Australia and 
the US.  The idea behind this exploration is to assess whether the dilemmas faced by 
these countries are inherent in liberal democratic states as standard practices with the 
further aim of exploring the convergence, divergence and diffusion of practices or 
whether they are mere coincidence. 
 
In 1901, the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia enacted the Immigration 
Restriction Act 1901 with respect to immigration and emigration prohibiting the 
immigration into the Commonwealth of any person who failed a certain dictation test in 
a European language.648 This Act therefore was one of the first legislative measures that 
did not allow non-whites to enter the country except on a temporary basis under permit 
having already passed the Chinese Immigrants Regulation and Restriction Act 1861.649 
The Act also provided for the exclusion of other classes of immigrants such as 
criminals, later to be found in the Migration Act 1958.650 This as this research finds, is 
similar to the UK’s immigration practice as stated above.651 
 
																																																								
646 The recent Immigration Act of 2014 continues the manifestation of this policy; see Immigration Act 
2014, s 15. The Act now further restricts the right of appeal of migrants with a view to achieving 
deportation stating in addition that First Tier Tribunal must not consider a ‘new matter’ unless the 
Secretary of State has given consent to the Tribunal to do so. Furthermore, the 2014 Act allows the 
Secretary of State to certify a claim prior to appeal proceedings, during the course of the appeal or after 
exhaustion of the appeal, see s 17 of the Act, see also chapter five of this thesis for a general discussion 
on deportation and removal. 
647 See section 3.4 of this chapter above 
648 Robert French, ‘The Role of the Courts in Migration Law’ (Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee 
Review Tribunal Annual Members’ Conference 25 March 2011) 10 
649 A typically non-white immigration policy as explained in Herbert Ira London, Non-white immigration 
and the “White Australia” policy (New York University Press, 1970) 11 cited in Robert French, ‘The 
Role of the Courts in Migration Law’ ibid, 6 
650 The Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 6, s 12 and s 22 
651 See section 3.4 of this chapter 
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Drawing from the United States position, certain categories of people were also 
excluded in 1907 such as people with physical or mental defects or tuberculosis and 
children unaccompanied by parents and in addition, Japanese immigration became 
restricted.652 This exclusion list was further expanded in 1917 with the addition of 
illiterates, persons of psychopathic inferiority, men as well as women entering for 
immoral purposes- alcoholics, stowaways, and vagrants.653 
 
The research identified the UK’s 1971 Immigration Act as the cornerstone of all 
immigration laws in the UK with the interplay and introduction of partiality, discretions, 
unpublished guidelines, rules and policies.654 As it will be seen, about the period 
between 1971-1999 similar immigration revolutions were in operation in the US and 
France that relieves the argument whether such practices were simply co-incidental, a 
trend amongst liberal democratic states or mere convergence. It raises fundamental 
questions whether the style, form and pattern of immigration control in liberal 
democratic states is the emergence of a new legal framework of state power. 
 
In the USA, in 1952, the multiple laws, which governed immigration and naturalization 
to that time, were brought into one comprehensive statute called the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).655 Then came the Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 
(IRCA) that was a comprehensive reform effort which amongst other things was created 
to legalize aliens who had resided in the United States in an unlawful status since 
January 1, 1982. The Legal Immigration and the Immigration Act of 1990 that provides 
for caps on immigration (similar to the UK’s immigration cap policy) further provided 
for all grounds for exclusion and deportation, significantly rewriting the political and 
ideological grounds and repealing some grounds for exclusion.656 The highpoint of all 
reforms in the USA was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRAIRA), enacted in 1996. This Act was and as it is presently aimed to have a 
lasting effect on immigration control with provisions aimed at adopting stronger 
penalties against illegal immigration, streamlining the deportation (removal) process by 																																																								
652 Federation For American Immigration Reform, ‘History of U.S. Immigration Laws: Historical 
Immigrant Admission Data; 1821-2006’ 
<http://www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/legislation.html>accessed 24 February 2012 
653 ibid 
654 See section 3.4 of this chapter as discussed above 
655  See the Immigration Nationality Act (INA) 1952 <http://www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-
nationality-act > accessed 15 December 2014 
656 Warren R Leiden and David L Neal, ‘Highlights of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1990’ (1990) 14 (1) 
Fordham International Law Journal 328, 329 
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curtailing the appeal process. The main provisions of the Act include inter alia the 
barring of legal admission for removed illegal aliens and permanently barred admission 
for deported or removed aggravated felons,657 the creation and the facilitation of 
deportation of criminal aliens by expanding the definition of aggravated felony to 
include crimes carrying a prison sentence of one year or more rather than time served.658 
 
In France, the governments from the mid-1970s and 1980s tried to stop immigration 
through different measures. An internal control was instituted through “inspecteurs 
dutravail” that made unexpected work checks and had the power to sanction employers 
if any illegal employee was found .659 Charles Pasqua, as minister of the interior in the 
Chirac government, dealt with the problem through the border police – he increased the 
power of the “Police de l‟Air et des Frontières” to undertake border controls, to detain 
and deport. 660 In the early 1980s, immigration became a major political issue with the 
rise of the National Front and growing challenges from North Africa.661 In effect, the 
early 1990’s saw France pursue a zero immigration policy where numerous regulations 
were tightened through the Pasqua Laws, which amongst other measures expanded the 
powers of immigration authorities to deport non-citizens leading to protests, by Africans 
and Chinese called the campaigns of the ‘san papiers’.662 
 
Therefore the trend amongst all the liberal democratic states is that they all appear to 
have adopted a harder stance against migrants’ admission and settlement between the 
years 1958-1990 and even to date. While the UK used ‘not conducive to public good’ 
term as a ground for deportation, the USA facilitated the deportation of criminal aliens 
by expanding the definition of aggravated felony to include crimes carrying a prison 
sentence of one year or more rather than time served. France as we saw used the Pasqua 
laws to expand the deportation regime through the grant of special powers to 
																																																								
657 See the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996, s 305, s 307, s 321 
658 See the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996 s 321, s 324 
659  Labour Inspector <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/FRANCE/LABOURINSPECTOR-
FR.htm> accessed 04 May 2012 
660Police National  
<http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_l_interieur/la_police_nationale/organisation/dcpaf > accessed 04 
May 2012 
661 Virginie Guiraudon, ‘Immigration Policy in France’ Brookings 
<http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/0101france_guiraudon.aspx > accessed 06 May 2012 
662 Immigration Laws in France (by A J) 
<http://www.ac.aup.fr/~ggilbert/contentpages/Immigration_Laws.html >accessed 27 February 2012 
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immigration officers to detain and deport aliens.663 In France, Schuster had specifically 
reported that there are those (Afghanistan nationals or residents) whose ‘asylum 
applications had been refused by the French government, so are ‘rejected asylum 
seekers’ but as France finds it difficult to deport to Afghanistan, they are stuck in 
France without status as illegal migrants’664, these remain in a legal limbo with no 
chance of regularizing their stay in the country.  
 
3.6.1 The Exercise of Discretion: Diffusion or Coincidence? 
 
The UK is not alone in the typical use of discretion in immigration control. By way of 
drawing from Australia’s practice, another liberal democratic state, evidence shows a 
convergence in the use of discretion. The Australian Migration Act of 1958 and the 
Migration Amendment Act of 1983 are relevant here. The Migration Act 1958 is 
described by its preamble as ‘An Act relating to the entry into, and presence in, 
Australia of aliens, and the departure or deportation from Australia of aliens and certain 
other persons’.665 The Migration Act, 1958 contains a wide range of discretionary 
powers incumbent on the minister, “in his absolute discretion” including delegation of 
powers to authorized persons.666 These discretionary powers are related to arrangement 
for entries and deportations. In the words of Ozdowski, ‘The Migration Act 1958 
contains a level of discretion unknown even in other “machinery” legislation conferring 
a wide range of discretionary power on the minister or those authorized by him’.667 
Viewed from the perspective of the UK Immigration system, Regulations are also made 
to implement the Act as can be seen from the perspective of the Migration Act 1958, 
which makes the Regulations addressing issues of procedures.668 The Department of 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA) makes administrative and procedural rules, 
which are not usually subject to public announcement, but are communicated through 
the issuance of instructions and through periodical up-dates to the departmental 
manuals.669  																																																								
663 Eleonore Kofman, Madalina Rogoz and Florence Lévy, ‘Family Migration Policies in France’ (2010) 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development 1, 6 
664 Liza Schuster, ‘Turning Refugees into illegal migrants: Afghan Asylum seekers in Europe’ (2011) 34 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 1392, 1393 
665 Sev Ozdowski, ‘The Law, Immigration and Human Rights: Changing the Australian Immigration 
Control System’ (1985) 19 International Migration Review 535, 537 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2545855 > accessed 24 February 2012 
666 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 7 (1) 
667 Ozdowski, (n665) 538 
668 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 51A-s 64 
669  Ozdowski (n665) 537 
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Arguing systematically from a normative standard as gathered from the various States’ 
practices is the contention ‘that there is an underlying tension between liberal values 
including the belief in the universality of human rights and democratic values which 
surfaces in form of an irresolvable dilemma when liberal democratic States are 
confronted with the issue of how they should treat migrants’.670 Immigration control on 
its part has a strong reliance on spectacle where the migration regime must be perceived 
as competent and for the State to act powerfully in the defense of its borders.671 
Therefore the control of immigration is generally seen, as one of the central 
prerogatives of national sovereignty but international human rights obligations require 
States to comply with their treaty obligations regarding the treatment of aliens in their 
territory rather than mere exercise of discretion.672  
 
However, given the strong presence of the European Union Law, it is commonplace and 
now a requirement of EU Law that the rights guaranteed under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) are respected as general principles of EU law.673 
This is why Finch argues that it is ‘plausible to construct an approach to immigration in 
the UK within the remit of liberal democracy with broad appeal which is neither open 
door nor fortress UK to manage and limit migration in the national interest while at the 
same time being a welcoming place for migrants and to build a new patriotism which 
embraces and encompasses diversity’.674 Therefore the research shares the argument 
that ‘immigration law serves as instruments to supply and refine parameters of both 
discipline and coercion largely through laws as tactics, which cannot totally guarantee 
certainly of their realization’.675  
 
																																																								
670 Savitri Taylor, ‘From Border Control to Migration Management: The Case for a Paradigm Change in 
the Western Response to Transborder Population Movement’ (2005) 39 (6) Social Policy and 
Administration 563, 570 
671 Bridget Anderson, ‘“Illegal Immigrant”: Victim or Villain?’ (n643) 3 
672 Steve Peers, ‘Free Movement, Immigration Control and Constitutional Conflict’ (2009) 5 European 
Constitutional Law Review 173, 173 
673 Treaty on European Union, Art 6 
674 Tim Finch, ‘Immigration under Labour’ (Prospect Institute for Public Policy Research 2010) 9 
www.prospect-magazine.co.uk accessed 07 April 2012 
675 Nicholas De Genova, ‘Migrant “Illegality” and Deportability in everyday life’ (2002) 31 Annual 
Review Anthropology 419, 425 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
The research identified that early measures controlling the movement of aliens were 
often connected with hostilities that gave rise to unfair and harsh laws against migrants. 
These seemingly repressive laws in spirit and character are incompatible with liberal 
democratic ideals and created the enabling environment for the detention and 
deportation of migrants. 
 
The issue of certification and the tinkering with the right of appeal, the research argues, 
engages both the substantive and procedural rights of migrants as protected by 
international human rights law.  
 
The use of discretion in immigration decisions by the UK on the one hand and other 
liberal democratic states on the other hand suggest a degree of impropriety capable of 
undermining the rights of migrants within the context of liberal ideologies.  
 
It has equally been noted that precarious migrants are represented by undocumented 
migrants- those who reside in the State’s territory unlawfully. They are considered not 
to be lawfully present in the State despite the grant of temporary admission; their 
position made worse as they remain in limbo without right to work or access to state 
benefits, yet are not deportable or removable. They are subject to detention at any time 
on the orders of the State and vulnerable to exploitation by the State or its agents, and 
other individuals given their immigration status.  Some of them as highlighted are 
legally stranded when they are caught between actual removal from a state in which 
they are physically present and their inability to return to their state of nationality or 
even former residence compounded by the refusal of another state to grant entry. Aside 
from the fact that they became precarious by accident or design, the State at times 
creates their precarious status by forcing them into destitution with the end purpose of 
frustrating them to leave the State.  
 
It has further been identified that there is a statutory creation of precarious immigration 
status in the UK by the 2008 Act. This is at variance with the duty of the State to respect 
and protect migrants while they remain within their territorial jurisdiction and to 
117		
facilitate their return safely to their country or as the case may be country of former 
residence in dignity.  
 
In order to guarantee the rights of precarious migrants in a State, it is contended that 
there should be a clear bifurcation between immigration law enforcement on the one 
hand and the protection of basic human rights on the other hand. States should 
guarantee that individuals enjoy their human rights without being exposed to undue 
apprehension and deportation. 
 
The convergence, divergence and trends in immigration control in the mentioned liberal 
democratic states appear not to exist by sheer co-incidence but an indication of some 
sort of policy transfer, diffusion or even legal transplant as exemplified by their 
respective State practices viewed in perspectives which may have implications for their 
international treaty obligations.  
 
In essence, migrants may not be owed the benefits of citizenship but no doubt they are 
owed a modicum of protection under international human rights law given that human 
rights are guaranteed irrespective of an individual’s immigration status acquired as a 
function of a person’s status as human being and not as a citizen of a particular state. 
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Chapter 4. The Detention Estate 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Detention in law means deprivation of liberty-a confinement in a pre-arranged place 
such as prisons, closed camps, receptive centres or other restricted areas with certain 
restraints that inhibits detainees from the pursuit of their normal activities.676 The term 
detention will be generically employed to cover both administrative and preventive 
detention.677 The 2012 UNHCR Guidelines define detention as ‘the deprivation of 
liberty or confinement in a closed place which an asylum-seeker is not permitted to 
leave at will, including, though not limited to, prisons or purpose-built detention, closed 
reception or holding centres or facilities’.678 Silverman and Massa define immigration 
detention more generally, as ‘the holding of foreign nationals, or non-citizens, for the 
purposes of realising an immigration-related goal’.679 They stated that such detention 
represents a deprivation of liberty taking place in a designated facility in the custody of 
an immigration official’.680 
 
As has been highlighted in the preceding chapter, ancillary to the power to control 
immigration is the power to detain. However ‘the burgeoning phenomenon of 
immigration-related detention sits uncomfortably on the fault line separating the 
prerogatives of State sovereignty from the rights of non-citizens regardless of the broad 
discretion of States to control immigration’.681 Therefore, there is in existence a tension 																																																								
676 See generally Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘International Law and the Detention of Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers’ (1986) 20 (2) International Migration Review 193, 194; R Jennings and A Watts, Oppenheim’s 
International Law  (9thedn Longman 1992) 897-941; Alice Block and Liza Schuster, ‘At the extremes of 
exclusion: Deportation, detention and dispersal’ (2005) 28 (3) Ethnic and Racial Studies 491, 500; 
Stefanie Grant, ‘Immigration Detention: Some Issues of Inequality’ (2011) 7 The Equal Rights Review 69 
677 Preventive detention when specifically used will be to delineate detention of migrants with criminal 
convictions or those perceived to be a threat to public order. Administrative detention on its part will be 
typified by administrative convenience relative to detention in admission cases, pending applications for 
leave to remain or breach of conditions of leave. 
678 UNHCR ‘Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers’ (n24) 9; see Art. 2(h) recast RCD; Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
(recast), OJ 2013 L 180/96.The RCD was originally adopted in 2003 -Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 
January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, OJ 2003 L 31/18; the 
UK decided not to opt in to the Directive and is not bound by it, see Recital 33 recast RCD, but the UK 
had opted in to the original Directive 2003 is therefore bound by it. 
679 S. Silverman and E. Massa, ‘Why Immigration Detention is Unique’ (2012) 18 (6) Population, Space 
and Place 679  
680 ibid 
681 Michael Flynn, ‘Who Must Be Detained? Proportionality As A Tool For Critiquing Immigration 
Detention Policy’ (2012) 31 Refugee Survey Quarterly 40, 40 
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between the right to liberty of migrants against the broadly unfettered rights of States to 
control the admission and expulsion of migrants conferred on States by national and 
international law.682 It is against this backdrop that the right to liberty has been 
expressed as ‘ubiquitous in human rights instruments in protecting all individuals from 
arbitrary arrest and detention and any such deprivations of liberty require the strongest 
possible justification’.683  
 
More so, the right to liberty is a jewel, prized and fundamental not only of English 
common law but an indicator and barometer of measuring a liberal democratic 
society.684 In Brogan v UK 685 the ECtHR expressed the view that a liberal democratic 
state must strictly observe the rule of law when it interferes with personal liberty. In 
addition, the core concept in the ECHR in general is that of the rule of law which was 
described in the preamble to the Convention as part of a common heritage shared by all 
signatories and is one of the fundamental principles of a [liberal] democratic society.686 
 
In view of the above, this chapter will discuss the contours and detention powers, 
legality of detention in the light of the principles of necessity, due diligence, 
arbitrariness and proportionality within the remit of liberal democratic paradigm. This 
chapter contends that the legality of detention require that the law, which authorizes 
detention, must accord with international human rights law standards. In short, an 
assessment of legality for our purpose would encompass a broader test of substantive 
arbitrariness to include decisions, which are unreasonable, unjust, delayed and 
unpredictable. This ultimately will engage the issue of proportionality that underpins the 
ECHR in Art 8-11 ECHR -‘necessary in a democratic society’ test.  It will equally be 
contended that the reluctance or refusal of the ECtHR to require specific necessity in the 
detention of migrants does not sit comfortably with international human rights law.  																																																								
682 This right is entirely unfettered, see G Goodwin-Gil, ‘The Limits of the Power of Expulsion in Public 
International Law’ (1975) 47 British Yearbook of International Law 55, 156; cf the dictum of Lord 
Atkinson in AG for the Dominion of Canada v Cain [1906] AC 542 [546] on supreme State power; see 
generally Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandani v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471EHRR 471; Soering v UK (1989) 
11 EHRR 449; Vilvarajah v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 248; Amur v France (1996) 22 EHRR 533 
683 Cathryn Costello, ‘Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration Detention Under 
International Human Rights Law’ (2012) 19 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 257, 257-258 
684R (Abbasi) v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 1598; Re Wasfi Suleiman Mahmood [1995] Imm AR 311 
685 (1988) 11 EHRR 117, para 58-59 
686Latridis v Greece App No 31107/96 (ECtHR 25 March 1999) para 62; see comments by John Wadham 
and others Blackstones Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 (4thedn, OUP 2007) 30; David John Harris, 
Michael O'Boyle, Colin Warbrick, The Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Butterworths 
1995) 17 
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This chapter presents the argument that a State wishing to detain migrants must do so in 
conformity to international human rights standards rather than other latent reasons. In 
this connection, this chapter will therefore seek to highlight the test for the legality of 
detention both from the substantive and procedural limbs as a law may be substantively 
sound but procedurally unfair giving rise to the tension between substantive legality and 
procedural illegality or impropriety.  
 
References in this chapter will equally be made to three other selected liberal 
democratic states-the United States of America, Australia and France whose detention 
reality offers significant similarities with the UK. This is in order to put the analysis of 
detention issues in the UK within the broader context of other liberal democracies by 
way of convergence, divergence, diffusion and dilemmas of practices in immigration 
control. 
 
This research does not intend to give a separate treatment to the detention of refugees 
and asylum seekers, as they cannot be separated from the context of migrants in the 
light of the right to liberty. While it is true that there is clear rationale for differentiating 
refugees and asylum seekers on the one hand and irregular migrants on the other hand, 
but for the purpose of this thesis and in detention discourse, all non-citizens will be 
viewed as a single cohort in order to capture all facilities and procedures involved in 
detention and given that what is important is the “non-citizen” status that led to the 
detention.687 But this does not mean that specific differentiations will not be made of 
refugees and/or asylum seekers when necessary. 
 
4.2 The Contours of Detention 
 
The detention of migrants pending removal or deportation is currently a common 
practice amongst liberal states, which has assumed exponential dimensions. In fact, it 
has been posited that States have resorted more frequently to detention for longer 
periods as a response in part to large volume of migrants entering their territories.688 As 
Sawyer and Turpin observe, ‘detention is now used far more routinely than before, to 																																																								
687  See also Michael Flynn, ‘Who Must Be Detained? Proportionality as a Tool for Critiquing 
Immigration Detention Policy’ (2012) 31 Refugee Survey Quarterly 40, 42-43 
688 Daniel Wilsher, ‘The Administrative Detention of Non-Nationals Pursuant to Immigration Control: 
International and Constitutional Law Perspectives’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 897, 897. 
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discourage entry and for immediate practical purposes with the detention of those 
whose applications have failed even in the longer term as more detention centres are 
built’.689  
 
In the view of Mitchel and Sampson, detention in the global context has ‘increasingly 
become a preferred means for States to maintain and assert their territorial authority and 
legitimacy, and respond to mounting political pressures regarding border and 
security’.690 As Bloomfield Tsourdi and Petin commented, this preferred means of 
maintaining territorial authority and legitimacy finds justification in ‘practical 
considerations such as having the migrant at the disposal of the authorities for identity 
checks or public health screenings at arrival; enforcement-related motivations such as 
securing public order or forced return of irregular migrants; or political arguments such 
as to deter any further arrivals or to protect host societies’.691 In these circumstances, 
States assume that detention is essentially non-punitive but only incidental to 
immigration control. 
 
The criminalization of immigration with reference to immigration detention and its 
corollary-deportation have become key aspects of border control of modern liberal 
democracies.692 This has led to a tension between the right to liberty of migrants with 
the broadly unfettered rights of States to control the admission and expulsion of 
migrants conferred on States by national and international law.693  
 
Detention elicits the question of constitutional rights of migrants with respect to 
security, liberty and equality. This, argues Caloz-Tschopp, produces a harmful effect on 																																																								
689 Caroline Sawyer and Philip Turpin, ‘Neither Here Nor There: Temporary Admission to the UK’ 
(2005) 17 (4) International Journal of Refugee Law 688, 727 
690 R. Sampson and G. Mitchell, ‘Global trends in immigration detention and alternatives to detention: 
practical, political and symbolic rationales’ (2013) 1(3) Journal on Migration and Human Security 97, 98 
691 Alice Bloomfield, Evangelina Tsourdi and Joanna Petin, Alternatives to Immigration And Asylum 
Detention in the EU (Philippe De Bruycker ed Odysseus Network 2015) 16; see also G. Cornelisse, 
Immigration detention and Human rights – Rethinking territorial sovereignty (Martinus Nijhoff 
publishers 2010) 247; S. Vohra, ‘ The Detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers’ in R. 
Cholewinski, R. Perruchoud and E. McDonald (eds), International migration law – Developing 
paradigms and key challenges, (T.M.C. Asser Institut 2007) 49 
692 Criminalisation of Immigration law otherwise coined ‘crimmigration’ see generally Mary Bosworth, 
‘Deportation, ‘Detention and foreign-national prisoners in England and Wales’ (2011) 15 Citizenship 
Studies 583,587; Juliet Stumpf, ‘The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and the Sovereign Power; 
immigrants, crime and sovereign power’ (2006) 56 American University law Review 367,420; A de 
Gorgio, ‘Immigration control, post-fordism and less eligibility: a materialist critique of the 
criminalization of immigration across Europe’ (2010) 12 Punishment & Society 147,167 
693  Wilsher ‘The Administrative Detention of Non-Nationals Pursuant to Immigration Control: 
International and Constitutional Law Perspectives’ (n688) 898 
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liberal ideologies by way of deterioration of liberal policies but may at the same time 
act as an indicator of deeper and more insidious change,694 and reflected in the liberal 
democratic paradox or contradictions as previously discussed.695   
 
Detention has also been described as a form of torture without physical violence, which 
instills fear, silence and isolation.696 It thus severs contacts between detainees and the 
population given that detainees are located in isolation thereby extending the sphere of 
imprisonment.697 McLouglin describes detention centres as a ‘continuum of anxiety; a 
continuum in which post traumas and future uncertainties faced by asylum seekers are 
exacerbated and rendered continuous with psychological corrosive presence embedded 
in Immigration Detention Centres (IDC) itself where people are detained on grounds of 
breaches of immigration law and not for criminal conviction’.698 The point is that a 
migrant who has not been convicted of a criminal offence is continuously detained like 
a criminal with some detained for a long period of time.  
 
The present international legal position regarding fundamental importance of the right 
to personal freedom finds credence in Art 3 & 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) 1948699 and Art 9 & 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966.700 In addition, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 1950, the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) 1969 and international soft laws such as the U.N. Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment 1988701, the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners 1955 and Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the 
Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention 1999 and 2012 are of key 
importance.702 																																																								
694 Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, ‘On the Detention of Aliens: The Impact on Democratic Rights’ (1997) 
10 Journal of Refugee Studies 165, 166-167 
695 For a full discussion on the liberal democratic paradox, see Chapter 2 of this Research  
696 Caloz-Tschopp, ‘On the Detention of Aliens: The Impact on Democratic Rights’ (n 622)  
697 ibid   
698 Pauline J McLoughlin, ‘Serve, Subvert or Emancipate’ Promoting Mental Health in Immigration 
Detention (2006) 5 Australian Journal for the Advancement of Mental Health 1, 10 
699 For the provisions of UDHR Art 3, see chapter 2.1 of this thesis.  
700 For the provisions of ICCPR Art 9 & 10, see chapter 2.1 of this thesis. 
701 For the provisions of UNGA ‘Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment A/RES/43/173 76th plenary meeting 9 December 1988(9 December 1988) 
UN Doc A/43/49, see chapter 2.1 of this thesis 
702Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the 
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Nevertheless, the above legal instruments and standards do not guarantee a right to be 
free from detention but provide and impose limits on the use of the power of detention 
by the restriction of permissible grounds of detention and its attendant procedural 
safeguards. In the view of Moeckli, ‘the fact that detention on national security grounds 
have become less acceptable by the international community, liberal states have now 
resorted to the use of immigration as a ground for detention in the justification of the 
exercise of sovereignty to admit or expel non-nationals’.703 He argues that these two 
grounds notably national security and immigration control are now closely intertwined 
as States have adopted detention powers pursuing national security aims within the 
penumbra of immigration.704 In support of this viewpoint, Migreurope thinks that that 
there may be a correlation between Immigration Removal and Detention Centres (IRC-
IDC) which using the expression ‘pops up like weeds in a turnip patch’ and the 
approximately 180 such centres in Europe currently’705 which illuminates the argument 
that detention may have assumed a business dimension in disregard to required 
international standards.  
 
Furthermore, an insidious aspect of immigration detention, which has not attracted 
much attention for policy review, is the involvement of private companies. The growth 
of immigration detention in the opinion of James may not be based solely on restrictive 
asylum and immigration policies but can be attributed to the involvement of private 
companies whose concern is to win and maintain contracts and to keep their facilities 
full 706 even as immigration detention has been identified as a highly profitable venture 
for the growing incarceration business in recent years as bidding is done for prisons and 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Economic and Social Council by its resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 
1977  (13 May 1977) UN Doc E/5988; Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the 
Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (n3) 
703 Daniel Moeckli, The Selective “War on Terror”: Executive Detention of Foreign Nationals and the 
Principle of Non-Discrimination (2005-2006) 31 Brook J. Int’l L 495, 501, see also Stephanie J 
Silverman and Evelyne Massa, ‘Why Immigration Detention is Unique’ (2012) 18 Population, Space and 
Place 677, 677-678; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘International Law and the Detention of Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers (n595); B MacGrady, ‘Resort to International Human Rights in challenging conditions in 
U.S. immigration detention centres (1997) 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 271; A De Zayas, 
‘Human rights and indefinite detention’ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 15 
704 Daniel Moeckli, ibid 502 
705 Migreurope, Foreigners’ camps in Europe and in Mediterranean countries (2005) 
<http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/carte-en.pdf> accessed 20 August 2012 
706 Al James and others, Privatising Prisons: Rhetoric and Reality (Sage 1997); A Coyle, A Campbell and 
R Neufeld (eds) Capitalist Punishment: Prison Privatisation and Human Rights (Zed Books 2003) 
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immigration detention centres as well.707 Contracts with the Home Office provide 
private contractors with a fee per inmate on a daily basis, with the United Kingdom 
Detention Services (UKDS) reporting a turnover of £12.18million for its 
Harmondsworth centre operation for the year ended 31 August 2002 compared to its 
Forest Bank Prison profit of £13.6 million.708  
 
The Guardian709 reported that the average cost of detaining an asylum seeker is £29,400 
a year and the weekly cost of holding a person at the Oakington Detention Centre in 
Cambridgeshire (supposedly meant for fast track asylum cases) is £1,620.00, about 
£85,000.00 a year. This underpins the fact that the sheer expenses of detention in policy 
and practice may be responsible for the deeper structural factors and interests attracting 
private companies. There were 12 immigration detention centres [including short term 
holding centres] in the UK out of which 9 are managed by private contractors.710 
Currently there are approximately 4000 places in 15 centres,711with the centres 
consisting of 11 Immigration Removal Centres, 3 short-term holding facilities, and 
Cedars, meant for families only.712 Most recently, The Verne in Dorset, which had a 
prison status till September 2014, has been remodeled as an IRC in September 2014 
with a capacity of 595 places. The Home Office reported that 30,387 people entered 
immigration detention in the UK in the year ending September 2013.713  
 
Consistent with the above information, is the argument that the market for private 
correctional facilities is growing internationally with small number of global providers 																																																								
707 S J A Talvi ‘It Takes a Nation of Detention Centres to Hold Us Back’ Interview with Michael Welch, 
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University Lip Magazine (21 January 2003) 
708  Prison Privatization Report International No 60, (Public Services International Research Unit, 
University of Greenwich 2004)<http://www.psiru.org/justice/PPRI60.htm> accessed 11 September 2012 
709Melanie McFadeyan, ‘Hard Labour’ Guardian (London, 14 September 2002) The Guardian reported 
about an answer to parliamentary question time answered in October 2001 
710 Home Office UK Border Agency, ‘Immigration Removal  
Centres’<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/aboutus/organisation/immigrationremovalcentres/> 
accessed 11 September 2012 
711 AIDA, ‘National Report for UK’ (last up-date April 2014) 66 
<http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_-
_uk_second_update_final_uploaded.pdf> accessed 03 March 2015; see also Stephanie J. Silverman and 
Ruchi Hajela, The Migration Observatory, ‘Briefing: Immigration Detention in the UK’ (2012) 2  
<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Immigration%20Detention%20Briefing.pd
f > accessed 03 March 2015 
712 Cedars are immigration detention centres opened in August 2011 for families with children  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-cedars-pre-departure-accommodation/cedars-
pre-departure-accommodation-information > accessed 03 March 2015 
713 Home Office, ‘Immigration statistics, July to September 2013’ (2013)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-july-to-september-
2013/immigration-statistics-july-to-september-2013#detention-1 > 03 March 2015 
These statistics do not include people detained under the Immigration Act powers in prisons.  
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competing for contracts in what has been described as ‘healthy competition’ with 
Global Solutions Limited (GSL) being the company running the largest number of 
immigration centres in the UK.714 In addition, the private sector has taken prominent 
positions in escorting with Group 4 Securicor as the primary provider of UKBA’s 
immigration escorting operation in the UK as well as accompanying foreign nationals to 
their home countries of about 60 charter flights and 1800 scheduled flights yearly.715 
This was expected to generate revenue in excess of £125 million in five years.716 
 
The use of private companies in the immigration detention estate reflects the norm in 
most liberal democracies such as the USA, UK and Australia, which led Beyen and 
Snacken to remark that ‘What happens in the USA today happens in the UK 
tomorrow’.717  This could be interpreted to mean that liberal democracies appear more 
interested in encouraging detention than the respect of the right to liberty of non-
citizens. Tim Newburn adds that the emergence of private prisons and detention centres 
in the UK owes its motivating developments to the USA in what is referred to as ‘policy 
transfer’.718 Garland describes it as shared culture of control, assisting to shape penal 
policies with increasing similar outlook. 719 Writing from a symbiotic, cross-pollinated 
and axiomatic viewpoint, Jones and Newburn see it as ‘elements of globalisation 
emerging from policy ideas implemented across international boundaries when political 
conditions are ripe’.720  
 
Nonetheless, there appears to be paucity of scholarly debates concerning the deeper 
structural factors and interests necessitating immigration detention and how this 
privatization of the detention estate has affected the evolution of immigration detention 
in liberal democracies.721 The consequence is that immigrants are stripped of many of 
the legal safeguards granted to suspected criminals given that under criminal law; strict 																																																								
714 Christine Bacon, ‘The Evolution of Immigration Detention in the UK: The Involvement of Private 
Prison Companies’ (2005) Refugees Studies Centre RSC Working Paper 27/2005, 8 
<http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/working-papers-folder_contents/RSCworkingpaper27.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2012  
715  Prison Privatization Report International No 62, (Public Services International Research Unit, 
University of Greenwich 2004)<http://www.psiru.org/justice/PPRI62.htm> accessed 11 September 2012 
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2000 Conference, University of Leicester 8-10 April 2000) 5 
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719 D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (OUP 2001) 
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time limits are imposed on arrested criminal suspects whereas an immigration detainee 
may be detained indefinitely especially in the UK. A criminal suspect must be released 
or charged after 24 hours unless an officer of the rank of an inspector or above 
authorizes detention but in any case detention without charge is not permitted after 96 
hours.722  
 
There is also a presumption in favour of release in criminal bail hearings as well as full 
access to legal assistance and appeal rights. This is not the case with immigration 
detention as there is no presumption in favour of release of immigration detainees, no 
full access to legal assistance and no appeal rights if bail was not granted to the 
applicant-these would be analyzed further in this chapter. The probable reason for this is 
that the State sees immigration detention only as administrative function of the State 
thus allowing the private nature of immigration detention to be invisible. In essence, the 
contours of immigration detention revolves amongst others; the quality of the national 
law authorizing detention, the conditions and place of detention, the reasons for 
detention and the duration of detention,723 and these will be discussed subsequently in 
this chapter. 
 
4.3 Detention and Liberal Democracies: Trends and Turns 
 
The detention of migrants in the UK was first undertaken under the 1920 Aliens Act, 
which gave enormous powers to immigration officers to deport aliens. This was further 
elaborated under the 1971 Immigration Act (1971 Act) as provided under Schedule 2 & 
3 to the 1971 Act.724  This power, as observed by Johnston, can be exercised in 
conjunction with any of the three administrative acts notably examination, removal or 
deportation.725 In the view of Block and Schuster, ‘the powers to detain are very wide 
and not subject to any automatic scrutiny of the lawfulness, appropriateness or length of 
detention’.726 The 1971 Act authorized detention in several situations concerning 
examination, decision to grant leave and administrative removal.727 In Khan v SSHD728 																																																								
722  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 42 
723 Galina Cornelisse, ‘Human Rights for Immigration Detainees in Strasbourg: Limited Sovereignty or a 
Limited Discourse?’ (2004) 6 European Journal of Migration and Law 93, 96 
724 See Immigration Act 1972, Sch 2 on detention and deportation 
725 Connor Johnson, ‘Indefinite Immigration detention: can it be justified?’  (2009) 23 J.I.A.L 351, 352 
726 Alice Bloch and Liza Schutter, ‘At the extremes of exclusion: Deportation, detention and dispersal’ 
(2005) 28 Ethnic and Racial Studies 491, 499 
727 The 1971 Act, Sch 2, paras, 8,9, 16 (2) as amended by the 1999 Act, s.140 (1), cf The Immigration 
Rules para 2 HC 395 as a corollary to the Act. 
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the court confirmed that the prohibition on removal pending the pursuit of an asylum 
claim does not preclude the exercise of the power of detention.729  
 
In offering significant similarities with the UK, the United States on its part in 1892, 
even prior to the advent of the UK laws and policies on detention, authorized mandatory 
immigration detention for all non-citizens seeking entry into its territory that led to the 
establishment of Ellis Island as the first immigration detention centre and the most 
frequently used, popularly referred to as the “Island of Tears”.730 Furthermore, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 1952 gave special permission to the Attorney 
General to detain non-citizens for ninety days under the post removal detention statute-
mandatory immigration detention.731  
 
By way of diffusion and trends, immigration detention in the UK and the US has 
become restrictive over a given period of time. In characterizing the US immigration, 
Silverman opined that ‘detention has become more restrictive with time, with periods 
growing larger and conditions becoming deleterious with less accountability’.732 Of 
critical consequence here is the retroactivity clause entrenched in the Immigration 
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act 1996 (IIRIRA) that streamlined removal 
proceedings through its Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) of which 
immigration detention was the centerpiece and non-citizens as targets. In my view, the 
retroactivity clause of the US 1996 Act closely resembles section 32 of the UK Borders 
Act 2007, which has a retroactive effect against foreign nationals who may have 
committed offence before the law came into force. The massive expansive of 
immigration detention in the USA, argued Miller was a result of the retroactivity of the 
1996 legislation mandatory detention provisions in addition to the expandable 
categories of deportable offences733, as the Section 32 of the UK Borders 2009 made 
criminal conviction as a basis for deportation. As Loughran saw it, the ‘pre-September 
11 2001 legislation in the US marked a paradigm shift in immigration policy from 																																																																																																																																																																		
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the United States’ (2008) 61 (1) SMU Law Review 67, 72 
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individual –based focus to a categorical approach fed by the popular perception that 
migrants arriving the US are a faceless crowd that must be detained’ just like the 
approach adopted in the UK.734  
 
Another common nexus between State practice in the UK and the US relate to the 
criminalization of immigration detainees-an intersection between immigration 
enforcement following conviction for a criminal offence, as variously defined. State 
practice in these countries point to the multiple uses of immigration detention. In these 
countries, detention regime is at the nexus of foreign and domestic policies, 
instrumentalized at various times in response to both’. 735 Commenting on the US 
detention, Miller stated that immigration detention provides a unique variation as it 
showcases the manipulation of administrative policy in deterring potential future 
migrants.736  
 
The above illuminates the fact that the right to liberty might be a mirage substantively 
and procedurally with unjustifiable discrimination espoused in several guises against 
international human rights obligations even as liberty is not simply confined to citizens 
but extend to aliens regardless of their legal status in the host country.737  
 
In Australia and by way of convergence, the power to detain migrants is enshrined in 
the Australian Migration Act 1958 and tested under common law in the case of Al Kateb 
v Goodwin.738 The Australian Migration Act 1958 provides for administrative detention 
of non-nationals and that detention is mandatory not discretionary.739 Section 189 
authorizes an officer to detain a person whose presence he suspects or reasonably 
believes to be unlawful. Section 196 (1) deals with the period of detention, which 
provides that detainees under section 198 must be detained until removed, deported, or 
granted a visa. Section 196 (3) prevents a person being detained from release even by a 																																																								
734 A E Loughran, ‘Congress, Categories and the Constitution-Whether Mandatory Detention of Criminal 
Aliens Violates Due Process’ (2003-2004) 18 (4) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 681, 696 
735 Silverman, ‘Immigration Detention in America’ (n732) 20 
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737 See ECHR Art 1; A v SSHD [2005] 2 AC 68 [106] (Hope LL) held that right to liberty belongs to 
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(1983) 2 WLR 321 [344] (Scarman LL); see YickWo v Hopkins 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); The case of 
Kwong Hai Chew v Colding 344 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1953) held that the Fifth Amendment does not allow 
any distinction between citizens and resident aliens; Zadvydas v Davis 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also 
ICCPR Art 2 (1) and 26; see also U. N. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention (n26)  and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (n35) 
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court of an unlawful non-citizen.  In Al Kateb v Godwin740, the Australian High Court 
(highest court in Australia under the hierarchy of courts) decided by a narrowest 4-3 
majority rejecting the appellant’s argument that he should be released from detention. 
The court stated the Migration Act 1958 interpreted clearly provides that he will be kept 
in administrative detention until he is removed, meaning that the appellant is to be kept 
in administrative detention indefinitely if not removed.  
 
In his contribution to the Australian detention debate, Allan argues that the ability to 
detain flows from the purpose of detention which is removal and where that purpose no 
longer has any real likelihood of fulfillment, detention stops being lawful.741 To him, 
that allows one to avoid the otherwise seemingly clear words of s 196 (3).742 It is 
important to point out that the UK, US and Australia use similar phrases of ‘reasonably 
necessary’, ‘reasonably foreseeable’ or ‘reasonably practicable’ respectively to defend 
their practice of indefinite immigration detention against international human law 
standards - a dilemma faced by migrants in these liberal democracies. 
 
 Furthermore, it is argued that the power of the courts in Australia to specifically review 
the legality of such detention has been removed by operation of law.743 This lack of 
effective means of appeal or review has invited the UN Human Rights Committee to 
hold that such detention is ‘arbitrary’ within the meaning of Article 9 of the ICCPR.744 
In addition, the High Court of Australia in late 2003 surprised human rights advocates 
and the international community by entering a unanimous decision, where it considered 
it not to be unlawful or unconstitutional to detain children in immigration detention, 
stating that there were no exceptions to the law for children.745 Similarly, another High 
Court case added a salvo to the matter by finding that conditions of detention would not 
make an otherwise lawful detention, unlawful.746 This decision appears to be at variance 
with the Human Rights Committee’s views in which it held that article 9(4) of the 
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ICCPR requires that detained individuals be entitled to review by a court and that any 
review must be effective, most notably, that a court must be able to order release.747  
 
France on the hand tilts towards a contrast to immigration detention as practiced in 
Australia, USA and the UK. It has been reported that as at 31 March 2004, migrants 
notably asylum seekers are generally not detained in France while decisions on their 
claims for asylum are pending.748 It is recorded that the maximum time permitted in a 
waiting zone is 20 days,749 and in the event of impossibility of detention, admission 
must be allowed with a functional appeal system that allows for a référéliberté to the 
Tribunal, which is decided upon very quickly-within a few days.750 As at 2003, there 
were 24 centres (with 775 beds) registered as places of rétention in addition to over one 
hundred other places, which can be temporarily used as sites of retention, such as, 
police stations or, exceptionally, hotel rooms.751 In 2003, the percentage of asylum 
seekers released from waiting zones and admitted to French territory was 68.8%.752 
Viewed in perspectives with state practices in the UK, USA and Australia, it appears 
that French detention policies and practice tilt more towards conformity to international 
human rights standards.  
 
4.3.1 Detention Under Common Law in the United Kingdom and Implications for 
Strasbourg Jurisprudence 	
Under common law, efforts made to establish basic and effective safeguards against 
detention is as old as time, 753 and it has indeed been posited that freedom from arbitrary 
detention could be termed the oldest of human rights.754 It is therefore crucial to 
mention that under common law, the detention powers outlined in the section above 
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were first tested in the case of Hardial Singh755 concerning an Indian national detained 
for 6 months upon the completion of a prison sentence while the Home Office made 
preparations to deport him. His removal was delayed because the Indian High 
Commission did not cooperate with the Home Office in preparing his travel documents. 
The court held that his continued detention under para 2 of Sch 3 to the 1971 Act was 
unlawful because the power given to detain individuals is subject to express limitations 
as to purpose- only pending his removal or deportation. Moreover the period must be 
reasonable, given that if the Secretary of State cannot deport within a reasonable time, 
continuous detention will be unlawful. The question for common law was what 
constitutes a reasonable time within the remit of Hardial Singh? Therefore in R (on the 
application of I) v SSHD756 the court found detention to be unreasonable in the light of 
several non-exhaustive factors namely: the length of detention; the nature of the 
obstacles in the way of removal; the diligence of the Secretary of State; the conditions 
of detention; the effect of detention on the detainee and his family.757  
 
As seen from the above cases, necessity, reasonableness and due diligence were major 
factors necessitating detention under common law but it remains to be seen whether 
these continue to be factors considered under Strasbourg jurisprudence or typical of 
liberal democracies in the detention of migrants. Under common law, detention will be 
unlawful where it exceeds the period reasonably necessary for the purpose of removal 
or where it could be shown to be disproportionate because of interference to family. But 
evidence in practice shows that the contrary is the case as issues of necessity amongst 
others is seldom if ever considered. The question then is why would the requirement of 
necessity be irrelevant for the deprivation of liberty of non-citizens whose single 
offence stems from their immigration status? In essence, the reasonability of detention 
was not entrenched until the intervention of common law as explained by the Hardial 
Singh principles that laid down the principle that detention must be within a reasonable 
time, although reasonable time was not defined.  
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By way of convergence, the most significant judicial intervention in the detention of 
migrants in the US came with the decision in Zadvydas v Davis.758 In this case, the court 
held that a non-citizen’s detention is permissible only if it was for a ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ period in order to carry out deportation with recognition of the 
government’s rights to set detention rules. This ‘reasonably foreseeable’ test is similar 
to detention under common in the UK as represented by the Hardial Singh principles, 
which in my view has a bearing on the legality of detention. 
 
4.4 The Legality of Detention  
 
Legality of detention requires that the law, which authorizes detention, must accord 
with international human rights law standards. This amongst others and specifically for 
refugees is contained in the Detention Guidelines of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which adds that the review of detention must 
inculcate the question of necessity of detention in the appropriate circumstance.759  In 
the light of this, the UNHCR posits that the detention of asylum seekers is inherently 
undesirable and only accepted if it is brief, absolutely necessary and implemented where 
other options have been exercised leaving detention as the last resort.760 This view is 
supported by Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention which provides that penalties 
shall not be imposed on refugees on the account of illegal entry provided they present 
themselves without delay and show good cause for their illegal entry.761  
 
The ECHR codified its protection of liberty under Art 5 of the ECHR 1950.762 In Engels 
v Netherlands, the court explained that in a classic sense, the right protected is that of 
physical liberty rather than physical safety.763 Article 5 ECHR may be seen as providing 
two safeguards for detainees notably the test for the legality of detention on the one 
hand and a set of procedural rights for detainees on the other hand.764 The need for 
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procedural guarantees is predicated on the fact that rights can be substantively 
consistent with the law while procedurally defective.  
 
The overall aim and legal rationale of Article 5 is therefore to ensure that no one is 
deprived of his liberty in an arbitrary manner inconsistent with its provisions thus 
emphasizing the security of the person.765 This is anchored on Art 5 (4) of the ECHR 
1950 which provides that no one can be deprived of their liberty save in accordance 
with a procedure established by law and for a purpose recognized by the ECHR.766  
Anyone deprived of his right in this regard has the right to apply to a court for a speedy 
review of the legality of the detention and to be released if detention is found unlawful. 
The supervening question is whether detention is in accordance with the law and 
permissible under Art 5 (1) (f) and what factors are engaged in deciding the legality of 
detention. Detention under Art 5 (1) (f) is permissible in two situations (two limbs): one 
is to prevent the migrant from ‘effecting an unauthorized entry into the country’ and the 
other is ‘where action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’ of a non-
national (migrant) who has entered the country. 
 
In essence, the factors identified by this research in answering the above questions 
specifically and discussing generally the legality of the detention revolves around the 
acceptable international human rights law standards: the issue of arbitrariness, 
conditions of detention; the necessity and proportionality debate in the light of 
procedural and substantive implications; length of detention and due diligence. These 
shall be considered below. 
 
4.4.1 Arbitrary Detention 
 
[A]rbitrariness is interpreted broadly to include not only unlawfulness but includes 
elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability which demands for 
necessity in an individual case, reasonable in the circumstance and proportionate to a 
legitimate purpose.767 Detention is ‘arbitrary if it is random or capricious or not 
accompanied by fair and efficient procedures and/or when it is disproportionate and 																																																								
765 Guzzard v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR [92] ; Bozano v France (1986) 9 EHRR 292 [54] 
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indefinite’.768 For detention not to be arbitrary, it should be prescribed by law-
sufficiently accessible and precise excluding all elements of arbitrariness’.769  
 
The remit of Art 5 ECHR is to protect the person against arbitrary detention, which is 
also made clear in Article 9 of the ICCPR770 where it considered the case of A v 
Australia, 771 regarding the detention of a Cambodian asylum seeker-the Committee 
(HRC) noted that the notion of arbitrariness must not be equated with ‘against the law’ 
but has to be given a broad interpretation to include inappropriateness and injustice. The 
HRC remarked that remand in custody could be considered arbitrary if it is not 
necessary in all circumstances which hitherto invites the issue of proportionality, 
emphasizing that, periodic review of detention is required for which its continual 
exercise should not continue beyond an acceptable period where the State can no longer 
provide justification.  
 
In essence, where there exists a presumption in favour of liberty, there is no 
corresponding requirement for its absolute protection against deprivation. This accords 
with Nowak’s contribution that Article 9 ICCPR ‘does not strive towards the ideal of a 
complete abolition of State measures that deprive liberty. [...] It is not the deprivation of 
liberty itself that is disapproved of but rather that which is arbitrary and unlawful’.772 
The HRC has further explained that liberty is not absolute; deprivation at times may be 
justified.773 
 
Furthermore, in C v Australia 774 the Committee discussed the issue of the detention of 
an asylum seeker for 2 years who was eventually released on health grounds having 
been diagnosed to be mentally ill. Due to limitations placed on the review of his 
detention by primary legislation, no review of his detention was carried out. The 
Australian government argued that mandatory detention was in general justified on 																																																								
768 UNHCR ‘Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s programme Standing Committee on 
Detention of asylum-seekers and refugees: The framework, the problem and recommended practice (4 
June 1999) UN Doc EC/49/SC/CRP.13 
769 ibid 
770 See provisions of ICCPR Art 9, but note that the UK does not recognize the right of individual petition 
under the ICCPR but is a signatory to the ICCPR 1966  
771 A v Australia Communication No 456/1991 CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991 
772 M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, N.P. Engel 
Verlag 2005) 210.  
773 HRC ‘General Comment No 35, Article 9: Liberty and security of person (Advance Unedited Version) 
CCPR/C/GC/35 (28 October 2014) para 11 
774 C v Australia Communication No CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 Meeting of 28 October 2002 
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policy grounds arguing further that C was an absconding risk due to his dishonesty upon 
arrival. The Committee rejected these arguments and found breaches of Article 9 (1) 
and 9 (4) of the ICCPR775. The Committee concluded that whatever original reasons 
exist for detention, the continuation of his detention without individual justification and 
without any chance of substantive judicial review was arbitrary. 
 
The concept of arbitrariness as further expressed in the UNHCR’s guidelines on the 
detention of asylum seekers, sees freedom from arbitrary detention ‘as a fundamental 
human right’.776 The Human Rights Committee General Comment on the issue of right 
to liberty and security specifically includes immigration control.777 It has been argued 
that this does not debar States from immigration control but requires ‘the decision-
maker to consider all other alternatives [alternatives to detention] such as the imposition 
of reporting conditions and the provision of sureties’.778  
 
Analytically expressed, detention may be in ‘violation of the applicable law but not 
arbitrary, or legally permitted but arbitrary, or both arbitrary and unlawful, therefore 
detention may be authorized by domestic law and nonetheless be arbitrary’.779 O’Nions 
contends that ‘what is required is not simply an assessment of legality but the definition 
should encompass a broader test of substantive arbitrariness to include decisions which 
are unreasonable, unjust, delayed and unpredictable’.780 I argue that an unreasonable 
decision, delayed decisions or where the State’s laws are not precise and predictable is 
an infraction on the rights of migrants and a harbinger for human rights violations 
contrary to the tenets of liberal democracies that emphasize the rule of rule of law.781 
O’Nions on her part finds support in the Commission of Human Rights comment on 
																																																								
775 See also HRC ‘General Comment No 35, Article 9: Liberty and security of person (Advance Unedited 
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Comment No 35, Article 9: Liberty and security of person (n775) para 12; Fongum Gorji-Dinka v 
Cameroon, Communication No 1134/2002, CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002, para 5.1 
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arbitrary detention782 which requires broader test for arbitrariness and the case of Van 
Alpen v Netherlands783 where the Committee emphasized that detention may be lawful 
but arbitrary, therefore detention could constitute a gross breach of Art 9 ICCPR. By 
extension, Art 12 of the ICCPR protects freedom of movement of persons ‘lawfully’ 
present within a State’s territorial jurisdiction. By virtue of this Article, the Human 
Rights Committee regards asylum seekers as ‘lawfully resident’.784 
 
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention sets out criteria for determining 
whether custody of migrants is arbitrary which applies only when a decision to detain 
has been made in accordance with the law. The working group’s 1998 report on the UK 
expressed dismay over lack of judicial oversight and resultantly emphasized that 
detention should only be used when legitimate and according to international standards 
especially when other measures will not assist.785 It is important to reassert that this 
research identified that prior to the coming into force of the I999 Immigration and 
Asylum Act; the detention of migrants was not subject to supervision by the courts.786 
The Working Group’s Report recommends alternative and non-custodial measures in 
the manner of reporting conditions rather than actual detention and in addition states 
that ‘the detaining authorities’ must assess a compelling need to detain based on the 
personal history of the asylum seeker.787 
 
The ECHR on the hand has determined that an avoidance of arbitrariness either in 
motivation or effect also encompasses cases of bad faith where detention is not 
consistent with the restrictions as enshrined in Art 5 ECHR .788 The issue of bad faith 
																																																								
782 HRC ‘On the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/826/Rev.1; 
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finds explanation in Bozano v France.789 In this case, an Italian national was convicted 
in his absence by an Italian court and the ECtHR held that the deprivation of liberty was 
arbitrary in motivation and unlawful given that the detention was obviously for the 
purpose of deportation but in reality was a disguised illegal extradition. The ECtHR also 
determined that arbitrariness might occur where an applicant is denied adequate reasons 
for the detention. According to the court, this obligation continues as detention may 
therefore become unlawful if the reason given initially ceases to apply.790 
 
Applying what seems like a purposive approach in arriving at the scope of arbitrary 
detention with specificity to asylum seekers, the Executive Committee in a Standing 
Committee agreed that ‘the detention of asylum seekers may be considered arbitrary if it 
is not in accordance with the law or if the law itself allows arbitrary practices or if it is 
enforced in an arbitrary way.791 Goodwin-Gill observed that it might be argued that 
what is in accordance with the law cannot be arbitrary792 but this is not the case as he 
postulated. For him, ‘an infringement of personal liberty such as detention may be 
arbitrary not only in accordance with procedures established by law but extends to the 
provisions of the law contrary to liberty and security of the person’.793 This thus 
embraces not only what is illegal but also what is unjust. 
 
4.4.2 Necessity and Proportionality 
 
The HRC emphasized that State parties need to show that detention does not last longer 
than absolutely necessary, that the overall length of possible detention is limited and 
that it accords with the guarantees provided for by Article 9 ICCPR.794 The principle of 
proportionality presupposes that where an action to achieve a lawful objective is taken 
in a situation and the subsequent action appears to restrict a fundamental right, ‘the 
effect on the right must not be disproportionate to the public purpose sought to be 
achieved’.795 Proportionality is the most crucial element of the necessity test that 
																																																								
789 (1987) 9 EHRR 297, para 60 
790 Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413, paras 43, 112-113 
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795 Michael Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (Hart Publishing 2008) 81; R (Daly) v SSHD [2001] 
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involves a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of 
community and the requirements of protection of the individual’s human rights.796 In 
Daly 797 the House of Lords adopted a three stage approach to establish proportionality: 
i) the legitimate objective should be of sufficient importance justifying the limitation of 
a fundamental human right; ii) the measures designed to meet the objective must be 
rationally connected to it; iii) the means used to impair that right must be no more than 
necessary to accomplish the objective.   
 
Proportionality is in essence a balancing exercise underpinning the ECHR in Art 8-11 
ECHR with the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test. A restriction cannot be 
regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ unless it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.798 The state cannot use ‘a sledgehammer to crack a nut’ as the 
pressing social need for the restriction of the right must accord with the requirements of 
a democratic society which supposes pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness.799 
 
In the European Union, detention rules with respect to asylum seekers can be found in 
the Directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection (Procedures Directive)800 as well as in the Directive laying down standards 
for the reception of applicants for international protection (Reception Conditions 
Directive).801 These instruments confirm that detention should be employed when it 
proves necessary.  Art 26 of the Procedures Directive provides that Member States shall 
not hold a person for the sole reason that he/she is an asylum applicant and even where 
the applicant is held in detention, there should be a speedy judicial review. Art 7 (2) of 
the Reception Conditions Directive on its part provides that States are allowed to 
confine an applicant to a particular place when it proves necessary. It has been argued 
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that these two instruments leave ‘extensive discretion to States to detain asylum seekers 
for purported legal reasons or for reasons of public order’.802 
 
The dilemma faced by the two directives are how to interpret the term ‘necessary’ for 
legal reasons or for public order under Art 7 (2) of the Reception Conditions Directive 
and whether detention requires an individual assessment of necessity based on a 
balancing test where accounts have been taken of all private and public interests and 
how to apply the principles of proportionality.803 I argue that even if these instruments 
allow for detention, the operating word is ‘necessity’ which should be construed 
narrowly in order to avoid abuse of the powers of confinement enjoyed by receiving 
States as currently exercised.  This view finds support in Bail for Immigration Detainees 
(BID) statement that detention is employed in the UK as a deterrent to asylum seekers 
where lack of procedural safeguards leads to widespread arbitrary detention.804 
 
In addition, the Executive Committee’s Conclusion on detention of refugees and asylum 
seekers805 stressed the need for necessity to be related to legitimate aims as updated by 
the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines that describes detention as inherently undesirable .806 
According to it, ‘detention should be a measure of last resort with liberty being the 
default position’.807 The Guideline 2 recounts that the fundamental rights to liberty and 
security of person and freedom of movement are expressed in all the major international 
and regional human rights instruments, which are the essential components of legal 
systems, built on the rule of law.808 
 
The idea being expressed is that even though national legislation is the primary source 
for ascertaining the lawfulness of detention, but it is not always the decisive element in 
the assessment of the justification of deprivation of liberty as special regard must be had 
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to the underlying purpose of preventing arbitrary deprivation of liberty.809 It is equally 
of importance to the UNHCR that detention laws must conform to the principle of legal 
certainty, which requires that the law itself must be foreseeable and predictable without 
retroactive effect.810 This research has explained that liberal democracies operate under 
the rule of law whose laws should conform to predictability, foreseeability and legal 
certainty.811 
 
Wilsher is of the view that ‘the Guidelines allow for detention in order to determine the 
elements of the claim but stressed that such detention is justifiable if it is within a 
prescribed period’.812 The 2007 UN Working Group suggested that necessity was 
important to avoid the issue of arbitrary detention because the detention of migrants in 
general or asylum seekers in particular is not prohibited.813 The critical issue therefore is 
how necessity is defined and/or construed.  Hathaway is of the opinion that ‘short-term 
detention only aimed for administrative purpose can be said to be necessary even 
though it is not specifically governed by the Guidelines’.814 In his contribution, Grahl-
Madsen opinionates that detention should be used to ‘ascertain identity and for 
investigative purposes and limited by necessity but he specifically rules out the 
legitimacy of detention for administrative purposes’.815  
 
The Home Office’s EIG concedes that detention will be unlawful where it exceeds the 
period reasonably necessary for the purpose of removal or where it could be shown to 
be disproportionate because of interference to family.816 Field adds that the 
consideration of non-custodial alternatives is a ‘pre-requisite for satisfying the principle 
of necessity in relation to lawful detention’.817 I argue that even if properly motivated 																																																								
809  UNHCR ‘Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers’ (n36) Guideline 3; see also Lokpo and Toure v Hungary App No 10816/10 (ECtHR, 20 Sept 
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812 Daniel Wilsher, ‘Detention of asylum seekers and refugees and international human rights law’ in P 
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817 Ophelia Field and Alice Edwards, ‘Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees’ (2006) 
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and otherwise lawful, a deprivation of liberty may become arbitrary in effect if it is 
found to be disproportionate to the pursued aim. In Witold Litwa v Poland 818 a case 
concerning Art 5 (1) (e) of the ECHR 1950 the ECtHR emphasized the necessity of 
detention in that less severe measures would have been considered and found 
insufficient to safeguard the individual prior to detention.819 
 
However, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR appears to have applied a different 
parameter in discussing the issue of necessity and proportionality in the case of Saadi v 
the UK.820 Saadi was an Iraqi asylum seeker who came to the UK in December 2000 
and claimed asylum. He was initially granted temporary admission, but his detention 
was necessitated by a change in the Home Office policy that allowed detention at 
Oakington for a seven-day period if it appears that the application can be decided 
quickly with those certified as clearly unfounded. On 2 January 2001, Saadi was 
detained at Oakington but reasons for his detention were not given. His claim was 
refused and after two years as he was officially accorded refugee status and was granted 
asylum in the UK. Saadi and others challenged the legality of their detention citing 
unlawful deprivation of liberty. It was clear from available facts that Saadi was not 
detained under the second limb of Art 5 (1) (f) as his detention was not pursuant to 
removal. 821 The only key question was whether his detention was to prevent 
‘unauthorized entry’. The High Court under Collins J ruled that even though detention 
was lawful under domestic law, the detention was not needed to prevent his ‘effecting 
unauthorized entry’. 822 He held that the detention was disproportionate and not 
‘reasonably necessary’ to its stated purpose namely the speedy examination of his 
asylum claim.823 Both the Court of Appeal824 and the House of Lords825 held that 
detention was lawful under domestic law and under Art 5. The House of Lords 
concluded that detention did not have to be necessary to prevent absconding or actions 
against public good and further stated that all entry was unauthorized until expressly 
authorized by the Home Office. Therefore providing the action was proportionate, it fell 																																																																																																																																																																		
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4472e8b84.pdf> accessed 29 August 2012 
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within the exceptions listed in Art 5 (1) (f). The necessity limb was rejected but a breach 
of Art 5 (2) was found which requires that everyone arrested must be informed 
promptly about the reason for detention but Saadi was not informed until about a period 
of 76 hours.826  
 
The ECtHR on their part in 2006 upheld the decision of the House of Lords by a narrow 
majority. The court appears to have given excessive prominence to the undeniable right 
of states to control the right of aliens to enter and reside in their country with the 
unfortunate conclusion that until a potential migrant has been officially granted leave, 
he/she has not effected a lawful entry. 827 This means detention is permissible under Art 
5 (1) (f) to prevent unlawful entry.  The Grand Chamber upheld the Chamber’s decision 
on 28 January 2008.828 The court attempted to separate notions of necessity from 
arbitrariness and proportionality. It stated: 
 
To avoid being branded as arbitrary… such detention should be carried out in 
good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing 
unauthorized entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of 
detention should be appropriate… and the length of detention should not exceed 
that reasonably required for the purpose pursued. 
 
O’Nions remarks that the cautious approach adopted by the ECtHR ‘was simply 
deference to state sovereignty, which led the court to reason that the detention of 
migrants including asylum seekers should confer a broader discretion than detention 
under other exceptions in Art 5 (1)’.829  O’Nions adds that ‘the outcome of this case 
legitimizes reasonably brief periods of detention for administrative convenience 
provided it is not seen as arbitrary’. 830 This according to her increases the restrictive 
European immigration policy.831 Despite the ECtHR’s ruling, necessity is a common 
thread that runs through international human rights discourse on detention as 
highlighted above given the numerous international instruments cited. Cornelisse raises 																																																								
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pertinent questions-‘Why does immigration detention not need to be a necessary 
measure? Why does the Court with regard to immigration detention not require that 
other less sever measures have been considered and found insufficient to prevent 
unauthorized entry or to effect deportation? Why is it sufficient merely to start 
deportation proceedings in order to be able to detain a foreign national?’832 The above 
portrays the existence of excessive executive deference, which arguably has become an 
instrument for state practice in immigration detention. 
 
In essence, deference appears to have been an issue with the ECtHR. As stated by Lord 
Bingham in A (FC) and Others v SSHD833 this executive deference owes its sanctity to 
the popular belief that great weight should be given to the judgment of political 
authorities because they do exercise pre-eminently political judgment which courts are 
not saddled to do. While it is agreed that it is the function of political authorities and not 
the courts to resolve political questions, but where the issue has more legal content, the 
greater the potential role of the court in this regard. It is therefore not sufficient for the 
ECtHR to remain nonchalant with the proportionality and necessity limbs in the 
detention of migrants-decisions devolving into questions that seem to have more legal 
than political contents.  
 
My view finds support in the thinking of Fawcett who argues that ‘execute deference 
operates in the form of margin of appreciation allowing a State to make decisions on 
detention in terms of necessity as in the case of Saadi’.834 This notion has been located 
between objective and subjective powers where the state retains a degree of freedom of 
decision not by virtue of its sovereignty but because it is adjudged to be well placed to 
know the facts and determine it objectively. He opines that the decision in Saadi v UK 
is inherently dangerous for individual liberties.835 Goodwin-Gill agrees and argues that 
‘no power in the context of international law is ultimately discretionary in the sense of 
unlimited and omnipotent given that the very idea of power involves an element of 
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design, of a defined objective or purpose’. 836  He further explains that the role of the 
law is to set limits and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such rights.837 
 
By and large, the reluctance or refusal of the ECtHR to require specific necessity does 
not sit comfortably with international human rights law. Strasbourg’s approach is 
equally at variance with the Council of Europe’s own recommendations which in 
respect of asylum seekers inter alia states that measures of detention of asylum seekers 
should be applied only after a careful examination of their necessity in each particular 
case.838  
 
Furthermore, the legal interpretation of Art 5 (1) (f) that sparked controversy is the 
definition of unauthorized entry particularly the reasoning that all entry is unauthorized 
until expressly authorized by the State. As have been stated earlier on in Celepi v 
Sweden,839 the Human Rights Committee agreed that an irregular [illegal] entrant whose 
status has been regularized was lawfully in the State within the meaning of Art 12 
ICCPR which follows that an asylum applicant with temporary admission is lawfully 
present under the law. It has been suggested that Collins J’s approach to the question of 
unauthorized entry accords with the spirit of Art 14 of the UDHR and Art 31 of the UN 
Convention on the Status of Refugees.840 The use of the word ‘prevent’ in Art 5 (1) (f) 
argues Blake is that there must be a causal connection between detention and unlawful 
immigration, stating that an asylum seeker is not thereby without more seeking 
unlawful or unauthorized entry. 841 I argue that the use of Detained Fast Track System 
(DFT also referred to ‘Oakington’ process) is to speed up the asylum process but not 
directed at preventing unauthorized entry. Even at that, the Court of Appeal had recently 
found as unlawful detention pending an asylum claim under the Detained Fast Track 
System due to lack of clarity and transparency.842 
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In Saadi v UK, the ECtHR concluded that ‘until a State has authorized entry to the 
country any entry is unauthorized and the detention of a person who wishes to effect 
entry and who needs but does not have authorization to do so can be, without any 
distortion of language to ‘prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry’.843 Even though it 
is accepted that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ which accepts proactive and 
teleological approaches but the Strasbourg court in Saadi seems to have used it in 
expanding the limitations on the fundamental right to liberty. As O’Nions argues, ‘the 
consequence of that interpretation is that any person without express leave to enter or 
remain in the UK could now be detained as their presence is similarly unauthorized 
under Art 5 (1) (f)’. 844  
 
However, later developments tilt towards a contradiction of the necessity nexus in 
immigration detention rejected by the ECtHR in Saadi v UK. The ECtHR in Rusu v 
Austria845, (a case postdating Saadi) surprisingly abandoned its previous stance and 
accepted that the necessity adjunct was very vital in the applicable domestic law but 
nevertheless refused to incorporate it into its interpretation of Art 5 (1) (f) on detention. 
Costello sees this ‘as signaling a more intense judicial review of both adherence to 
domestic standards and the factual matrix surrounding the claim of unauthorized 
entry’.846  She remarked that by ‘rejecting the necessity test in the deportation-detention 
nexus, the Court explicitly sets a lower standard of protection for immigration detention 
than for other forms’.847 
 
By way of divergence and trend, the US Supreme Court in Denmore v Kim848 similar to 
Saadi v UK, had to decide the issue of necessity in immigration detention. Denmore was 
the second Supreme Court case decided in 2003. The court although divided, accepted 
that government’s rationale for mandatory detention was a means to compensate for its 
own inefficiency and lack of resources but went ahead to reject information suggesting 																																																								
843 Saadi v UK (n820) para 65 
844 Helen O’Nions, ‘Exposing the flaws in the Detention of Asylum Seekers: A critique of Saadi’ (n748) 
42, for general discussions regarding the ‘presence’ of asylum seekers and refugees, see Ralph Grillo, 
‘”Saltdean can’t cope” protests against asylum seekers in an English seaside surb’ (2005) 28 (2) Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 235, 237; Rosemary Sales, ‘Welfare for asylum seekers in Britain’ (2002) 22 Critical 
Social Policy 456, 459 
845 Rusu v Austria  App No 34082/02 (ECtHR 2 October 2008) 
846 Cathryn Costello, ‘Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration Detention Under 
International Human Rights Law and EU Law’ (2012) 19 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 257, 
286 
847 ibid 287 
848 538 US 510 (2003) 
146		
that necessity is required in immigration detention in all cases of criminal non-
citizens.849  Therefore the issue of necessity in immigration detention as was decided in 
Saadi850 by the ECtHR in 2008, where the State does not have to show that detention 
was necessary only if removal of the migrant was pursued with due diligence, somehow 
suggests that the ECtHR borrowed extensively from Denmore by way of diffusion.  
 
In essence, the debate is whether detention is necessary and proportionate to the aims to 
be achieved. While some scholars are in agreement that short-term detention will not be 
at variance with Art 31 of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 
underlying issue is that detention undermines the efficacy of the spirit of Art 31 if an 
individual is still detained having complied with all reporting and monitoring conditions 
imposed by the host in the absence of an individualized assessment. 851 It is important to 
state that other migrants do not enjoy the protection of Art 31 UN Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, (which prohibits imposing penalties on account of illegal 
entry or presence on refugees coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened), as they are not refugees. Mirroring this position, in R v 
Naillie852, the House of Lords in 1993 decided that where an asylum seeker arrived but 
did not seek entry, by means including deception, they could not be treated as 
[irregular] migrants. 
 
On the proportionality question, the ECtHR held in Chahal v UK853that proportionality 
does not apply to immigration detention where in this case, an Indian national was 
detained for over 6 years on national security grounds, the ECtHR found no violation of 
Art 5 (1) (f). The court reasoned that the Article does not demand that detention be 
considered reasonably necessary; therefore that the executive need not have reason at all 
for immigration detention beyond the fact that deportation was ongoing.  This reason is 
not in accordance with other non-immigration case-laws on Art 5 where the court was 
																																																								
849 J K Doucleff, ‘Denmore v Kim: Upholding the Unnecessary Department of Legal Permanent 
Residents, Supreme Court Review’ (2003) 94 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 625, 650 
850 Saadi v UK (n820) 
851 Christos Giakoumopolis, ‘ Detention of asylum seekers in the light of Art 5 of the ECHR’ in Hughes 
and Liebaut (eds) Detention of Asylum Seekers in Europe: Analysis and Perspectives (Kluwer 1998) 161; 
Landgren Karin, Comments on the UNHCR position on detention of refugees and asylum seekers in 
Hughes and Liebaut above, 146 
852 [1993] AC 674 
853 (1997) 23 EHRR 137, para 112 
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prepared to ‘read down’ legislation 854 permitting detention under Art 5 with the aim of 
imposing a proportionality test even when there was no clear textual basis for doing so. 
 
In Winterwerp v Netherlands855 the ECtHR was confronted with a provision that 
authorizes detention for mental patients without any clear public interests being served. 
The court ruled that mental patients detained under Art 5 (1) (e) must present a threat to 
themselves or others if at large despite having the sub-Article providing no such 
limitations. Similarly in Witold Litwa v Poland856 the ECtHR adopted similar approach 
for those detained being under the influence of alcohol which applies the same 
proportionality test as explicitly engrained in Articles 8- 11 of the ECHR. It beggars 
belief that detention could be authorized and refused to be subjected to the necessity test 
in Art 5 (1) (f) whereas the necessity test can be applied in Article 5 (1) (e) cases and 
even at that ‘general assumptions on proportionality cannot replace a test of necessity in 
each individual case’.857   
 
In the view of Bryan and Langford, ‘the Court’s interpretative attitude to Article 5 (4) 
when viewed together with its approach to Art 5 (1) (f) exposes a measure of 
incongruity because the Grand Chamber’s acceptance that lawfulness for both Article 5 
(4) and Article 5 (1) have the same meaning but held that an Art 5 (4) inquiry into the 
lawfulness of detention with a view to deportation is not expected to be of such 
magnitude to comprise all aspects of detention neglecting the conditions essential for 
the lawful detention under Art 5 (1) (f)’.858 It is rather inexplicable that the court did not 
take into cognizance the significance of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969 which requires that the meaning of treaties should be determined not only of their 
wording, object, purpose and context but also with reference to well established 
principles of international law.859 
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The issue of proportionality has also been viewed from the praxis of the physical sites 
of detention centres. Flynn posits that ‘physical sites of the deprivation of liberty are 
critical factors in an effort to assess the proportionality of detention practices’.860 He 
remarked that, this accounts for the reason why the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 
created standards relative to detention of aliens.861 The CPT provides that “care should 
be taken in the design and layout of [immigration detention facilities] to avoid as far as 
possible any impression of a carceral environment”.862 Proportionality will 
inadvertently take into account the general characteristics of detention centres such as 
facility type; operational characteristics such as security regime, segregation, 
management, private contractors etc; bureaucratic characteristics such as custodial and 
ownership. This mirrors Rule 94 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners, which prohibits restriction or severity of liberty greater than necessary.863  
 
In their contribution, Silverman and Massa add that ‘even though international law 
regulations stipulate that detention must be proportionate and legal; but given that the 
standards are poorly defined and the rarity of immigration detention watchdogs, the said 
regulations are difficult to enforce’.864 According to them, the difficulty creates a 
disadvantage for detainees in the state’s attempt to balance the basic rights of non-
citizens with the sovereign imperative of immigration control.865 It is therefore my view 
that the continuous detention of migrants at police stations, prisons and detention 
centres designed as prisons is not a proportionate reaction to the non-citizen status in the 
enforcement of detention actions. 
 
4.4.3 Due Diligence in the Light of Substantive Legality and Procedural Illegality 
 
Due diligence for our purpose is expressed as reasonable steps taken by the State to 
effect detention taken into account due processes involved in order to avoid prolonged 
and/or arbitrary detention. 
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Remarkably, the ECtHR in Chahal866 limited the power of detention under the limb of 
Art 5 (1) (f) with the proviso that detention would only be lawful as long as the 
underlying deportation proceedings were being pursued with due diligence. In addition, 
the court stated that even where the said proceedings were diligently pursued, they 
would become arbitrary if they continue for an exceptional length of time without 
explanations being provided.867 In Kolompar v Belgium868 the applicant was detained 
for almost three years because he had delayed proceedings and impliedly consented to 
prolonged detention; no breach of Article 5 (1) (f) was found. From the foregoing, it is 
no doubt clear that the protection afforded migrants under the ECHR is less as 
compared to other international organs.  
 
Furthermore, Europe’s own Parliamentary Assembly has recommended that member 
states be encouraged to introduce a maximum period of detention which should be 
specified in law.869 This equally finds support with the UNHCR and the European 
Council for Refugees and Exiles dealing specifically with refugees in emphasizing that 
an absolute maximum period of detention should be specified in national law. 870 As 
already highlighted, this assertion enjoys the support of the UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention which states that in no case should detention be unlimited or of 
excessive length.871 
 
With respect to substantive legality and procedural illegality, it is my view that even 
though the law may be substantively sound but the procedure for the implementation of 
the law may give rise to illegality otherwise procedural unfairness. Therefore the 
manner of implementation of the power of detention itself may play a role in the 																																																								
866 Chahal v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413, para 117 
867 See also Lynas v Switzerland (1976) 6 DR 141 (Commission Decision, 6 October 1976); see generally 
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determination of its lawfulness. This was the position when the court decided in 
Ashindgane v UK872and in Bouamar v Belgium873 that there should indeed be a 
relationship between the main ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on by 
the authorities and the manner of implementation of detention, if not so, detention may 
be deemed inappropriate.874  
 
A case that will further illuminate the procedure for the implementation of detention 
that touches and concerns procedural illegality is the Conka v Belgium875, a case of four 
Slovakian nationals who had alleged that the circumstances of their arrest and 
deportation amounted to an infringement of Art 5 and 13 of the ECHR and Art 4 of 
Protocol No.4. In this case, the Belgian Police sent a notice to a number of rejected 
asylum seekers requiring them to report to the police station. The notice informed them 
that the attendance was required for the purposes of updating their asylum applications 
whereas upon their arrival at the police station, they were served with 
removal/deportation order and taken to a transit centre. The court categorically 
condemned the use of ‘ruse’ where the authorities misled asylum seekers to gain their 
trust paving way for their arrest, detention and subsequent deportation. Leaving the 
remit of asylum seekers and moving to overstayers generally, the Court emphasized that 
‘even as regards overstayers, a conscious decision by the authorities to facilitate or 
improve the effectiveness of a planned operation for the expulsion of aliens by 
misleading them about the purpose of a notice so as to make it easier to deprive them of 
their liberty is not compatible with Article 5’.876 The court remarked that ‘where the 
“lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure 
prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to the 
obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law, but it 
requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the 
purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness’.877 It could 
therefore be seen that the procedure for the execution of a lawful order could give rise 
to procedural illegality even when the law may be substantively legal. 
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4.4.4 Detention Conditions and the Treatment of Detainees  
 
As a starting point, Principle 1 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment provides that ‘All persons under 
any form of detention […] shall be treated in a humane manner and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person’.878 Principle 6 on its part provides that ‘No 
person under any form of detention […] shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. No circumstance whatever may be 
invoked as a justification for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.879  Article 10 ICCPR corroborates and affirms that ‘All persons deprived 
of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity 
of the human person’ read together with Art 7 ICCPR, which prohibits torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.880 It therefore follows that as much as detention may 
be permissible, conditions in which detainees are detained must conform to these 
acceptable international standards and the treatment meted to detainees must in itself 
meet these requirements without which detention will be unlawful not only in the 
context of Art 5 (1) (f) ECHR but in the context of Art 3 ECHR-the prohibition of 
torture-an absolute right.  
 
Put in context, the consideration of detention conditions will equally take into account 
the treatment of detainees as both can be said to be connected for our purpose hence this 
joint consideration. With respect to asylum seekers, the UNHCR under Principle 2 
above stated that asylum seekers should not be detained or as an exception under certain 
conditions.881 More so, Guideline 10 of the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to 
the Detention of Asylum- Seekers requires that conditions of detention should be 
humane avoiding the use of prisons for detention etc.882These instruments lay down the 
acceptable international human rights standards on acceptable conditions of detention of 
migrants in general and asylum and/or refugees as applicable. 
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As much as detention may be authorized, ‘Strasbourg jurisprudence has firmly 
established that the conditions in which a person is detained may give rise to the 
engagement not only of Article 5 but also of Article 3 ECHR (prohibition against 
torture and degrading treatment) even if there is no intention on the part of the State to 
humiliate or debase the victim’.883  In Hurtado v Switzerland, the court held that not 
providing an applicant with the opportunity to change his clothes is degrading treatment 
and that failure to provide adequate medical treatment following a violent arrest was 
inhuman treatment.884 In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium885 the 
ECtHR held that the detention and subsequent deportation of a five-year-old child was a 
violation of Art 3 ECHR, the applicant had submitted that she was held in an adult 
world where liberty was restricted and she was in a vulnerable condition.886 Similarly, 
the ECtHR held that in respect of a person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to 
physical force, which has not been made strictly necessary by his conduct, diminishes 
human dignity and an infraction of Article 3.887 The court in Ribitsch v Austria888 also 
held that severe bruises while in detention in police custody suggest ill treatment as 
much as shaving off of detainees’ hair also constitutes degrading treatment contrary to 
Article 3.889 
 
Moreover, in Peers v Greece890, the court found that the refusal or inability of the State 
in taking positive steps to improve objectively unacceptable conditions of detention 
showed lack of respect for the applicant. The court arrived at this decision because in 
the Delta wing of the prison, the appellant claimed he shared a small cell with one other 
prisoner, with an open toilet, which often failed to work, in hot, cramped conditions 
with little natural light, without ventilation and considered unhygienic. In Kalashnikov v 
Russia891 the court was particularly emphatic that the State must ensure that the 
conditions of detention are compatible with respect for human dignity including the 
measures of execution so that the detainee will not be subjected to distress or intensity 
of hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. The 
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implication is that anyone deprived of his liberty must be treated with dignity deserving 
of human beings. 
 
In addition, the court has emphasized the implied duty of States to investigate 
allegations of ill treatment. In Assenov and Ors v Bulgaria892, the implied duty of States 
to investigate allegations of serious ill treatment by a State agent was fully articulated. 
In further deciding whether the conditions of treatment are sufficient to reach the level 
of severity consistent with Article 3, issues such as the size of the cell and 
overcrowding, sanitary conditions, opportunities for recreation and exercise, medical 
treatment and supervision are important.893 This is because it is now settled that all 
forms of solitary confinement without appropriate or adequate mental and physical 
stimulation are likely in the long term to have damaging effects which results in the 
deterioration of mental faculties and social abilities.894 
 
Furthermore, in the year 2000, David Ramsbotham, the UK HM Inspector of Prisons 
published a report of Rochester Detention that reported of a filthy dirty accommodation, 
poor treatment and conditions of asylum seekers.895 The fallout of this report seems to 
have contributed to the creation of the Immigration Detention Centre Rules 2001.896 In 
addition, in 2011, the HM Inspector of Prisons at Brook House Immigration Removal 
Centre (IRC), one of the eleven IRC’s reported of the excessive and often illegitimate 
use of the separation unit.897 The report emphasized that the use of Detention Centre 
Rule 15 – an administrative measure to certify all accommodation – as a ‘catch-all’ to 
authorize and justify the separation of many detainees was unacceptable, in addition to 
the finding that the regime and quality of facilities were limited and privileges were 
permitted or denied in a crude and sometimes unthinking way.  
 
																																																								
892 App No 90/1997/874/1086 (ECtHR 28 October 1998) 
893 ibid, para 135 
894 Iorgov v. Bulgaria App No 40653/98(ECtHR 11 March 2004) 
895 HM Inspector of Prisons ‘Report of a short unannounced inspection of HM Prisons Rochester’ (31 
August -03 September 1999)  
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmipris/prison-and-yoi-
inspections/rochester/roch1-rps.pdf> accessed 02 September 2012 
896 The Detention Centre Rules is made under subordinate legislation- Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 238 
see paragraph 15 concerning sufficiency of accommodation. 
897 HM Inspectorate of Prisons, ‘Report on an unannounced full follow-up inspection of Brook House 
Immigration Removal Centre’(12 – 23 September 2011) 
<(http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmipris/immigration-removal-
centre-inspections/brook-house/brook-house-2011.pdf> accessed 03 September 2012 
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In essence, the important point that emerges from the consideration of conditions and 
treatment of detainees inter alia - vulnerable conditions, severe bruises, inadequate 
medical treatment, overcrowding, bad sanitary conditions is that they engage Art 7, 9 & 
10 of the ICCPR and in the regional context, Art 3 ECHR meaning that the conditions 
of detention may therefore amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. It then follows 
that when assessing conditions of detention, cognizance must be taken of the cumulative 
effects of the conditions.898 As the Court stated in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece899 
‘States must have particular regard to Art 3 of the Convention, which enshrines one of 
the fundamental values of democratic societies and prohibits in absolute terms torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment irrespective of the circumstances 
of the victim’s conduct’. The Court emphasized that ‘the confinement of aliens, 
accompanied by suitable safeguards for the purpose concerned, is acceptable only in 
order for States to prevent unlawful immigration while complying with their 
international obligations’.900  
 
Further stated, Art 1 of the ECHR places an obligation on State Parties to secure 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention 
taken into account the absolute nature of Art 3 ECHR which requires States to take 
measures designed in ensuring that individuals within their jurisdiction are not 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.901  
 
4.4.5 Length of Detention 
 
Of significant concern is the length of detention in the UK.902 The ECtHR’s position on 
the length of detention is that detention should not exceed that reasonably required for 
the purpose pursued- ‘action being taken with a view to deportation’.903 The ECtHR 
emphasized that any deprivation of liberty under Art 5 (1) (f) ECHR remains justifiable 
so long as deportation proceedings are in progress and such proceedings are executed 
with due diligence. In Suso Musa v. Malta,904 the ECtHR recently found that ‘it cannot 
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consider a period of 6 months to be reasonable’ and in Kanagaratnam v. Belgium905 it 
‘considered that a period of 3 months was unreasonably lengthy’. In contrast, in 
Kolompar v Belgium,906 the Court held that delays of over 2 years and 8 months 
pending deportation did not amount to a violation of Art 5 ECHR because they were not 
attributable to the detaining State. Similarly in Chahal907 the applicant was detained for 
more than six years while deportation proceedings were in progress but the ECtHR did 
not find the length of detention, unreasonable.908  
 
However, the ECtHR is increasingly insistent that States need to demonstrate that there 
is a realistic prospect of deportation for detention to be termed reasonable. The Grand 
Chamber in A & Others v UK909, a case concerning the detention of foreign terrorists 
suspects-the Court held that the applicants were non-removable under the standards 
established by ECHR. The Court was quick to reject the UK’s argument that the matter 
was under active review in order to justify detention and bring it within the purview of 
Art 5 (1) (f) ECHR as amounting to ‘action being taken with a view to deportation’. As 
Costello pointed out, the Court distinguished Chahal stating that in Chahal, proceedings 
were being actively and diligently pursued whereas in A & Others, the proceedings 
centred on the legality of detention given that the prohibition of deportation has been 
conceded.910 
 
Detention in the UK has no time limit . Gurd argues that the indefinite detention is a 
failure given that it is ‘increasingly seen as a symptom of a fundamentally dysfunctional 
detention system and an example of the UK’s treatment of unwanted migrants’. 911 
There is therefore ‘an impasse between the sanctity of liberty and the interplay of the 
statutory purpose of effecting removal’.912 Johnston remarked that ‘the importance of 
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liberty both to the individual and society is too great to justify indefinite detention’.913 
Bosworth argues strongly that ‘a period of detention neither changes the detainee nor 
prepares them for eventual return; rather what detention does is to confirm their 
identity’.914 The growth in immigration detention and deportation only reveals the scale 
of power the State is able and willing to use. The HM Inspector of Prisons found in 
1997 that 10 percent of detainees have been locked up for more than one year.915 
Amnesty International in 1996 surveyed 150 detainees and found that 82% of them have 
continuously been detained since their application with less than 7% detained solely in 
order to facilitate removal. The sample records an average of five months incarceration. 
916 In the year 2002, the Home Office Select Committee reported that 32% of migrants 
have been in detention for more than four months including children.917 In 2007, it was 
recorded by HM Inspector of Prisons that 18 detainees in Colnbrook Removal Centre 
had been detained for over one year, 46 for more than two years and 9 for more than 
three.918 The maximum recorded was eight years concerning an Algerian plumber.919  
 
While the above figures might represent the position on ground, the open-ended nature 
of the statistics kept by the Home Office can mean that this cannot be with all amount 
of certainty. On surface, when the UK’s state practice on detention is compared with 
international human rights standards, there exist some lacunae. In essence the length of 
detention of migrants in the UK is at variance with international human rights standards 
even as established by Art 9 ICCPR.920 The HRC has explained that ‘State Parties need 
to show that detention does not last longer than absolutely necessary, that the overall 
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915 HM Inspector of Prisons, ‘An Inspection of Campsfield House Immigration Removal Centre’  
(March2002)<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-
reports/hmipris/immigration-removal-centre-inspections/campsfield-house/campsfieldhouse02-rps.pdf> 
accessed 03 September 2012. This document makes reference to the previous years’ inspections. 
916  Richard Dunstan, Cell Culture  (Amnesty International 1996) 1 
917 Home Affairs Committee Asylum Removals 4th Report of Session (HC 2002-03) 26 
918 HM Inspector of Prisons, Report on an unannounced follow-up inspection of Colnbrook Immigration 
Removal Centre’ (18-22 June 2007)  
<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/ircinspections.html/544553/> 
accessed 03 September 2012 
919 London Detainee Support Group, ‘Detained lives’ (January 2009)  
<http://www.detainedlives.org/wp-content/uploads/detainedlives.pdf> accessed 03 September 2012 
920 ICCPR Art 9 (1)  
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length of possible detention is limited and that they fully respect the guarantees 
provided for by Art 9 in all cases’.921  
 
With respect to refugees and/or asylum seekers, Guideline 6 of the UNHCR Detention 
Guidelines states that indefinite detention is arbitrary and law should establish 
maximum limit on detention.922 Quite recently in August 2015, the Human Rights 
Committee expressed concern that ‘no fixed time limit on the duration of detention in 
immigration removal centres has been established and that individuals may be detained 
for prolonged periods’ while advising that ‘a statutory time limit on the duration of 
immigration detention be established while ensuring that detention is a last measure of 
resort and is justified as reasonable, necessary and proportionate’.923  
 
A multiplier effect of the legality of detention was exemplified when some detained 
migrants won thousands of pounds compensation for illegal detention. Notable amongst 
the cases were Vasyl Vovk, a Ukrainian national and Bironjit Kumar Datta from 
Bangladesh where the Home Office failed to make prompt decisions on whether or not 
they should continue to be detained awaiting deportation after serving their prison 
sentences- a case seen as failure to apply reasonable diligence and expedition.924 
Similarly, an asylum seeker was paid £150,000 compensation for unlawful detention 
where the appellant mother and family were detained while their appeal was in progress 
against the Home Office’s own policy on asylum seekers.925  
 	
																																																								
921 HRC ‘General Comment No 35, Article 9: Liberty and security of person (Advance Unedited Version) 
CCPR/C/GC/35 (28 October 2014) UN Doc no CCPR/C/GC/35, para 15, see also HRC ‘Commission on 
Human Rights Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment regarding the situation of immigrants and asylum 
seekers’ (1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/4/Annex 2 
922  UNHCR ‘Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers’ Guidelines 6 (n36) 
923 HRC, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (2015) UN Doc CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7, para 21 
924 Editorial, ‘Illegal immigrants win compensation over ‘unlawful’ detention’ Mail Online (London 13 
December 2006) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-422429/illegal-immigrants-win-compensation-unlawful-
detention-html> accessed 14 December 2012 
925 Tom Whitehead, ‘Asylum Seeker family wins £150,000 compensation’ Telegraph (13 February 2009)  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/4606367/Asylum-seeker-family-wins-150000-
compensation.html >accessed 14 December 2012 
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4.5 Detention and Bail 	
It has been asserted that in the UK there is a presumption of liberty flowing from the 
Magna Carta926, a pre-eminent right and the core foundation of the UK’s liberal 
democracy. This means that no person within the jurisdiction of the State can be 
deprived of his liberty without cause irrespective of the person’s immigration status.927 
It is common ground that the courts will seriously guard the liberty of persons and it 
will obviously require clear words in a statute to take away liberty or to interfere with 
it.928 The courts have also expressed that the broad statutory discretion to detain will be 
narrowly and strictly construed while ensuring that they are only exercised for proper 
purpose.929 
 
In the UK, it has been shown that detention is indefinite but the power is limited to 
duration and circumstances and must be reasonable.  Article 5 (4) of the ECHR requires 
that anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
proceedings to determine the lawfulness of his detention, which shall be decided 
speedily by a court and released if detention is unlawful. Therefore the application for 
bail is a crucial safeguard for anyone in detention.  
 
The typical argument in a bail application is that the discretion to detain should not be 
exercised in a given case implying that the applicant should be released. In immigration 
and asylum matters, there is no automatic bail hearing unlike in criminal cases but 
detainees have a right to apply for bail.930 The rules do not allow an application for bail 
by those detained pending examination for less than eight days in the UK.931 I contend 
that there is no justification for the eight days limitation prior to grant of bail if criminal 
defendants must be charged to court or released within 48 hours. An ordinary 
immigration offender or asylum seeker of vulnerable stature does not require to be 
detained for the purposes of examination for eight days; this evidently and as discussed 
																																																								
926 Magna Carta 1215 (n160)  
927Kwawaja v SSHD [1984] AC 74 [110-112] (Scarman LL) 
928 Tan Te Lam v Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Centre [1997] AC 97; R v SSHD ex p Simms 
[1999] 3 WLR 328 
929 Re Mahmood (Wasfi) [1995] Imm AR 311 (Laws J) 
930 This is provided in the 1971 Act Sch 2, paras 22-29 and section 54 of the 1999 Act 
931 This is provided under sch 16 (1) and paragraphs 22 (1B) of the 1971 Act 
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above is at variance with international human rights standards and an affront to 
liberalism.  
 
The power to grant bail rests either on the Chief Immigration Officer (CIO) before eight 
days detention932, with the Secretary of State933 after the period of eight days and before 
an Immigration judge934 thereafter usually with conditions attached to bail. 
Furthermore, the right to bail lies before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
for those whose detention have been certified by the Secretary of State as necessary in 
the interest of national security or deportation on national security grounds.935 The 
lawfulness of detention on its part can only be challenged by way of judicial review or 
the prerogative writ of habeas corpus. 936  
 
However, the question that engages this research is not whether there is a right to bail 
but whether the procedures enabling the enforcement of those rights are substantively 
sound and procedurally fair consistent with international human rights standards even in 
the light of Art 5 (4) ECHR or whether they are carefully orchestrated to inhibit the 
release of the detainee or to frustrate them to take voluntary return.  
 
4.5.1 Bail Hearing and Connected Procedures 
 
The rule allowing for bail hearing in the UK is currently located in the Consolidated 
Asylum and Immigration (Procedure) Rules 2005937 and in the Practice Directions of 
the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First Tier and Upper Tribunal938 and the 
Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First Tier Tribunal 
and Upper Tribunal939 augmented by the 2003 Bail Guidance Notes and Note 1 Bail 																																																								
932 This is provided under Sch 2 paras 22, 29 and 34 of the 1971 Act 
933 Section 68 of the 2002 Act takes away the power of the CIO to grant bail after eight days to the 
Secretary of State.  
934 Sch 2, para 22 (1A) of the 1971 Act 
935  Special Immigration and Appeals Commission Act 1997 section 3 (1) and amended by The 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Consequential and Incidental Provisions) Order 2003 SI 
2003/1016, Schedule 10  
936 The writ of habeas corpus is an ancient remedy regarded as constitutionally important as a means 
whereby the court can investigate the reasons for any detention and to order release if unlawful, see 
Halsbury’s Laws Vol 1 (1) para 208; note also that the relationship between judicial review and habeas 
corpus was pointed out in R v SSHD ex p Sheikh [1999] EWCA Civ 1320 with respect to time limits. 
937  This is a Statutory Instrument (SI No. 230) 
938 Part 3 (13) of the Tribunals Judiciary, Practice Directions of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers 
of the First Tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal (10 February 2010)  
939 Part 2 of the Tribunals Judiciary, Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the 
First-Tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (10 February 2010) 
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Guidance 2012.940 The Home Office policy on bail is located at Chapter 57 of the 
Enforcement Instruction and Guidance (EIG) which rhetorically provides that Ministers 
have given a commitment that detention will only be used as a last resort given that the 
presumption is to grant temporary release where possible except when considered 
inappropriate. 
 
In a bail hearing, the burden of proof rests on the Home Office to prove that bail is 
inappropriate. 941 The EIG refers to the common law presumption in favour of bail read 
together with the UNHCR’s position, which holds that there is a presumption against 
detention and further accentuated by the State parties’ obligations regarding the right to 
liberty. 942 Nevertheless, there is no statutory presumption in favour of immigration 
detainees as there is for those in criminal detention.   
 
The Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO) represents the State and is required to file 
a bail summary showing reasons for opposing bail. This should be done no later than 2 
pm on the business day before the scheduled date of hearing.  I argue that the service of 
bail summary by 2pm prior to the next day scheduled date for bail hearing is in itself 
not sufficient for the detainee to mount a solid argument against the Home Office’s case 
as the detained individual, requires to successfully dispute the bail summary if bail must 
be granted. This practice of less than a day is not consistent with the ruling that the 
detainee must be allowed adequate time to prepare an application for release.943 
Moreover, the refusal to allow adequate preparation for bail hearing leads to the 
argument by legal representatives and detainees alike that immigration bail is played as 
a lottery in the light of the rules. This gives rise to the withdrawal of applications when 
they appear before certain judges whose antecedents are deemed hostile to applicants,944 
thus culminating to the number of repeat bail applications, which outnumber first time 
applications. 
 
																																																								
940 AIT, ‘Bail Guidance Notes for Adjudicators from the Chief Adjudicators’ (May 2003); Clements J‘ 
President of the First Tier Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber Presidential Guidance Note No 1 
of 2012: Bail Guidance For Judges Presiding Over Immigration and Asylum Hearings’ (11 June 2012) 
941 This mirrors the decision in Zamir v UK (1983) 5 EHRR 242, para 58 which holds that the burden for 
justifying detention falls on the State. 
942 ibid 
943 Farmakopolous v Belgium (1993) 16 EHRR 187, para 51 
944 BID, ‘The Liberty Deficit: the long-term detention and bail decision-making; a study of immigration 
bail hearings in the First Tier Tribunal’ (November 2012) 6 
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Bail applications in the eyes of legal representatives and the tribunal are ancillary to the 
main immigration case. It follows that if a migrant has been detained for a month or 
more without deportation or removal, there should therefore be heightened need for the 
bail system to operate as a proper check on detention. Therefore fairness in bail 
outcomes should be reflected in the structures and safeguards. Procedural rules should 
be followed and bail summaries served on time. The debate is that these safeguards are 
still failing. One reason is that despite clear and stronger guidance to First Tier judges 
on the use of bail in principle and the use of directions to parties, these elements 
nevertheless, are not reflected in practice in the light of the revised bail guidance.945 The 
conclusion is that the Tribunal is not using its available powers sufficiently to ensure 
that detention does not become unnecessarily prolonged.  
 
The timing of bail applications on its own raises fundamental issues about the 
willingness of the State to respect the individual’s right to liberty and equality of arms. 
This is because there is no right to automatic bail hearing even after a set of number of 
days in detention, rather what is obtainable is for the detainee to know of such 
opportunity and to make the application with or without legal representation.946 The 
implication is that a detainee is faced with the issue of securing legal representation, 
which may be funded publicly if the means test, financially eligibility and merit tests are 
passed before the provision of legal aid is granted.947  
 
The critical issue is that detention is time related. How plausible would it be for a 
detainee who has been served with removal directions to be granted public funding 
when removal is imminent? How plausible would it be for an asylum seeker to easily 
source adequate legal representation in an alien country having just arrived in the 
country? As BID puts it, ‘the availability of legal aid for immigration challenges exists 
only in name and may have been carefully planned with a view to maintaining detention 
of migrants’.948 The obvious consequence is that the presumption in favour of release as 
rhetorically adumbrated by the State appears to fizzle out quickly which leads to the 
argument that there was no intention ab initio to grant bail and the use of detention as a 
																																																								
945 ibid, 8 
946 BID, ‘A nice judge on a good day: immigration bail and the right to liberty (July 2010) 16 
947 ibid, 16 
948 BID, Out of sight, out of mind: experiences of immigration detention in the UK (July 2009) 34-44 
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last resort.949  The legal requirement that detainees must therefore be brought promptly 
before a court becomes a mirage, as this may not actually happen in practice. In Torres 
v Finland 950 the HRC found an infringement of Art 9 (4) where Finnish law did not 
allow access to court until after seven days of detention thereby mirroring the UK’s 
practice of the 8-day rule in detention. What then is the rationale for the first week in 
detention without review by the courts? Have the powers of the courts not been usurped 
or emasculated by State detention authorities? Has the detainee enjoyed an effective 
opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or other authority in the light of these 
procedural barriers?  
 
4.5.2 Procedural Barriers 
 
It is contended that the processes and procedures have a multiplier and cumulative 
effect on the outcome of bail hearings and by extension on the right to liberty. 
Procedural fairness is ‘an essential attribute of the judicial function which is guaranteed 
by the common law principles of natural justice, article 6 of the ECHR and the 
overriding objective’.951 A tribunal must act fairly and judicially. Judges must act on all 
evidence before them in order to reach a rational judgment; a requirement that they 
must act with scrupulous fairness will add nothing.952 Fairness is therefore expressed as 
the right to fair hearing. The relationship between fairness and procedural legislation is 
that the rules of procedure must endeavour to make specific provision for eventualities 
that may occur regarding proceedings.953 The Tribunal, Court Enforcement Act 2007 
(TCEA 2007) applies the rules of procedure and practice directions, which are subject 
to the overriding objectives.954 
 
Many detainees who cannot access quality legal representation must know of the 
availability of how to make a bail application in addition to language difficulties that 
some detainees encounter. This problem led the Joint Committee on Human Rights to 
																																																								
949 There appears to be a general consensus in the legal instruments that when detention has taken place, 
judicial review must be prompt [“without delay”] (ICCPR Art 9 (4), the American Convention on Human 
Rights Art 7(6), The ECHR Art 5 (4) [“decided speedily”] 
950 Torres v. Finland CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) 5 April 1990 
951  Edward Jacobs, Tribunal Practice and Procedure: Tribunals under the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007 (2nd edn, Legal Action Group 2011) 113 
952 R (M) v Inner London Crown Court [2003] 1 FLR 994 [45] (Henriques J) 
953 Edward Jacobs, Tribunal Practice and Procedure: Tribunals under the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007 (n951) 113 
954 See The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, Part 1 Introduction-Overriding objectives  
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state that there are sufficient evidence that although the right to apply for bail exists 
after seven days but in reality many detainees are unaware or unable to exercise the 
right either because of language difficulties and/or lack of legal representation.955 
 
There is also a connection between quality representation and successful bail 
applications. In a survey by BID and Refugee Council in 2008, it was reported that 50% 
of the applicants in the bail applications examined were not legally represented and 
none of the cases without legal representation were successful.956 This could have 
informed the ECtHR to place a proactive duty on the State to provide legal assistance 
during Article 5 (4) hearings whenever this is considered necessary to enable the 
detainee to make effective application for release.957 Furthermore, in Amur v France958 
the court held detention to be unlawful because no provision was made for legal, 
humanitarian and social assistance. 
 
In practice, aside the seemingly inability to access legal aid and inability to access 
quality legal representation, detainees face an uphill task. A case in point is the 
introduction of the policy ‘hub and spoke’ in 2009 by HM Prison designed to increase 
the speed and efficiency of removals where male foreign prisoners can be removed 
quickly from the UK which arguably affect their chances to be granted bail.959 When 
this is viewed alongside the expansion of detention regime and the inability to access 
legal aid and quality legal representations inter alia raise fundamental concerns for the 
lawfulness of detention. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Detention in the eyes of a detainee is seen as a form of torture without physical 
violence, which instills fear, silence and isolation, as detainees are located in complete 																																																								
955 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The Treatment of Asylum Seekers: Tenth Report from Session 
2006-07’ (22 March 2007 HL 81 HC 60) 280 
956 Bail for Immigration Detainees and the Refugee Council, Immigration bail hearings by video link: a 
monitoring exercise (March 2008) 6 
957 Megveri v Germany (1992) 15 EHRR 584, para 54; Woukan Noudefo v France (1988) 13 EHRR 549; 
Winterwerp v Netherlands (1992) 2 EHRR 387 and Principle 17 (1) of the UN Body of Principles on All 
Forms of Detention (n34) 
958 (1996) 22 EHRR 533, para 53 
959 Ministry of Justice National Offender Management Service and the Home Office UK Border Agency, 
‘Service Level Agreement to support the effective management and speedy removal of foreign national 
prisoners’ (April 2009) <http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/FNP_SLA.pdf> accessed 17 September 2012; see 
also R (Konan) v SSHD [2004] EWCA 22 where the movement of a detainee from June 2002 where he 
was detained another detention in Scotland, delayed bail application until September 2002. 
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isolation. It has been identified that common law principles in immigration detention in 
the UK presupposes that the State must engage the issue of necessity, reasonableness, 
due diligence and proportionality as in the case of Hardial Singh and ex parte I string of 
cases. That position can be contrasted with the decision in Saadi v UK where the court 
refused to accept that necessity was required for immigration detention, which many 
have seen as an excessive executive deference. Strasbourg court seems to have thrown 
proportionality to the winds by its decision in Saadi v UK despite the fact that 
proportionality is in essence a balancing exercise underpinning the ECHR in Art 8-11 
ECHR with the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test. A restriction cannot be 
regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ unless it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. In its latter decision in Rusu v Austria, the ECtHR surprisingly 
abandoned its previous stance in Saadi v UK and accepted the necessity adjunct but did 
nothing to incorporate it into its interpretation of Art 5 (1) (f) on detention. 
 
In essence the right to liberty which has been described as the oldest form of human 
right in the light of the Magna Carta 1215 and Petition of Rights 1628 has been 
compromised with debilitating effect on the rights of migrants. The UK’s Home Office 
policies on its part mirror an amalgam of the common law principles and Strasbourg but 
actual practice with respect to the liberty rights of migrants remains a mirage. 
International human rights standards for the protection of liberty appear to have been 
compromised by the decision in Saadi v UK and numerous State practices in the UK, 
USA and Australia. It follows that States even in the face of treaty obligations are wont 
to following similar practices whether or not such decisions are in conformity to their 
obligations under international human rights law. Despite this seeming intransigence, 
the UNHCR posits that the detention of asylum seekers [migrants] is inherently 
undesirable and only accepted if it is brief, absolutely necessary and implemented where 
other options have been exercised leaving detention as the last resort.  
 
The core concept in the ECHR in general is that of the rule of law described in its 
preamble as part of a common heritage shared by all signatories and is one of the 
fundamental principles of a [liberal] democratic society. With respect to Article 5 
ECHR, what is paramount are two limbs notably the test for the legality of detention on 
the one hand and a set of procedural rights for detainees on the other hand. I argue that 
these may be substantively legal but the procedures for safeguarding those rights may 
be otiose and hence unreachable. It is lamentable to find that wider rights are afforded 
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to criminal suspects allowing them to apply to the court for the review of the 
desirability of detention pending trial in the light of Art 5 (3) ECHR, which do not 
apply to immigration detainees that are not charged with criminal matters. 
 
It is further contended that detention may be lawful but arbitrary. In essence what is 
required is not simply an assessment of legality of detention as it is but the definition 
should encompass a broader test of substantive arbitrariness to include decisions, which 
are unreasonable, unjust, bad faith, delayed, and unpredictable. I argue that an 
unreasonable decision, delayed decisions or where the State’s laws are not precise and 
predictable is an affront on the rights of migrants and a harbinger for human rights 
violations contrary to the tenets of liberal democracies that emphasize the rule of law. 
The important questions are: why would the ECtHR reject the requirements for 
necessity and proportionality while accepting due diligence or reasonable time into its 
lexicon of arbitrariness? Can arbitrariness be well defined without the requirement of 
necessity and why would the reasonable threshold of the EU standards of 
proportionality be subjugated to the arguably irrational standards of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence? The further question is if administrative detention is a measure taken to 
facilitate expulsion policies and where expulsion figures are dropping as against 
increasing detention, how can administrative detention be justified? 
 
In the UK, anecdotal evidence confirms that detainees are detained in places with poor 
hygienic standards as revealed by the HM Inspector of Prisons in a published report in 
2000. The same position applies to the USA and Australia with the exception of France. 
In the UK, the Vulnerable People Working Group of the Detention Forum (VPWG) 
published a catalogue of human rights breaches by the Home Office regarding the 
detention of mentally unwell persons in cases, which has been described as forming a 
pattern of systemic failings within the immigration detention system leaving the most 
vulnerable at risk.960 Prominent amongst the catalogue of cases is the case of R (S) v 
SSHD961 where the High Court found that the detention of a mentally ill man by the 
UKBA amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.962  
 																																																								
960 Briefing by the Vulnerable People Working Group of the Detention Forum (VPWG) ‘The Detention 
of Vulnerable People: Human Rights Breaches in the UK (10 December 2012) 
<http://detentionforum.wordpress.com/2012/12/10/briefing-paper-the-detention-of-vulnerable-people-
human-rights-breaches-in-the-uk/> accessed 12 December 2012 
961 [2011] EWHC 2120 (Admin)  
962 See also R (BA) v SSHD [2011] EWHC 2748 (Admin)  
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It follows that liberal democracies do not reflect their liberal ideologies of fairness with 
respect to detention, which as highlighted above remains antithetical to their obligations 
as states where the rule of law holds sway. Here lies the fundamental contradiction or 
paradox at the heart, arteries and veins of a liberal democracy, which enunciates 
universality and the same time, indulge in the practice of closure. 
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Chapter 5. Deportation, Removal and the Contrivance of Deportability  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Detention as deprivation of liberty, discussed in the preceding chapter, is a prelude to 
deportation and/or removal. While ‘detention serves as an enclosure and exclusion from 
the receiving society, deportation involves an explicit form of exclusion’.963 Therefore 
deportation and/or removal, which function as a corollary to detention, aims to enforce 
the departure of the migrant out of the State, lending credence to the argument that 
deportation and/or removal have become integral and key aspects of immigration 
control.964  
 
Relying on the customary rights of State sovereignty, States have in principle the 
freedom to expel aliens [migrants] in their territorial jurisdiction.965 It is unarguable 
however that with the advent, emergence and development of global and regional 
human rights institutions, States by virtue of their treaty obligations incumbent on these 
developments have ceded a measure of their sovereignty.966 In essence, the emergence 
of the ECHR characterized as an international human rights treaty with regional 
compass becomes germane967 given that freedoms enumerated in the ECHR are 
resultantly predicated on the recognition by States that individuals have rights because 
they are human beings, regardless of certain differentiations between aliens and citizens 
as permitted under international law.968  
 																																																								
963 Liza Schuster, ‘The Exclusion of Asylum Seekers in Europe’ (2004) Centre on Migration, Policy and 
Society Working Paper No. 1, 3  
<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/media/WP-2004-001-Shuster_Asylum_Europe.pdf> accessed 14 
September 2014; Alice Bloch and Liza Schuster, ‘At the extremes of exclusion: Deportation, detention 
and dispersal’ (2005) 28 Ethnic and Racial Studies 491 
964 For full details of the discussion on Detention, see Chapter 4 of this Thesis 
965 See discussions on the issue by the following authorities- H. King, ‘The Extraterritorial Human Rights 
Obligations of States’ (2009) 9 (4) Human Rights Law Review 521; M P Pederson, ‘ Territorial 
Jurisdiction in Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 279 
966 C Dauvergne, ‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’ (2004) 67 Modern Law 
Review 588, 589; C Schreuer, ‘The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for 
International Law?’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 447 
967 Ian Bryan and Peter Langford, ‘Impediments to the Expulsion of Non-Nationals: Substance and 
Coherence in Procedural Protection under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2010) 79 Nordic 
Journal of Law 457, 459; Alison Harvey, ‘Expulsion and Exclusion’ (2007) 21 (3) Journal of 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 208, see also ICCPR Art 7; ECHR Art 3  
968 See chapter 2.3 of this thesis; ECHR Art 1; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 
1031 (1994) < http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta94/ERES1031.htm> 
accessed 11 July 2013 
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This chapter will discuss the historical dimensions of deportation and/or removal, 
grounds and rationale for deportation, the trends and turns in contemporary deportation 
regimes and substantive legality as challenged by deportation inhibitions. This invites a 
further inquiry as to whether contemporary deportation regime in the United Kingdom 
and by extension in liberal democratic states is the emergence of a new legal framework 
of state power.  
 
It will also discuss the role of the ECtHR on removal in order to ascertain its relevance 
in promoting or inhibiting removal of migrants in a liberal democracy given the 
necessary in a democratic society adjunct. In short, the legality of deportation and/or 
removal practices within the confines of the rule of law and minimum procedural 
safeguards as encapsulated by international human rights law will be engaged. The 
putative question is whether the United Kingdom complies with its treaty obligations 
under International Human Rights law in the act of deportation and removal of 
migrants? 
 
Discussions will be taken further to the contrivance of deportability and/or 
removability, which for our purpose finds expression in the legislative and judicial 
architecture being that deportation or removal in the United Kingdom is unarguably 
constructed by a combination of legislative and judicial actions. The State can change 
its laws as it wishes in conformity with acceptable international human rights standards 
but the idea is to query whether legislation associated with deportation and/or removal 
are constantly and in an unrestrained manner, enacted, revised and re-enacted to achieve 
deportation in contrast to the doctrine of legitimate expectation encapsulated under the 
principle of legal certainty. This is given that evidence shows that the earlier 
Immigration Acts have been amended by a vast accretion of other Acts, with some 
provisions re-enacted, enlarged and some, consolidated-a complex set of immigration 
laws. 969  
 
By operating a complex set of immigration laws, described by a High Court Judge as a 
“disgrace”970 the United Kingdom enhances deportation and/or removal which arguably 																																																								
969 Macdonald and Toal (n580) 1 
970 See R (On the application of RA (and by his litigation friend) and another) v SSHD IJR [2015] UKUT 
00242 (IAC); R (on the application of RA) v SSHD IJR [2015] UKUT 00292 (IAC), the Judge in that 
decision criticized the complexity of Britain’s immigration laws, describing the multiplicity of rules as a 
“disgrace”  
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means that, the more the ‘laws’, the easier it becomes to achieve deportation and/or 
removal, the more complex the laws, the easier it becomes to attract violation. 
Vehemently put, the more the laws are made, the more the atmosphere of deportation is 
created. It is therefore queried whether deportation or removal laws as they stand may 
have been contrived to enhance deportability or removability. As Edwards recounts, 
“the constantly changing laws and regulations lead much to confusion and lack of 
accountability”971, given that the prevalence of a vast body of case law adds to the 
already difficult burden of operating these complex legislations, to the extent that 
keeping track of the law and practices have become a superhuman task.972 
 
It is further argued that the ever increasing and shifting pattern of deportation laws 
(some of which are retroactive) appears to violate the basic principles of human rights 
norms. This is heightened by the fact that these laws are either discretionary or couched 
in rigid terms leaving less chance for compassionate considerations even in the light of 
unclear judicial interpretation given to some of these deportation laws.  Discussions will 
revolve around the issues of legal certainty and legitimate expectation, the 
criminalization of immigration (hereinafter ‘crimmigration’) its effects and implication 
for the migrant in a deportation and removal regime. 
 
Additionally, references in this chapter will equally be made to three other selected 
liberal democratic states-the United States of America, Australia and France whose 
deportation reality offers significant similarities with the UK even in the light of the 
growing nature of deportation and/or removal business. This is in order to put the 
analysis of deportation issues in the UK within the broader context of other liberal 
democracies by way of convergence, divergence, diffusion and dilemmas of practices in 
immigration control. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
971 Emmanuela Paoletti, ‘Deportation, non-deportability and ideas of membership’ (2010) RSC Working 
Paper Series 65/2010, 15 citing Alice Edwards, ‘Rights of Immigrants in voluntary and involuntary 
return procedures in national law’ (2009) Thematic Legal Study on rights of irregular immigrants in 
voluntary and involuntary return procedures 
<http://www.lepnet.org/sites/default/files/upload/og_files/RSC%20Deportation,%20non-
deportability%20and%20ideas%20of%20membership.pdf> accessed 12 November 2013 
972 Macdonald and Toal (n580) 1 
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5.2  Conceptualization and Contextualization 
 
Deportation and removal are inextricably intertwined but given their different statutory 
bases are distinctively defined. Deportation is defined by the Immigration Act 1971 
section 5 (1) (2) and paragraphs 362 of the Immigration Rules, as a process where a 
non-citizen can be forcibly removed from the UK by virtue of an order and prohibited 
from returning unless the order is revoked.973 It therefore authorizes detention of the 
person until the subject leaves the UK, prohibits re-entry while the order is in force and 
invalidates any leave to remain, which the person has during the subsisting order.974 The 
power to deport is exercised by the Secretary of State consistent with Immigration Act 
1971 s 5 (1) but may equally be performed by certain other officials as delegated to 
them by the Secretary of State.975 A distinguishing feature of deportation from other 
compulsory or forceful removal is that deportation brings a particular application or 
entry to an end but may create further difficulties for a migrant seeking future re-entry.  
 
Removal on the other hand refers to all enforced departures thus describing the actual 
embarkation, which is preceded by a removal direction.976 With the coming into force of 
the 1999 Immigration Act, s 10, removal became known as ‘administrative removal’, 
which strictly speaking distinguishes removal from deportation. This is embedded in the 
fact that prior to the coming into force of the 1999 Act, deportation applied to persons 
who had leave to enter or remain whom the Secretary of State intended to remove or 
those recommended for deportation by a court following criminal conviction, whereas 
administrative removal applied to those who had no leave to enter or to irregular 
migrants.977  Furthermore, while deportation is reserved for more serious cases of 
violation of immigration law where the non-citizen will be required to leave the UK and 
prohibited from entry while the order is still in force, administrative removal on its part 
is reserved for less breaches of immigration law that does not apply the prohibition 
clause but might create obstacle for re-entry for a particular period, as captured under 
the Immigration Rules, paragraph 320-321. 
 
																																																								
973 Immigration Act 1971, Section 5 (1) and (2)  
974 Immigration Act 1971 Section 5 (1) and Paragraph 362 of the Immigration Rules  
975 See Carltona Ltd v Commissioner of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 CA; R (Munir) v SSHD [2012] 
UKSC 32; R (Alvi) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 33  
976 Immigration Act 1971 Sch 2, para 9  
977 David Jackson and others, Immigration Law and Practice (4th edn, Tottel Publishing 2008) 974 
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In addition, deportation and removal attract different congeries of rights with respect to 
in country and out-country rights of appeal, as established in Section 10 of the 
Immigration Act 1999, section 47 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 
2006, section 82 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 32 of the 
UK Borders Act 2007 with exceptions at section 33 and section 15 of the Immigration 
Act 2014 which amends Part 5 of the 2002 Act.978 Quite recently, section 63 of the 
Immigration Act 2016 with the ‘deport first and appeal later’ provisions, which came 
into force on 01 December 2016, further distinguished appeal rights as it relates to 
deportation and removal.979 
 
Walters refers to deportation as the removal of aliens [migrants] by State power from 
the territory of that State, either voluntarily under the threat of force, or forcibly.980 For 
Clayton, deportation may take place where its grounds are either proved or deemed 
proved by statute while removal regardless of its devastating effect is an enforcement 
process; the grounds for it being regulatory and based on immigration control.981 But for 
Jackson, there is no clear or principled distinction between the processes of deportation 
and administrative forms of removal except on statutory bases.982 Gibney on his part, 
refers to deportation as the departure of individual non-citizens under the threat of 
coercion by State authorities for breaches of immigration or criminal law elaborated as a 
broad account that go under a range of different nomenclatures in different States such 
as expulsion, removal or judicial deportation.983 He opined that while each of these may 
capture different congeries of rights, protections and entitlements, they nevertheless 
result in the expulsion from the State under the operation of the law.984 
 
In short, the terms deportation and removal, for our purpose are used in this thesis 
distinctively because each attracts different rights of appeal. Deportation and/or removal 
are encapsulated under the term ‘expulsion’. Several authors prefer the use of expulsion 																																																								
978 See also sections 82, 84, 92 and 94B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 dealing 
with certification of human rights claims made by a person liable to deportation 
979 ‘In-country’ depicts appeals that are allowed in the UK while ‘out-country’ are appeals having been 
removed; see also the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 s 82; Section 51(3) of the Crime 
and Courts Act 2013 amended section 47 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; see also 
Adamally and Jaferi (section 47 removal decisions: Tribunal Procedures) [2012] UKUT 00414 (IAC) 
980 William Walters, ‘Deportation, Expulsion and the International Police of Aliens’ (2010) 6 Citizenship 
Studies 265, 266 
981 Clayton, (n465) 580 
982 Jackson and others (n977) 973 
983 Matthew J Gibney, ‘ Is Deportation a form of Forced Migration’ (2013) 32 Refugee Survey Quarterly 
116, 119 
984 Gibney, ‘Is Deportation a form of Forced Migration’ ibid 
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to describe deportation and/or removal.985 Consistent with this is Goodwin-Gill who 
described expulsion as the exercise of State power that secures either the voluntary or 
enforced removal of an alien [migrant] from the territory of the State noting that 
terminologies vary from State to State.986 However, Henckaerts observes that expulsion 
is more generally used in international law while deportation is preferred in municipal 
law.987  For our purpose, expulsion will be used as an expression in international law to 
describe either deportation or removal but with the understanding that all successful 
deportation or removal results in the actual removal of a migrant from the territory of 
the State.  
 
5.3 Historical Dimensions of Deportation and Removal 
 
Deportation as a form of expulsion commenced with exile that has been described as the 
ancient custom of all nations used against the individual who is a member of a political 
community or nation.988 Walter reconstructs that in Ancient Greece, exile was often the 
penalty for homicide while ostracism was for those guilty of political crimes.989 Kedar 
recounts that the word deportatio was used by the Romans to mean banishment to some 
outlying place outside of the empire.990  
 
By and large, modern forms of deportation commenced with the restriction of relief to 
the local poor and the denial of such relief to foreigners to the extent that the policing of 
the foreign poor became by the late nineteenth century, a major preoccupation of 
deportation policy.991 Expulsion is ‘a kind of convulsion that accompanied the birth of 
the modern state system that allowed political authorities to find other ways of 
regulating their population’.992 As Arendt stated, ‘the persecution of refugees and others 																																																								
985 Ian Bryan and Peter Langford, ‘Impediments to the Expulsion of Non-Nationals’ (n985); Alison 
Harvey, ‘Expulsion and Exclusion’ (2007) 21 (3) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 
208 
986 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of Persons between States (Clarendon 
Press 1978) 201 
987 J M Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 
5; see also Eric Fripp, Bowena Moffat and Ellis Wilford (eds) The Law and Practice of Expulsion and 
Exclusion from the United Kingdom: Deportation, Removal, Exclusion and Deprivation of Citizenship 
(Hart Publishing 2015) x in their use of the terms expulsion or exclusion. 
988 William Walters (n980) 269 
989  Walters ibid; see also Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland 1964) 296, in her 
commentary statelessness and what she described as having lost “the rights to have rights”. 
990 B Kedar, ‘Expulsion as an issue of world history’ (1996) 7 (2) Journal of World History 165, 166 
991 William Walters (n980) 270 
992  Alfred J Rieber, ‘Repressive population transfers in central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe: a 
historical overview’ (2000) 16 Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 16, 22 
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was not because of what they have done or thought but because of the fact that they 
were born into the wrong kind of race or class’.993  
 
In the United Kingdom, the legal framework for deportation started with the 1905 
Aliens Act where immigration officers were given the power to exclude 
‘undesirables’.994 Schuster and Solomos see the importance of this Act as ‘providing a 
mechanism of control for the first time since the reign of Elizabeth 1’.995 Having further 
passed a more effective Aliens Restriction Act in 1914, targeting enemy aliens,996 
Holmes revealed that the Home Secretary and immigration officers were given the 
power to deport-a key political pledge by Lloyd George in 1918.997 Following thereafter 
was the 1920 Aliens Order Act, where ‘the Home Secretary retained the power to deport 
any alien whose presence was considered detrimental to the public good’.998  
 
The next major Act, which had deportation as its central theme, is the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, followed by the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
and the 1969 Immigration Appeals Act, s 16 authorising the deportation of 
Commonwealth citizens for breach of conditions, with the exception of those resident 
for five years. A further implication of the 1969 Appeals Act was that between 1904-
1969 migrants subject to deportation did not have right to appeal their deportation. 
 
The 1971 Immigration Act on its part cemented deportation for breach of conditions 
making aliens’ easily deportable. This, in the view of Solomos introduced racialization 
of immigration control by targeting black and Asian migrants.999 A paramount part of 
the Act was the granting of powers of deportation to immigration officers and use of 
																																																								
993 Hannah Arendt, (n989) 294 
994 See particularly chapter 3.3 and 3.4 of this thesis for a discussion on immigration control in general; 
see also Robin Cohen, Frontiers of Identity: The British and Others  (Longman 1994)  
995 Bloch and Schuster, (n882) 493-494 citing Liza Schuster and J Solomos, The politics of refugee and 
asylum policies in Britain: Historical patterns and contemporary realities’ in Alice Bloch and C Levy 
(eds) Refugees, Citizenship and Social Policy in Europe (Macmillan 1999)  
996  Bloch and Schuster (n963) 494 
997 Block and Schuster, ibid 494 citing C Holmes, A Tolerant Country: Immigrants, Refugees and 
Minorities in Britain (Faber and Faber 1991)  
998 The Open University, ‘Making Britain: 1920 Aliens Order’  
<http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/1920-aliens-order> accessed 18 October 
2014; see generally John Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain (3rd edn, Palgrave 2003) 217 
999 Solomos, ibid 185 
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fast track system for the prospective deportee. In a nutshell, ‘what the Act did was the 
withdrawal of the right of appeal before an independent body’.1000 
 
The Asylum and Immigration Act 1999 on its part under section 28 widened the ground 
for deportation that includes obtaining leave by deception with restricted appeal rights, 
dramatically translating most of the grounds for deportation into grounds for removal 
thereby further reducing the right of appeal of migrants and thus substantially 
eradicating the differences between deportation and removal.1001 It is important to note 
that deportation powers were discretionary and exercised by the Secretary of State but 
with the UK Borders Act 2007, section 32-39 created a statutory obligation to make a 
deportation order in criminal cases automatically deemed as conducive to the public 
good.1002 Block and Schuster therefore argue that ‘the increase in deportation from the 
early 1980s onwards is due, in part, to the reduction of the powers of MPs to intervene 
to delay deportations […]’.1003 They provided anecdotal evidence to show that despite 
increases in the serving of deportation orders only a minority are actually removed 
reasoning that regardless of the huge expenses incurred by government and distress 
experienced by deportees, there is still high indulgence by government.1004  
 
5.4 The Contours of Deportation, Removal and the Liberal State 
 
It is trite to posit that the power to deport flows from the State’s exercise of sovereignty 
given that the grounds for deportation and/or removal of migrants may be determined 
solely by the State but the expulsion must not be abused but justified. Liberal States 
have resorted to the justification of deportation on criminality grounds,1005 which has 
assumed exponential dimensions, as it is increasingly difficult to justify deportation on 
criminality grounds since the world today is gradually becoming a global village and 
what affect one State directly, affects others indirectly. Indeed, the commitment of a 
liberal state in the deportation of migrants is embedded in the fact that deportation is an 
inherently international act in a transnational setting requisite of a pact with another 																																																								
1000 Block and Schuster (n963) 495 citing Ann Dummet and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and 
Others, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990) 21-55 
1001 ibid; see further comments by D K Marrington, ‘Commitment and contradiction in immigration law’ 
(1986) 6 Legal Studies 272, 273   
1002 ibid 
1003 Block and Schuster (n963) 496 
1004 ibid 
1005 See section 5.7.5 of this thesis on detailed discussion on the effects of criminalization-over-
criminalization (crimmigration) on the deportation of migrants. 
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state because deportation requires destination.1006 The foreign criminal label or 
stereotype provides the amphitheatre and the lynchpin in the justification of deportation, 
which ‘predominantly overcomes the lingering qualmishness of a liberal state to a 
politics of exclusion’.1007 Crime control rhetoric is further added as justification for 
deportation by the liberal State thus expanding the scope of its power in the face of neo-
liberalism,1008 but the increased international coordination of policing through the 
instrumentality of deportation in my view, amounts to the international coordination of 
criminal justice system using immigration control as springboard.1009  
 
From a sociological viewpoint, Walter notes that ‘deportation is constitutive of 
citizenship and as such quite fundamental and immanent to the modern regime of 
citizenship in that its regulative function has become a sine qua non in the making of the 
world and a symbol of exclusion’.1010 But for the lawyer, the State decides who 
becomes its citizen, thus international law allows States in the exercise of sovereignty to 
lay down rules governing the grant of its own nationality (citizenship) that may be 
immuned from deportation.1011  
 
Kanstroom, referring specifically to American history, considers deportation as the 
evidence of the development and the refinement of a well focused but harsh government 
power, which is subject to minimal judicial oversight,1012 but for the United Kingdom, 
deportation must meet the right to effective remedy standards enshrined under Art 13 
ECHR.1013 Put bluntly, deportation and/or removal is a key component that has done 
little to reduce irregular flow of immigration but has rather done much to drive irregular 
migrants into an underclass that degrades them and offends the moral sensibilities of 
liberal democracies.1014 In the view of Kanstroom, deportation is a form of extended 																																																								
1006 Mathew Gibney, ‘Asylum and expansion of deportation in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 43 (2) 
Government and Opposition 146, 167 
1007 Mary Bosworth, ‘Deportation, detention and the foreign-national prisoners in England and Wales’ 
(2011) 15 Citizenship Studies 583,592-593 
1008 David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order (University of Chicago Press 2001) 
167 
1009 See Raghbir v Singh [1996] Imm AR 507  
1010 William Walters (n980) 288 
1011 But note that historically the United Kingdom did deport its criminal population to Australia-between 
1788-1868, see Alan Frost, Botany Bay: the real story (Black Inc 2011) 10; see also ‘Immigration 
Control, Citizenship and the interplay of sovereignty’ at chapter 3 of this thesis, see particularly chapter 
3.2  
1012  D Kanstroom, Deportation nation: outsiders in American history (Harvard University Press, 2007) x 
1013 ECHR Art 13, cf Article 13 ICCPR 
1014 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Illegals in our Midst: Getting Policy Exactly Wrong’ (1998) Oct-Nov Boston 
Review 3, 7 
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border control, which enables states to exercise immigration control within their 
borders.1015 Similarly De Genova and Peutz, state that deportation has emerged as a 
definite and increasingly convention of routine statecraft.1016  
 
In short, deportation and/or removal is used to send individuals from a country where 
they do not belong or are not accepted as belonging, to a country where they belong,1017 
where deportable migrants are as a result, described as guests who have overstayed their 
welcome or vehemently put, as those through their criminal or other unlawful behaviour 
have abused the hospitality of their hosts.1018 Walters on his part remarked that 
deportation is an act of “international policing of aliens” given that it is a practice which 
aims to return individuals to their rightful places of residence which in turn enforces a 
kind of international order entitling individuals who are qualified to remain in a State by 
virtue of their nationality.1019 The foregoing illuminates the idea that the power of States 
in the pursuit of deportation are grounded on sovereignty and citizenship which seems 
constantly on the increase as compared to the decreasing power of migrants to resist 
deportation. But it remains to be seen whether this is justifiable and consistent with 
liberal democratic ideals or whether there are contradictions.   
 
Pursuant to the above argument and specifically from a policy and political viewpoint is 
the postulation by Gibney and Hansen that the regulative function of deportation can be 
explained in terms of electoral politics and public expectation given that the state needs 
deportation to assure public opinion of its authority within national borders.1020 
However this is contrary to Baubcock’s concept of liberal citizenship where he 
postulated that citizenship is disconnected from territory and formal legal status.1021 
This then sets in motion the universal argument for open borders as propounded by 
radical Universalists who argue that morally speaking, national borders are arbitrary and 
that the only morally consistent position will be open borders.1022 Caren, a cosmopolitan 																																																								
1015 Kanstroom, Deportation nation (n1012) x 
1016  De Genova and N Peutz, The Deportation regime: sovereignty, space and the freedom of movement 
(Duke University Press 2010)  
1017 Gibney ‘ Is Deportation a form of Forced Migration’ (n983) 122 
1018 Kanstroom, Deportation nation: outsiders in American history (n1012) x 
1019 William Walters, (n980) 267 
1020 Gibney and Hansen, 'Deportation and the liberal state' (n1) 1  
1021 Rainer Baubock, ‘Citizenship and identity in the European Union’, in Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 4/97 cited in Emmanuela Paoleti, ‘Deportation, non-deportability and ideas of membership’ (2010) 
65 Working Paper Series, 4 
1022 Joseph H Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’  (1987) 49 (2) The Review of 
Politics 215, 270 
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liberalist holds strong commitment to the international right to free movement which to 
him, has a significant limitation on the State’s exclusion claims, and to that extent, 
views all deportations as illegitimate given that it violates the fundamental human rights 
of migrants to reside where they wish.1023 
 
The argument is that even if there may not be open borders in reality, the understanding 
of liberal democracies is that sovereignty claims are constrained by human rights which 
individuals are entitled to, not necessarily by virtue of being members of a polity but by 
their nature of being human beings.1024 This is why Gibney and Hansen still believe that 
the very notion of universality of human rights, which extends to all persons, shapes the 
manner in which entry and exit norms are conceived, thereby exposing a paradox, 
which institutionalizes liberal values, and the same time hampers the authority of the 
liberal state.1025 It is therefore incontrovertible to posit that of fundamental importance 
to a liberal state is the use of sovereignty in immigration control but this capacity is 
sometimes [in a muscular way] antithetical to liberal principles.1026 This means that the 
legitimacy of deportation by a liberal state is measured by its adherence to domestic and 
international human rights norm such as prohibition against refoulement and collective 
expulsion, to mention but a few.1027 In this connection, the grounds and rationale for 
deportation in a liberal state must recognize the full weight, implications and 
commitments to international human rights obligations such as respect for family life 
and the fracturing of social relationships given that migrants become part of the 
community where they reside regardless of their immigration status.1028  
 
On the conditions faced by migrants during deportation, Fekete observed the ‘frequency 
of denial of basic necessity, being manhandled, sometimes shackled, sometimes 
illegally sedated’ which fits into the classification of inhumane and degrading treatment, 
some of which led directly to a number of deaths in recent years with the United 
Kingdom amongst those with indulgence in these practices.1029 In the UK, the death of 
																																																								
1023 ibid 
1024 S Benhabib, ‘Citizens, residents and aliens in a changing world: political membership in the global 
era’ (1999) 66 (3) Social Research 709, 711 
1025 Gibney and Hansen, 'Deportation and the liberal state: (n1) 1 
1026 ibid 
1027 ibid 
1028 Mathew Gibney, The Ethics and politics of asylum: liberal democracy and the response to refugees 
(CUP, 2004) 2 
1029 Liz Fekete, ‘Analysis: Deaths During Forced Deportation’ <http://www.irr.org.uk/news/analysis-
deaths-during-forced-deportation >accessed 30 June 2013  
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Jimmy Mubenga illustrates the use of extreme coercion employed in the deportation 
enforcement process of a 46-year-old Angolan who died in October 2010 on a 
stationary aircraft at Heathrow during an attempt by the authorities to deport him from 
the United Kingdom, having restrained him with excessive force during the deportation 
attempt.1030 Nonetheless, deportation and/or removal is continually pursued by the State 
and freely used as a major weapon for immigration control that arguably engages a 
gradual violation of the rights of migrants by the encouragement of the out-sourcing of 
contracts dealing with human rights. This, in my view has far reaching implications on 
the legality of deportation and removal in a liberal democracy as the United Kingdom. 
In the light of the above analysis, one might be tempted to say that modern deportation 
practices have assumed exponential dimensions of coercion only aimed at facilitating 
expulsion.   
 
Balibar commenting on the liberal States’ use of deportation as a weapon of 
immigration control opined that liberal States are in the habit of creating an 
‘immigration complex’ a concept that describes the transformation of any social 
problem into a problem which is imputed and caused by the presence of migrants, if 
nothing, aggravated by them. It is only by deportation that this problem may be 
cured.1031 But even with this expansion of state power which arguably is not totally 
grounded on the excuse of sovereignty, the grounds for deportation are no longer 
effective as the actual process of deportation has become unnecessary given that the 
traditional border is no longer located at the periphery but now passes through every 
non-citizen regardless of their immigration status.1032  
 
The attitude of liberal States brings to the fore; the United Kingdom’s position with 
respect to the Directive on ‘common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third country nationals’ which the United Kingdom did not 
opt in to (European Return Directive).1033 The European Return Directive aims at 																																																								
1030 Samira Shackle, ‘Jimmy Mubenga's death: no prosecution, no surprise’ The Guardian (London, 17 
July 2012) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/17/jimmy-mubenga-death-no-prosecution> 
accessed 19 October 2013 
1031 Etienne Balibar, ‘Racism and Crisis’ in Etienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein (eds) Race, Nation, 
Class: Ambiguous Identities (Verso 1991) 219 
1032 Mary Bosworth, ‘Deportation, detention and the foreign-national prisoners in England and Wales’ 
(2011) 15 Citizenship Studies 583, 593 
1033 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals [2008] OJ L 348/98-348/107 (the Return Directive) 
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providing common standards and procedures in the deportation and/or removal of 
migrants, laying down minimum rules on how illegally [irregular] staying migrants can 
be removed from the territory of EU member states.1034  The Directive applies to all 
irregular (unlawful or illegally staying) third-country nationals in a Member State1035 
with the core obligation to issue a ‘return decision’ to every third-country irregular 
migrant on their territory.1036 But the general rule is that migrants will be given an 
opportunity to take a voluntary return within stated period-7-30 days, but they can also 
leave earlier if they choose to.1037 Article 8(4) of the Directive provides that any 
application of coercive measures applied to return the irregular migrant must 
nonetheless must be a last resort, proportional and not exceeding reasonable force and 
in accordance with human rights standards-dignity and physical integrity of the person 
concerned. 
 
Askola observes that the European Return Directive constructs migrants targeted as 
posing threats, leading to the default position that as a rule, migrants must be forcibly 
removed speedily from the territory of the Member States.1038 The adoption of these 
common rules leave much discretion to adopt domestic approaches that have the 
capacity of truncating interference in the harmonization of returns,1039 yet the United 
Kingdom did not opt in, arguably, it does not want its deportation regime for third 
country nationals, controlled. Contrary to expectations, the Directive has not operated a 
harsh mechanism (as far as possible) for the detention and subsequent removal of 
irregular migrants from their territories. This is simply due to judicial intervention, i.e. 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU as will be summarized inter alia by the following cases 
hereunder analysed. These cases raise common ratio of trying to balance humane 
treatment of irregular migrants whilst maintaining the underlying objective of removing 
																																																								
1034 The United Kingdom did not opt in to the Return Directive. See European Parliament ‘Parliament 
adopts directive on return of illegal immigrants’ 
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them as soon as possible.1040 The Directive has therefore not escaped without judicial 
oversight as the CJEU in El Dridi,1041 ruled that the use of coercive measures should be 
subject ‘to the principle of proportionality and effectiveness’ in order to accord with EU 
objectives. In the light of the above ruling, it might be said that dealing with removal at 
the European level can lead to a guarantee of minimum rights of irregular migrants 
faced with exclusion order,1042 given that the Directive as decided in El Dridi should 
streamline deportation processes within the remit of proportionality and not simply 
enhancing deportation. 
 
In Zaizoune1043, the CJEU aimed to clarify the issue of whether Member States have 
powers to set more favourable conditions if they are found compatible with the 
Directive. This happened in Spain where the State chose to fine some irregular migrants 
than to expel them, a case seen as choosing efficiency over humanity. The CJEU ruled 
that this went beyond the right of Member States to set more favourable conditions for 
irregular migrants given that it is a contradiction of securing removal as originally 
intended by the Directive.1044 
 
Furthermore, the issue of criminalization of irregular migration regarding the Directive 
did not escape the radar of the CJEU, which engaged its attention in El Dridi1045 
highlighted above adding that irregular migrants who have committed immigration 
offences are captured within the scope of the Directive but that a custodial sentence for 
an immigration offence has the consequence of delaying removal which should not be 
imposed. 
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http://euredial.eu/blog/a-fine-or-removal-the-impact-of-the-ecjs-zaizoune-judgment-on-the-spanish-
doctrine/ accessed 24 December 2016 
1045 Case C-61/11 PPU El Dridi [2011] (First Chamber, 28 April 2011)
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Remarkably, the CJEU had cause to deal with the issue of non-refoulement as it 
concerns the Return Directive in the case Abdida.1046 This case concerns a terminally ill 
Nigerian national who required access to health care while being an irregular migrant. 
The CJEU held that the non-refoulement clause in Article 5 of the Directive prevented 
the enforcement of the return decision, and this accords with prohibition against torture 
or other inhuman or degrading treatment as enshrined in Art 3 ECHR. Even though, the 
ECHR does allow migrants to stay and enjoy social or medical assistance but the CJEU 
was quick to point out that removing such a foreign national in the circumstance of ill-
health to a country with inferior medical facilities may still raise issues under Art 3 
ECHR in exceptional circumstances especially where there are compelling humanitarian 
grounds. The CJEU further took it upon itself to hold that Mr. Abdida’s removal order 
should have suspensive effect regardless of the wording of the Directive, if not, the 
applicant will suffer irreversible or irreparable harm if returned to his country of origin. 
 
The overall implication of the jurisprudence of the CJEU regarding the Return Directive 
is that the CJEU has tried to strike a balance between ensuring the respect of human 
rights of irregular migrants on the one hand while at the same time ensuring effective 
removal on the other hand. While Zaizoune sets a limit on Member States’ application 
of compassionate treatment as seen above, El Dridi enhances the principle of 
proportionality and effectiveness and Abdida enthrones the use of health cases against 
removal-non refoulement obligations, in addition to the application of the suspensive 
effect of returns in health cases. 
 
Furthermore, with specificity to detention and return (expulsion) of migrants as it 
concerns France, some legal developments will be briefly examined in the two cases 
that follow. The first is the Achughbabian1047 case that originated from a preliminary 
reference made by a French Judge to the CJEU. Mr Achughbabian, an Armenian 
national, in 2008, entered France and remained in France unlawfully. He was later 
subjected to a decision requiring him to leave the French territory within one month but 
he refused. Following this, a new decision was made against him in the form of 
deportation and an order was made to place him in police custody and subsequently in 
detention for illegal stay, a decision that Mr Achughbabian challenged. The question 																																																								
1046 Case C-562/13 Abdida [2014] (18 December 2014), see further discussion of this case at section 5.6.1 
below 
1047 Case C-329/11 Alexandre Achughbabian v Préfet du Val-de-Marne [2012] CMLR 52 
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posed to the CJEU by the French court hearing the appeal was whether the Return 
Directive precludes national legislation which provides for the imposition of a sentence 
of imprisonment on a third country national on the sole ground of the person’s illegal 
entry or residence in the national territory.  
 
In response to the question, the CJEU elucidated two clear principles, namely, member 
States may criminalize illegal entry1048 or stay and member States may equally place 
third country nationals in detention in order to determine whether their stay is illegal. In 
stating so, the CJEU emphasized that the State cannot simply delay the implementation 
of the Return Directive by subjecting irregular migrants to a custodial sentence and by 
so doing postpone the application of the decision on return.1049 The Court espoused that 
once an irregular migrant has been identified, diligent steps should to be taken to ensure 
a return decision is issued and enforced. The Court clarified that following the wording 
of Art 2(2)(b) of the Return Directive, which permits the Member State not to apply the 
directive to third country national who are subject to a criminal law sanction but in 
stating so emphasized that this provision cannot be interpreted as permitting States not 
to apply the directives to third country who have only committed the offence of illegal 
stay as doing so will vitiate and defeat the purpose and binding effect of the directive 
which should encourage return. 
 
Then comes the recent case of Affum1050 decided on 7 June 2016 by the CJEU arising 
from a preliminary reference from the French Cour de Cassation concerning the 
detention of irregular migrants. The facts were that Ms Affum, a Ghanaian national, 
without a valid document, had illegally crossed the EU border heading towards the 
Channel Tunnel and was stopped by the French authorities, apprehended and placed in 
detention-garde a vue under Article L. 621-2 of the Code of Entry and Residence of 
Foreigners and Asylum Law. The Court ordered her administrative detention for a 
period of five days pending removal, which was later extended. Upon appeal, the Cour 
de Cassation submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU on the 
compatibility of the Return Directive with national law allowing the imposition of a 																																																								
1048 ibid, para 44, the CJEU referred to the El Dridi case, supra 
1049 See discussions by Ana Beduschi, ‘Detention of Undocumented Immigrants and the Judicial Impact 
of the CJEU’s Decisions in France’ (2014) 26 (3) International Journal of Refugee Law 333; Rosa 
Raffaelli ‘Illegal migration: the “Returns” Directive in the recent case-law of the ECJ’ (2012) European 
Area of Freedom Security & Justice <https://free-group.eu/2012/03/07/illegal-migration-the-returns-
directive-in-the-recent-case-law-of-the-ecj/> accessed 31 March 2017 
1050 Case C-47/15 Affum [2016] (07 June 2016) 
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term of imprisonment of a third country national on the basis of illegal entry and 
stay.1051  
 
The CJEU followed its decision in Achughbabian and held that the Return Directive is 
applicable in Ms Affum’s case by virtue of Article 2(1) and Article 3(2) of the Return 
Directive1052 having entered the territory of a Member State illegally and being regarded 
as staying there illegally. The CJEU therefore reasoned that a third-country national is 
thus not excluded from the scope of the Return Directive merely because the person was 
in a situation of mere transit and only briefly present on the territory of the Member 
State. The Court thus emphasized that no duration conditions are attached to the term 
‘staying’ and in following Achughbabian stated that even though the Return Directive 
does not preclude Member States from imposing criminal penalty on the basis of illegal 
entry and non-return but doing so will defeat the purpose of the Directive and will 
undermine its efficacy.  The CJEU thus went ahead to adopt what appeared to be a 
pragmatic approach where the Court preferred procedures such as prohibiting detention 
in order to achieve fast return. 
 
5.5 Deportation, Removal and Liberal Democracy: Trends and Turns 
 
Prior to the nineteenth century, actions of states regarding deportation were restricted to 
criminal matters but post events now include the use of migration policy to prevent 
aliens from disturbing public order.1053 Deportation as a form of state practice has 
therefore been employed to deal with failed asylum seekers, foreign criminals and those 
whose presence are considered detrimental to the public interest.1054 Bosworth1055 and 
Gibney1056 share the view that the terrorists attacks in USA of 11 September 2001 and 
consequent bombings in London on 07 July 2005 triggered a somewhat expansion of 																																																								
1051 Affum para 43, see also Giovanni Zaccaroni, ‘The Pragmatism of the Court of Justice on the Detention 
of Irregular Migrants: Comment on Affum (2017) European Forum 1; European Database of Asylum 
Law (EDAL) CJEU - Case C‑47/15, Sélina Affum v Préfet du Pas-de-Calais, Procureur général de la 
cour d’appel de Douai <http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/cjeu-case-c‑4715-sélina-affum-v-
préfet-du-pas-de-calais-procureur-général-de-la-cour-d’appel> accessed 30 March 2017 
1052 See Article 2 (1) regarding application of the Directive and Art 3 (2) of the Return Directive 
regarding the meaning of ‘illegal stay’ 
1053 F Castecker, ‘The Changing modalities of regulation in international migration within Continental 
Europe 1870-1940’ in A, Bocker and Others (eds) Regulation of Migration: International Experiences 
(Het Spinhus 1998) 74 
1054 Gibney ‘Is Deportation a form of Forced Migration’ (n983) 146 
1055 Mary Bosworth, ‘Border control and the limits of the sovereign state’ (2008) 17 Social Legal Studies 
199, 201 
1056 Gibney ‘Is Deportation a form of Forced Migration’ (n983) 146 
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the deportation estate and the use of migration laws as key elements in the reduction of 
risk from dangers posed by certain communities. This has led to the argument that 
deportation has become the main device to enforce modern migration policies.1057 The 
liberal state has now employed deportation from being a state’s response to specific 
events and crises throughout much of the twentieth century to being a normalized part 
of immigration control.1058 
 
A further seemingly innocuous but pernicious development is the construction of 
deportable subject using the springboard of securitization, criminalization and race.1059 
This, in the view of De Genova, accounted for the ideology that supported the 
deportation of Arabs and Muslims in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the USA 
and the UK.1060  
 
On the racialization discourse, some scholars are in agreement that the deportation turn 
should be seen as that part of a greater hostility to immigrants from the Third World 
states rooted in racism and xenophobia.1061 As De Genova observed, ‘the elision of 
European racism renders invisible ‘post-coloniality’ and colludes with the insinuation 
that racist or nativist outbursts lie in continuum with populist reactions of citizens 
provoked by the presence of migrants’.1062 Bigo applying a prognostic approach, 
comments that the immigrant as folk devil has completely replaced the ideological 
function, which was served by the Soviet bloc during the cold war era .1063  
 
																																																								
1057 F Castecker (n1053) 94 
1058 G Cornelisse, ‘Immigration detention and the territoriality of universal rights’ in N De Genova and N 
Peutz (eds) The Deportation regime: sovereignty, space and freedom of movement (Duke University 
Press 2010) 101 
1059 Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti, ‘Citizenship, deportation and the boundaries of belonging’ (n3) 552; 
see generally Robert A Williams, ‘Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: 
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World’ (1990) 4 Duke Law Journal 660; 
Ricardo Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (2nd edn, New York 
University Press 2012) 3, 10 
1060 N De Genova, ‘The production of culprits: from deportability to detainability in the aftermath of 
‘Homeland Security’ (2007) 11 Citizenship Studies 421, see also D Kanstroom, Deportation nation: 
outsiders in American history (n1012) x 
1061 Liz Fekete, ‘The Deportation machine: Europe, Asylum and human rights’ (2005) 47 Race & Class 
64, 64-91; L Weber and B Bowling, ‘Valiant Beggars and global vagabonds: select, eject, immobilize’ 
(2008) 12 (3) Theoritical criminology 355,361 
1062 Nicholas De Genova, ‘Inclusion Through Explosion: Explosion or Implosion’ (2008-2009) 1 
Amsterdam Law Forum 43, 48 
1063 Didier Bigo, ‘Liaison Officers in Europe: New Officers in the European Security Field’ in J Sheptycki 
(ed) Issues in Transnational Policing (Routledge 2000) 93 
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On criminality limb, Bosworth on her part espouses the growing reliance on criminal 
justice system by the UK in the construction of immigration and asylum policies.1064 
Chan1065 and Warner1066 reconstruct that if the migrant who has already been conceived 
as criminal carries a heavy load in the form of stereotypes with its attendant stigma, 
then it is possible to expect the migrant who has been convicted of a criminal offence to 
be doubly targeted for exclusion. This is supported by Weber and Bowling who 
postulated that criminality accounted for the furore raised by the ‘foreign criminal 
scandals’ in 2006 where it was reported that 1023 prisoners had been released between 
1999 and March 2006 without being considered for deportation.1067 Gordon Brown, the 
then Prime Minister in setting deportation targets of 4,000 foreign criminals, stated ‘I 
want a message to go out. If you come here you work and learn our language. If you 
commit a crime you will be deported from our country’, 1068 which as Weber and 
Bowling reported, led to the deportation of a record 45,000 failed asylum seekers, 
foreign national prisoners and other immigration offenders in the first quarter of 
2007.1069 
 
In the light of the above, the trend for liberal democracies in the enhancement of 
deportation is the reliance on the construction of deportable subject using the 
springboard of securitization, criminalization and race in such a manner that diminishes 
the liberal philosophy of fairness and inclusion which will be further discussed below. 
 
5.5.1 Deportation and Removal: Trends, Turns and Factual Matrix  
 
The deportation turn in the UK according to Huysmans and Buonfino further finds 
explanation in the alarmist and securitized rhetoric formulated by politicians. These 
rhetorics are usually expressed in the electronic and print media or during parliamentary 																																																								
1064Mary Bosworth ‘Border control and the limits of the sovereign state’ (2008) 17 (2) Social & Legal 
Studies 199, 201  
1065 W Chan, ‘Crime, Deportation and the Regulation of Immigrants in Canada’ (2005) 44 Law and Social 
Change 153  
1066  Judith Ann Warner, ‘The Social Construction of the Criminal Alien in Immigration Law, 
Enforcement Practice and Statistical Enumeration: Consequences for Immigration Stereotyping’ (2005) 1 
(2) Journal of Social and Ecological  Boundaries 56, 57 
1067 Weber and Bowling (n1012) 367 
1068 Philip Webster, ‘I’ll Deport 4000 Foreign Criminals by the End of Year, Brown Promises’ The Times 
(London, 25 July 2007) <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article2023656.ece > accessed 15 
July 2013 
1069 Weber and Bowling (n1012) 368; ‘Home Office Says 4,000 Foreign Criminals Deported’ Reuters 
(London, 26 December 2007) http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/12/26/uk-britain-deportations-
idUKL2636834620071226 accessed 15 July 2013 
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debates.1070 Charles Clark, the then Home Secretary in 2005 reported to Parliament the 
efforts of the government to increase the removal of failed asylum seekers.1071 In 
general, the continuous deportation and/or removal of migrants is hot on the 
government’s agenda with Keith Vaz, the Chairman of the House of Commons Select 
Committee recently advocating for a tougher action against irregular migrants, 
emphasizing regrettably that in every hundred reports of irregular migration, only six is 
actually investigated and in every hundred arrests made, only about ‘1.5’ results in 
actual removal.1072  
 
The UK is not alone in the upward trend in deportation and removal. Kanstroom 
revealed that since 1925, the number of time foreign nationals in the United States has 
been caught during enforcement for removal exceeded 46 million where 44 million 
were actually ordered to leave.1073 Australia equally follows the trend by way of 
convergence. Nicholls reports that the power of deportation became part of Australian 
jurisprudence as a dormant power at the time of federation in 1901 and it took some 
time for its strength and scope to become clear.1074 By and large, the general trend is 
that migrants are usually deported for conducts that were not deportable offenses at the 
time they occurred, referred to as ‘post entry social control deportation laws’ or 
succinctly put, an ‘eternal guest model’.1075 The reality is that all migrants are subject to 
an ever increasing and shifting pattern of retroactive deportation laws that violates the 
basic principles of human rights norms.1076  
 
In addition, recent deportation and removal laws across liberal democracies are either 
discretionary or couched in rigid terms, a seemingly “antiseptic uniformity” which 																																																								
1070 J Huysman and A Buonfino, ‘Politics of exception and unease: Immigration, asylum and terrorism in 
parliamentary debates in the UK’ (2008) 56 (4) Political Studies 766 
1071 HC Deb 5 July 2005, vol 436, col 191; see reports by Emmanuela Paoletti, ‘Deportation, non-
deportability and ideas of membership’ (2010) RSC Working Paper Series 65/2010, 10 <  
http://www.lepnet.org/sites/default/files/upload/og_files/RSC%20Deportation,%20non-
deportability%20and%20ideas%20of%20membership.pdf> accessed 11 December 2011; see also HC 
Deb 10 February 2009, vol 487, col 1828W 
1072 House of Common Select Committee, ‘Home Office still failing to get to grips with backlogs’ 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/home-affairs-
committee/news/ukba-q1-pubn/  > accessed 08 November 2013 
1073 D Kanstroom, ‘Deportation nation: outsiders in American history’ (n934) 3; see also Department of 
Homeland Security, ‘Immigration enforcement actions 2008’ <  
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_08.pdf> accessed 11 July 2013 
1074 Glenn Nicholls, Deported: A history of Forced Departures from Australia (University of New South 
Wales Press 2007) 13 
1075 Daniel Kanstroom, ‘Post-Deportation Human Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or Necessity?’ 
(2007) 3 Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 195, 202 
1076 See ECHR Art 7 
187		
leaves little room for compassionate considerations.1077 The underlying questions are: 
are these exclusionary powers a new phenomenon for liberal states and do they 
represent an emergence of a new legal framework of State power against liberal ideals 
of fairness? We will therefore show in consequent debates to follow that contemporary 
deportation and removal regime in the United Kingdom and by extension in liberal 
democratic states, regardless of legal inhibitions against certain State practices in this 
area, continue their indulgence. It could then be argued that the use of deportation 
and/or removal targets by the UK is to ensure consistent removal of migrants thereby 
indirectly becoming a corner stone of its migration policy rather than respect for the 
requisite international human rights standards.1078 This requires anxious scrutiny in the 
light of its implications.  
 
Deportation and/or Removal Targets 
 
The issue of targets in my view raises crucial questions for the legality of deportation 
and removal as carried out by a liberal state such as the United Kingdom. In a bid to 
meet or exceed its targets within a given period, a liberal state may encroach on its 
international human rights obligations given the interplay of domestic policies. When 
deportation rates become targets coupled by policy transfer and/or legal transplants that 
exist between and amongst liberal states, with respect to techniques and exchange of 
ideas and information, then the issue becomes that of illiberal democracy rather than of 
liberal democracy.1079 
 
A further emanating issue is that when deportation and/or removal targets are not met 
and removal specifically becomes impossible due to logistics and difficulties resulting 
from receiving states, the State unwilling to grant any kind of leave deliberately creates 
a non-deportable status whose status could better be described as precarious.1080 My 
view is supported by the debate in Parliament as the government made it clear that it 
																																																								
1077 Bill Ong Hing, ‘Detention to Deportation-Rethinking the Removal of Cambodian Refugees’ (2005) 
38 University of California Davis Law Review 891, 950 
1078 Emmanuela Paoletti, ‘Deportation, non-deportability and ideas of membership’ (n1071)10   
1079 For a discussion on Liberal democracy, see chapter 2 Sections of this thesis. William Walters using 
the phrase ‘governmentalization of government’ discusses the issue of deportation targets; William 
Walters, ‘Deportation, Expulsion and the International Police of Aliens’ (n980) 280 
1080 Precarious migrants are discussed at Chapter 3 of this thesis 
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will not grant leave to remain because of a person’s ‘irremovability’ or ‘non-
deportability’.1081  
 
Deportation Agreements in the Context of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)    
 
Another recent trend on deportation is the use of Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) to deport migrants to countries reputed for human rights violations. In this type 
of arrangement the receiving state assures the deporting state that it will comply with 
human rights obligations.1082 Nina argues that diplomatic assurances seemed to host an 
inherent paradox.1083 She opined that ‘the sending state’s insistence on additional 
guarantees in certain cases is an acknowledgement of the existence of a widespread 
practice of torture in the receiving State while asking for an exception to the practice in 
the individual case’.1084  The argument is that if States consider a person as a security 
risk, the use of deportation may not be an adequate solution given that making safe 
diplomatic assurances are increasingly problematic and loaded with portent difficulties 
of sensitive legal and political nature.1085  
 
In rejecting such diplomatic arrangements, Amnesty argues that State’s resort to seek 
assurances in this form amounts to the tacit acquiescence of torture of others similarly 
situated in the receiving country and states that  “such arrangements cannot be trusted 
and that reliance on them when seeking to expel people to countries where they risk 
torture or other ill-treatment violates states' obligations under international law”1086, and 
the UK has been identified as one of the states that use the MoU in this form.1087 Gibney 
and Hansen report that the UK, USA and Australia amongst others had to enter into 
complex and drawn out negotiations with China to enable deportation of its citizens.1088  
 
																																																								
1081 Emmanuela Paoletti (n1071) citing HC Deb 30 April 2008 
1082  Paoletti ibid 10 
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RSC Working Paper No. 32, 19  
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Quite recently the Human Rights Committee in its latest report on the United Kingdom 
has expressed concern that the ‘State party continues to rely on its “deportation with 
assurances” policy to justify the deportation of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism-
related offences to countries where it is reported that they may face a real risk of 
torture’. The Committee further remarked that ‘despite the memorandums of 
understanding on deportation with assurances that have been concluded with some 
countries with post-transfer monitoring arrangements, the Committee remains 
concerned that these measures may not ensure the protection of the affected individuals 
contrary to articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant (arts.2, 6 and 7)’.1089 
 
In general, it is one thing to sign such readmission agreements; it is a different thing to 
respect it, as non-compliance amongst States remains a significant problem,1090 given 
that when a source country refuses to cooperate, deportation becomes impossible in the 
absence of a valid nationality document or a deportee’s travel document, which had 
either expired or no longer exists. The Guardian reported that the Home Office 
celebrated the deportation [extradition strictly speaking] on grounds of terrorism to 
Jordan of Abu Qatada (Omar Mahmoud Othman) on 07 July 2013 based on a MoU 
between Jordan and UK.1091 In Othman (aka Abu Qatada) v SSHD1092, the Court of 
Appeal followed the Strasbourg judgment in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United 
Kingdom1093, where the key issue had been whether there was “a real risk of a flagrant 
denial of justice” so as to render Abu Qatada’s deportation a breach of the UK’s 
obligations under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court 
stated: “the applicant’s deportation to Jordan would be in violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention on account of the real risk of the admission at the applicant’s retrial of 
evidence obtained by torture of third persons”.1094 
 
																																																								
1089 HRC, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (2015) UN Doc CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7, para 19 
1090  Antje Ellermann, ‘The Limits of Unilateral Migration Control: Deportation and Interstate 
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always easy’ The Morning Call  (Pennsylvania, 22 January 2010)  
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1091 Patrick Wintour, Robert Booth and Hamza Al Soud, ‘As Abu Qatada leaves, Theresa May vows to 
change human rights law’ The Guardian (London, 7 July 2013)  
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1092 [2013] EWCA Civ 277 
1093 App No. 8139/09 (ECtHR, 17 April 2012) 
1094 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom App No. 8139/09 (ECtHR, 17 April 2012) para 290  
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It therefore beggars belief that given these numerous constraints inhibiting deportation, 
liberal states continue to pursue the deportation of migrants. The fact remains that, it is 
difficult if not impossible for a State to actually remove from its territory all criminal 
non-citizens and/or irregular migrants.1095 This therefore leaves a huge the gap between 
the deportable and the actual number of deportees. The quarterly statistics produced by 
the Home Office on deportation only indicates the number of enforced removals as 
against the number of deportation orders or removal directions issued. This means that 
the number of people liable to deportation but whom the State cannot deport is 
missing.1096 Recent statistics corroborates the figures.1097 The Migration Observatory 
observes that the Home Office does not publish data on the cost of deportations, but 
some information about costs were obtained from written answers to Parliamentary 
Questions, as well as in a National Audit Office (NAO) report from 2005.1098 Therefore 
the use of the MoU has not closed the gap between the deportable and the actual 
number of deportees due to constraints inherent in these MoUs with the consequence 
that non-deportability and/or removability has multiplier implications as will be seen 
below. 
 
The Implications of Temporary Non-Deportability and Removability  
 
A further underlying concern revolves around those who cannot be deported or removed 
for reasons highlighted earlier and if circumstances warrant detention, for how long? 
But if the affected migrants were on temporary admission without a right to work, how 
long would that be? The unassailable fact is that migrants who are not deportable and/or 
removable but not in detention are kept in a legal limbo (precarious situation) which 
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gives rise to the issue of destitution.1099 It could therefore be inferred that this practice is 
inconsistent with the liberal democratic principles of right to fair treatment, procedural 
equality and the rule of law. But in order to forestall the continuation of this practice, 
and to remove inhibitions and maintain deportation and removal targets, the Home 
Office awarded a contract worth up to £40m in 2012 to CAPITA- a services company to 
help find and specifically remove more than 150,000 migrants who have purportedly 
overstayed their visas.1100 The implication is, since targets have been set for removing a 
certain number of people and given that payment to this company depends on results, it 
could be reasonably argued that the main concern will be to remove these migrants 
without ensuring that their rights are respected-the UK Border Agency has revealed that 
CAPITA will get £40m from the taxpayer if it meets its targets.1101  
 
By and large, the furore generated by the campaign for migrants to leave the UK and the 
use of text messages by CAPITA even to UK nationals themselves, albeit mistakenly, 
are all engaged to force migrants out of the country or remove them through 
enforcement actions. This could be explained within the remit of immigration complex 
culminating into protracted deportability and removability with underlying intent to 
meet targets as highlighted above. The CAPITA’s text message coercion style lies in 
continuum with the ‘Campaign to go home’ mounted by the Home Office against 
irregular migrants with criticisms that trailed the controversial campaigns,1102 even as 
Vince Cable, the then Liberal Democratic Business Secretary calls it “stupid and 
offensive” with the Labour Party describing the government's tactic as "shambolic and 
incompetent".1103 It could be reasoned that the practice where citizens themselves also 																																																								
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1103 ibid; see also Robert Myles, ‘UK Government 'go home' text campaign harasses UK immigrants’ 
Digital Journal (London 19 0ctober 2013) 
<http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/360533#ixzz2iFl2VEZZ> accessed 20 October 2013; ‘Go Home 
Immigration Van Campaign Branded 'Misleading' By Advertising Standards Authority’ The Huffington 
Post (London 20 October 2013)  
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/10/08/go-home-van_n_4063643.html> accessed 20 October 
2013; Liberty targets Home Office campaign’ 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-23589448 accessed 20 October 2013; Hayley Dixon, 
‘Home Office ‘go home’ texts sent to people with right to remain’ The Telegraph (London 18 October 
2013) 
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receive text messages to be deported together with irregular migrants exposes the 
overzealousness of the State in deportation and resultantly the deep malaise pervading 
the deportation and removal regime thus illuminating the fact that the State is prima 
facie interested in meeting targets rather than complying with acceptable standards 
required of a liberal democracy.  
 
It can therefore be further argued that when a State contracts out a service that is 
embedded with human rights obligations to a private company, the natural tendency of 
sacrificing legality on the altar of profit making is clear. The privatization of removal 
together with the privatization of detention invites the argument that migrants are 
juggled and used in order to protect profit-an overriding interest of privatization. In 
essence, deportation and/or removal illuminate big business nature of this practice 
where the rule of the law may be easily sacrificed to dictates of free market forces. 
 
Costs and the Resolve to Deport and/or Remove 
 
Similarly, costs also presents inhibitions against deportation and/or removal.  The cost 
of flights i.e. actual removal makes up only about 8% of the cost of enforced removals. 
In comparison with an assisted voluntary return, the difference is clear. A return through 
an assisted voluntary return program cost about £1,100 in 2003-04 according to the 
National Audit Office’s (NAO) 2005 calculation. On its part, the UKBA’s internal 
impact assessments estimate the average cost of actually removing a person directly 
from port at £500, or £1000 for cases that include overnight detention. In short, the UK 
Border Agency paid more than £28 million for removal flights in the financial year 
2010-2011 and pays an estimated £11,000 for each enforced removal of a rejected 
asylum applicant.1104  
 
The above analysis shows that the inhibitions against deportation are real and the cost 
on the taxpayer, staggering. Regardless of these exorbitant costs and inhibitions, the 
United Kingdom continues to pursue vigorously, the deportation and/or removal of 
migrants. In addition, given that deportation is expensive involving the use of scarce 
																																																								
1104 Home Office, ‘Control of Immigration: Statistics United Kingdom 2001’  
<http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm56/5684/5684.pdf> accessed 13 August 
2013 
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public resources, time consuming and resource intensive,1105 with the further difficulty 
that without a valid deportation order and co-operation of Airlines in transporting 
deportees, actual removal might be a mirage.1106 The mirage of actual removal 
encumbered by the gap between the deportable and the actual number of deportees due 
to the inherent constraints discussed above raises more questions than answers for the 
legality of deportation and removal as practiced by liberal democracies. This challenges 
the ‘necessity in a democratic society’ nexus that considers whether a violation of rights 
is necessary in such democracies. 
 
5.6 Deportation and Removal Inhibitions and the ‘Necessity in a Democratic 
Society’ Nexus 
 
Deportation inhibitions are those constraints that limit the State’s power in effecting 
deportation. Joppke refers to it as self-imposed limits of State sovereignty where 
domestic courts are constrained by the mores of international human rights law, when 
applied, limits the expulsion powers of States.1107 Guiraudon further espoused that the 
limits of State’s power in effecting deportation is self-imposed by virtue of the State’s 
acquiescence to conventions while domestic courts usually articulate the precise 
associated obligations.1108 The requirement of Art 3 ECHR adds to the inhibition given 
that States are prohibited from returning migrants to where they will face torture, 
degrading or inhuman treatment-non-refoulement. 
 
5.6.1 Deportation and Removal Inhibitions in the Context of Non-Refoulement 
Obligations 
 
As argued at chapter 2.4.2 of this thesis, non-refoulement obligations over time has 
acquired the status of customary international law given that such status is clear. The 																																																								
1105 Gibney and Hansen (n1) 11 
1106 See Deportation Alliance  
<http://www.noborder.org/archive/www.deportation-alliance.com/faqs.html> accessed 12 August 2013; 
Alasdair Palmer ‘Asylum airlines-your one-way flight to deportation’ The Telegraph (London, 23 May 
2009) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/5374109/Asylum-airlines-your-one-way-flight-to-
deportation.html> accessed 12 August 2013; Corporate Watch, ‘Grounding deportation airlines June 
25th, 2010’  
<http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3664> accessed 12 August 2013 
1107 Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain 
(OUP 1999) 17 
1108 V Guiraudon, ‘Citizenship Rights for Non-Citizens: France, Germany and the Netherlands,’ in 
Christian Joppke (ed) Challenge to the Nation-State (OUP 1998) 272 
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idea is that the deportation of a person to a country where there is a risk that they will 
suffer, torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is prohibited and the State in 
breach will be held responsible.1109 But the implied non-refoulement prohibitions 
especially under the ECHR are certainly unclear and highly contentious, which has not 
provided the necessary panacea against deportation and/or removal, only acting to an 
extent, as a check. Arguing vehemently, Greenman stated that ‘there is something 
problematic about the way the prohibitions on refoulement are read into human rights 
provisions using the ‘removal plus risk’ formulation that can be seen in the medical 
cases with unfortunate consequences and detriment for individual protection, submitting 
that non-refoulement under the ECHR is a castle built on sand’.1110 
 
In the medical cases1111 under Article 3 ECHR, the underlying issue is that if the 
deportee would be exposed to torture or ill treatment in the destination state, deportation 
would be unlawful. In deciding D v UK, the ECtHR stated: 
 
The Court must reserve to itself sufficient flexibility to address the application 
of that Article [Art 3] in other contexts, which might arise. It is therefore not 
prevented from scrutinizing an applicant’s claim under Article 3 where the 
source of risk of proscribed treatment in the receiving country stems from 
factors which cannot engage directly the responsibility of the public authorities 
of that country, or which, taken alone, do not in themselves infringe the 
standards of that Article. To limit the application of Art 3 in this manner would 
be to undermine the absolute character of its protection.1112 
 
In reaching this judgement, the ECtHR emphasized the absolute nature of D v UK that 
the Grand Chamber had the opportunity to reconsider in N v UK, the ECtHR stated:  
 
‘The decision to remove an alien who is suffering from a serious mental or 
physical illness to a country where facilities for the treatment of that illness are 
inferior to those available in the Contracting State may raise an issue under 
Article 3, but only in a very exceptional case where the humanitarian grounds 
against the removal are compelling’.1113  
 
																																																								
1109 See discussions on this issue at chapter two, 2.4.2 of this thesis and Strasbourg jurisprudence with the 
Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439 as locus classicus; also note that the issue of ‘state responsibility’ 
here is not intended to mean State responsibility for an internationally wrongful act for the purposes of 
the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 2001 (ASR) 
1110 Kathryn Greenman, ‘A Caste Built on Sand? Article 3 ECHR and the Source of Risk in Non-
Refoulement Obligations in International Law’ (2015) 00 (00) International Journal of Refugee Law 1, 2 
1111 D v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 423 and N v UK (2008) 47 EHRR 39 
1112 D v UK, ibid para 49 
1113 N v UK (n1111) para 43 
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The Court explicitly aimed to strike a fair balance between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights without placing an obligation for the provision of free and unlimited 
health care to all irregular aliens. 
 
In short, the significance and/or ratio from the medical cases may be interpreted to mean 
that if there are substantial grounds for believing that the deportee would face a real risk 
of harm in the destination country, emanating from circumstances giving rise to 
responsibilities of the destination State, the expelling State is under a non-refoulement 
obligation. But if otherwise, the expelling State can only be under an obligation of non-
refoulement if the deportee can show exceptional circumstances in addition to economic 
considerations. As Greenman pointed out, ‘in reshaping non-refoulement in the medical 
cases, the ECtHR is undermining the absolute nature of Art 3 ECHR and the 
indivisibility of civil and political and socio-economic rights’1114 with the unfortunate 
creation of uncertainty due to the Court’s inconsistency leaving deportees helpless, 
without knowing on what side the pendulum will swing. 
 
Interestingly, recent legal developments in medical cases have thrown up arguments 
regarding the absolute nature of Art 3 ECHR. One of those was the case of Abdida1115 
decided by the CJEU in December 2014.1116 Abdida has enthroned the use of health 
cases against removal-non refoulement obligations and has gone ahead to apply 
suspensive effect of returns in health cases. Mr. Moussa Abdida, a Nigerian national 
was an irregular migrant residing in Belgium who submitted an application to the 
Belgian state requesting leave to remain on medical grounds- he was diagnosed with 
AIDS. This was refused and he was asked to leave the country and whilst appealing 
against the decision to remove him, Mr. Abdida was not allowed an in-country right of 
appeal, which means the decision has no suspensive effect. Furthermore, Mr. Abdida’s 
basic social security and medical care were withdrawn. In the legal proceedings that 
ensured at the Belgium domestic courts, which finally reached the Brussels 
Employment Court regarding Abdida’s entitlement under EU law, the issue was what 
sort of judicial remedies, (suspensive or otherwise) and social rights should be available 
to a third-country irregular immigrant when he claims to remain in the country to 																																																								
1114 Kathryn Greenman (n1110) 14 
1115 Case C-562/13 Abdida [2014] (18 December 2014) 
1116 See also discussions at chapter 5.4 above on the Return Directive, Abdida and other cases. 
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receive medical treatment. The Belgian court held that under Belgian law, Mr. Abdida 
had no judicial remedy with suspensive effect in refusing permission to remain in 
Belgium and that he was not entitled to any form of social assistance other than 
emergency medical assistance.  
 
Nonetheless, the Belgian court referred two questions to the CJEU. The questions were 
whether Mr. Abdida under EU law should have a suspensive effect remedy regarding 
the removal decision and whether he should receive basic social assistance other than 
the emergency medical care pending his appeal. Impressively, the CJEU answered yes 
to both questions holding that such an immigrant must be able to challenge the decision 
to send him back to his country of origin with suspensive effect and must also, in the 
meantime, get social assistance to cover his basic needs pending his appeal. The CJEU 
applied the Return Directive, supra, in addition, referred to Art 47 of the Charter in 
reaffirming the principle of effective judicial protection.1117 In further applying the 
Charter, the Court also noted that Article 19(2) of the Charter states, inter alia, that no 
one may be removed to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. This shows that the CJEU is willing to 
interpret the provisions of EU law in such a way that they comply with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and with the ECHR. 
 
Furthermore, in accordance with Art 52(3) of the Charter, the CJEU pointed out that the 
case-law of the ECtHR must be taken into account in interpreting EU law with respect 
to human rights.1118  And in doing so, the CJEU commented on the authority of N v 
UK1119 where the Court explained that, while non-nationals subject to a decision 
authorizing their removal cannot, in principle, claim any entitlement to remain in the 
territory of a State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of 
assistance and services provided by that State, a decision to remove a foreign national 
suffering from a serious physical or mental illness to a country where the facilities for 
																																																								
1117 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/1, Art 47 of the Charter 
provides that ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this article’, see also 
judgments in Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern 
[2007] ECR 1-2271, para 37, and Case C-93/12 Agrokonsulting-04-Velko Stoyanov [2013] ECR para 59 
1118 Art 52(3) of the EU Charter states: ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’.  
1119 N v UK (2008) 47 EHRR 885 
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the treatment of the illness are inferior to those available in that State may raise an issue 
under Article 3 ECHR in very exceptional cases, where the humanitarian grounds 
against removal are compelling.1120 The CJEU emphasized that those very exceptional 
cases are characterized by the seriousness and irreparable nature of the harm that may 
be caused by the removal of a third country national to a country in which there is a 
serious risk that he will be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. Therefore, in 
order for the appeal to be effective in respect of a return decision whose enforcement 
may expose the third country national concerned to a serious risk of grave and 
irreversible deterioration in his state of health, that third country national must be able 
to avail himself, in such circumstances, of a remedy with suspensive effect. This is to 
ensure that a competent authority has examined the matter before a return decision is 
enforced in compliance with Art 19(2) of the Charter.1121  
 
Following this authority, it is now clear that the CJEU has firmly established the 
standard that Member States are required to follow in providing for the basic needs of a 
third country national suffering from a serious illness who has appealed against a return 
decision and whose enforcement may expose him to a serious risk of grave and 
irreversible deterioration in his state of health. This decision in essence reignites the 
argument of exceptionality decided by the ECtHR in the case of N v UK, supra but the 
CJEU in the Abdida case took a purposive and pragmatic position in its ebullient 
pronouncement.  
 
It might be that given the CJEU’s position in Abdida, the ECtHR has now seized an 
opportunity in the very recent case of Paposhvili v Belgium1122 decided on the 13 
December 2016 to remove the exceptionality threshold in medical cases concerning 
third country nationals which softens the unduly restrictive approach that had so far 
been followed in cases concerning the expulsion of seriously ill migrants. The facts are 
that Mr. Paposhvili, a Georgian national living in Belgium, was seriously ill and 
claimed that his expulsion to Georgia would put him at risk of inhuman treatment and 
an earlier death due to the withdrawal of the treatment he had been receiving in 																																																								
1120 ibid para 42 
1121 See discussions on this at EU Litigation<https://eulitigationblog.com/2015/03/01/case-c-56213-
moussa-abdida-return-of-illegal-immigrants-and-proper-judicial-remedy-with-suspensive-effect/ > 
accessed 29 March 2017, see also EDAL-European Database of Asylum Law, CJEU: Advocate General 
Opinion in Case C-562/13 Abdida <http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/cjeu-advocate-general-
opinion-case-c-56213-abdida> accessed 29 March 2017 
1122 App no 41738/10 (ECtHR, 13 December 2016) 
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Belgium. Unfortunately, he died in June in Belgium in June 2016 whilst the case was 
pending before the Grand Chamber. The ECtHR did not strike his application out of the 
list but in reliance on its case management powers1123 proceeded to give a very 
important and spectacular judgment affecting third country nationals with medical cases 
whilst facing expulsion.  The Court held that there would have been a violation of 
Article 3 if Belgium had expelled Mr. Paposhvili to Georgia without having assessed 
the risk faced by him in the light of the information concerning his state of health and 
the existence of appropriate treatment in Georgia.  The ECtHR equally found that there 
would have been a similar violation of Article 8 if Belgium had expelled him without 
having assessed the impact of his return on his right to respect for his family life in view 
of his state of health.1124 
 
Paposhvili thus comes to fill what Judge Lemmens in his concurring opinion calls a 
‘gap in the protection against inhuman treatment’1125 in so doing included as 
exceptional more than just cases of imminent death that now appears to open up what in 
practice has resulted in a limited application of the high threshold.  
 
The Grand Chamber equally seized the occasion to meticulously set out a range of 
procedural duties for the domestic authorities in the ECHR state parties solely aimed at 
a more rigorous assessment of the risk as required by the absolute nature of the Article 3 
ECHR prohibition. The Court emphasized that in assessing the alleged risk of ill 
treatment; the domestic authorities should verify whether the care available in the 
receiving state is ‘sufficient and appropriate in practice for the treatment of the 
applicant’s illness so as to prevent him or her being exposed to treatment contrary to 
Article 3’.1126 The ECtHR reiterated that domestic authorities should also consider ‘the 
extent to which the individual in question will actually have access to this care and these 
facilities in the receiving State such as cost of medication and treatment, the existence 
of a social and family network, and the distance to be travelled in order to have access 
to the required care’.1127  
 
																																																								
1123 Art 37(1) ECHR, see para 133 of the judgment 
1124 Paposhvili (n1122) paras 222-226 
1125 ibid ,Concurring Opinion of Judge Lemmens para 3 
1126 ibid para 189 
1127 ibid para 190 
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The ECtHR further took a proactive approach in requiring that the returning State must 
obtain individual and sufficient assurances from the receiving State, as a precondition 
for removal, in addition to ensuring that appropriate treatment will be available and 
accessible to the persons concerned so that they do not find themselves in a situation 
contrary to Article 3 which appears to be a nascent approach by the Court to move its 
corpus of case law principles closer to its principles on the absolute nature of the Article 
3 prohibition.1128   
 
From the ratio of the above cases, it can now be seen that the ‘swinging pendulum’ of 
medical cases involving third country nationals facing expulsion is gradually been 
narrowed to reflect clear rationality and practicality. This approach by the CJEU in 
Abdida and the ECtHR in Paposhvili now attacks the high threshold required of medical 
cases to a purposive, reasonable, and humane level.1129 
 
5.6.2 ‘Necessity in a Democratic Society’ Nexus 
 
In the exercise of its sovereign rights in the deportation and removal of migrants, liberal 
democratic states are not only constrained by the international norms limiting its 
sovereignty but also by its self-imposed standards. The expansion of these international 
standards lie in a continuum with the complementary decline in sovereignty,1130 which 
leads to the argument that inherent tensions between universal human rights and the 
territorial sovereignty of States are built into international legal documents.1131 These 
tensions find expression in the ‘necessity in a democratic society nexus, nay a liberal 
democracy. Strasbourg jurisprudence introduced this necessity concept to assess 
whether a violation of a right is necessary in a democratic society, which thus 
incorporates the notion of proportionality.  
 
The raison detre for the necessity adjunct is to regulate the judgment of States in that 
where the law allows a restriction, it follows that it will be in accordance with the law 
and justified by a legitimate aim.1132 Therefore any such interference has to be 
																																																								
1128 ibid para 120 
1129 ibid para 183 
1130 Jelka Zorn, ‘The right to stay: challenging the policy of detention and deportation’  (2009) 12 (2) 
European Journal of Social Work 247,249 
1131 Seyla Benhabib, The rights of others. Aliens, residents and citizens (CUP 2004) 49 
1132 John Wadham and others, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 (4th edn, OUP 1999) 36 
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‘necessary in a democratic society’.1133 In Handyside v UK1134, the ECtHR explains that 
the term ‘necessary’ is synonymous with ‘indispensable’ or ‘strictly necessary’ as in 
Article 6 (1) ECHR or Article 2 (2) ‘absolutely necessary’ or even at Article 15 (1) ‘to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. The point being made is 
that when decisions are taken by a liberal democracy that involves the restriction of a 
right, that restriction must be strictly necessary; otherwise the State will be in clear 
violation of international obligations as well as its status as a democratic state. The test 
is a rigorous test that requires the assessment of a ‘pressing social need’ described as a 
stringent standard given that the protection of a legitimate aim by the State does not 
warrant the disproportionate restriction of the individual’s right.1135 Simply put, the 
State cannot use ‘a sledgehammer to crack a nut’.1136 
 
The ECtHR affirms that proportionality is the most crucial element of the necessity test 
that requires the application of a fair balance between competing interests i.e. between 
the requirements of the general interest of the community versus the requirement for the 
protection of human rights.1137 In Fayed v UK1138, the court stated that proportionality 
requires a reasonable relationship between the pursued goal and the means chosen to 
achieve that goal. Without proportionality as the element of the ‘necessary in a 
democratic society test’, the ‘very essence’ of a right will be impaired leading to 
flagrant breaches.1139 In this connection, ruses, deceits, high handedness, excessive 
coercive force and arbitrary actions comes within the confines of disproportionate 
actions, which are not considered necessary in a democratic society. 
 
The necessity adjunct as enshrined in Art 8 ECHR is often engaged in challenging 
deportation. It is noted that the recorded first invocation of Article 8 ECHR to protect an 
																																																								
1133 The concept of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is replete in the ECHR 1950 as mentioned in 
Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11, typically applied when such rights are qualified or limited as against absolute 
rights. 
1134 (1976) 1 EHRR 737 
1135 Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245 
1136 R v Barnsley MBC, ex p Hook [1976] 3 All ER 452; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for 
the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; Brind v SSHD [1991] 1 All ER 720; Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 
EHRR 493, para 138; R v SSHD, ex p Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433; Amanda Brown, ‘A Sense of 
Proportion: The Principle of Proportionality in the European Community, United Kingdom and New 
Zealand’ (2006) 3 The New Zealand Postgraduate Law E-Journal  
<http://www.nzpglejournal.auckland.ac.nz/webdav/site/nzpglejournal/shared/Subscribe/Documents/2006-
1/6_amanda.pdf> accessed 15 August 2013  
1137 Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 89 
1138 (1994) 18 EHRR 393 
1139 Rees v UK (1986) 9 EHRR 56 
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individual from deportation was in 1988 in the case of Berrehab v Netherlands1140 
where the applicant Moroccan national was facing deportation from Netherlands 
following his divorce from a Dutch woman. With a young daughter from the marriage, 
the applicant argued that if deported, their right to private and family life would be 
breached. The ECtHR then held that the restriction on family rights, which involves 
deportation, had to be justified as ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The court 
reasoned that the very close ties between father and daughter and threatened by 
proposed deportation will require a balance to be made between the legitimate aim of 
deportation on the one hand and the means to achieve that aim on the other hand. In 
short, the court accepted the fact that deportation which will result in the separation of 
families across international boundaries was an interference with family life, and in the 
instant case, disproportionate and unlawful given that in Berrehab, the only person 
whose removal was anticipated by the deportation order was the applicant and there was 
no question of his wife or daughter joining him. 
 
It is observed across the board that in numerous cases before the ECtHR1141, Article 8 
ECHR has been invoked by migrants to frustrate deportation following criminal 
conviction while the concerned States had at all relevant times argued a prevention of 
crime or wellbeing of the country as its legitimate aim. But the ECtHR had in them 
accepted that deportation that leads to separation of families across international 
boundaries would not be necessary in a democratic society. Therefore the reference to 
both private and family life became a regular feature in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The 
difficulty for the ‘private life’ limb is that national courts are not properly guided as to 
what should be accorded weight in the applicant’s personal circumstances especially 
when private right is pleaded in order to determine whether deportation is proportionate 
to the protection of the public as the State is wont to argue.1142 A guide was given in 
Niemietz v Germany1143 as to what factors courts should be considered in reaching a 
decision on the private life limb. Despite the guide in Niemietz v Germany1144 that 
																																																								
1140 (1989) 11 EHRR 322; Yael Ronen, ‘The ties that bind: family and private life as bars to the 
deportation of immigrants’ (2012) 8 International Journal of Law in Context 283, 284. Ronen discusses 
the issues impinging on Article 8 ECHR and why the ECtHR accorded weight to family ties. 
1141 Boughanemi v France  (1996) 22 EHRR 228; Moustaquim v Belgium (1991) 13 EHRR 822; Boulifa v 
France (1997) 30 EHRR 419; Omojudi v UK App no 1820/08 (ECtHR, 24 November 2009) 
1142 Vanessa Bettinson, ‘European Court Of Human Rights: Deportation of Migrant Following Criminal 
Conviction; European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8; Omojudi v United Kingdom’ (2010) 74 
Journal of Criminal Law 113,115 
1143 (1993) 16 EHRR 97 
1144 ibid para 29 
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provided a set of considerations, these have not have been strictly followed rendering 
the decision, merely cosmetic. 
 
On criminality grounds related decisions, Boultif v Switzerland1145 provided some 
criteria in assessing the effect of deportation on the migrant’s family life following a 
criminal conviction which now serves as a benchmark for proportionality assessment in 
deportation proceedings. In the United Kingdom in particular, there have been a 
somewhat fluctuation of the necessity adjunct in deportation matters. In 2004, the 
House of Lords [Supreme Court] in Razgar v SSHD1146 [Razgar test] held that a 
deciding authority should adopt a five stage approach in Article 8 cases bordering on 
removal of a person.1147 At stage four, the court applies the ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ nexus in determining the reasonability of such a decision necessitating removal 
not in every society but in a democratic society where the rule of law operates.1148  In 
JO (Uganda); JT (Ivory Coast) v SSHD1149 the court held that where it was sought to 
deport a person who has committed a criminal offence, the State has to show very 
serious compelling reasons to justify the decision. 
 
By way of interpretative obligations incumbent on United Kingdom courts1150, in 
typical deportation cases following a previous conviction, the United Kingdom courts 
have followed the Boultif criteria.1151 In addition to that, the courts have also followed a 
recent decision in Uner v Netherlands1152 where the ECtHR revisited Boultif and 
expanded the criteria adding the best interests of the children as a consideration in 
determining the proportionality of removal decisions involving the separation of 
families where children are involved. The fluctuations and lack standards in deportation 
of migrants may have been caused by several approaches taken by the ECtHR, which 
																																																								
1145 App no 54273/00 (ECtHR, 2 August 2001) The factors listed by the court includes the applicant’s 
family relationship, whether the spouse knew of the offence when they entered into the relationship; 
whether there are children of the marriage and their ages; the seriousness of the difficulties which the 
spouse is likely to face should the applicant be deported and the length of the applicant’s stay in the 
country. 
1146 [2004] UKHL 27 
1147 ibid, para 17 ‘(4) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others?’ 
1148 See also Huang and Others v SSHD [2007] UKHL 11 on the extension of the Razgar test to ultimate 
exceptional test bordering on reasonable expectation. 
1149 [2010] EWCA Civ 10 
1150 See the Human Rights Act 1998, s 2 (1)  
1151  Boultif v Switzerland (n1145) 
1152 App no 46410/99 (ECtHR, 18 October 2006) 
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the United Kingdom courts have followed. The following decisions will highlight these 
seeming inconsistencies. In Maslov v Austria1153, the court at paragraph 70 stated: 
 
The court would stress that while the criteria which emerge from its case-law 
and are spelled out in the Boultif and Uner judgments are meant to facilitate the 
application of Article 8 in expulsion cases by domestic courts, the weight to be 
attached to the respective criteria vary according to the specific circumstances of 
each case [...]  
 
At paragraph 74 it stated:  
 
Although Article 8 provides no absolute protection against expulsion for any 
category of aliens (see Uner para 55) […] the court has already found that 
regard is to be had to special situations of aliens [migrants] who have spent 
most, if not all, his childhood in the host country, were brought up there and 
received his education there.  
 
In Maslov, the court found in favour of the application and concluded that the 
imposition of an exclusion order [deportation order] even of limited duration was 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.   
 
In Grant v UK1154 a Jamaican national came to the UK at age 14 and committed series 
of criminal offences, the court distinguished Maslov stating that it could not ignore the 
sheer number of convictions. Furthermore, in Onur v UK1155 which concerns the 
deportation of a Turkish national who had come to the UK at age 11 and committed 
several criminal offences, the ECtHR applied Uner stating that deportation would not be 
disproportionate. The difficulty is that rather than treat long-term migrants as special 
category of non-citizens whose expulsion will require very weighty and obvious 
reasons; the ECtHR only ephemerally took account of individual circumstances which 
has produced different outcomes which may not be explained by the severity of the 
committed offences nor by the degree of integration of the applicant in the host 
country.1156 
 
Therefore, this lack of clear focus and clarity in what should be accorded weight and or 
the necessity in a democratic society adjunct in deportation matters may have invited a 																																																								
1153 App no 1638/03 (ECtHR, 23 June 2008)  
1154 App no 10606/07 (ECtHR 8 January 2009) 
1155 (2009) 49 EHRR 38 
1156 Charlotte Steinorth, ‘Uner v Netherlands: Expulsion of Long-term Immigrants and the Right to 
Respect for Private and Family Life’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 185, 186 
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barrage of criticisms even by the court’s judges themselves who characterized the 
ECtHR casuistic approach as a “lottery for national authorities and a source of 
embarrassment for the court”.1157  Judge Marten opined that the embarrassment arises 
since it makes it impossible for the court to make comparisons between the merits of 
cases before it and those already decided.1158 Such a fluctuating approach does not 
allow for legal certainty, consistency and precision, which should be a parameter of 
measuring the rule of law but the court, has adopted different standards thus 
culminating in different findings since 1991.1159 Nevertheless, it has been reported that 
many States through the instrumentality of their migration laws do no longer deport 
long-term migrants even when they commit criminal offences; they are therefore 
indirectly treated as nationals.1160 Similarly, the Parliamentary Assembly in its 2001 
Recommendation advised that the expulsion of migrants should not be applied under 
any circumstances to those born or brought up in the host State except on verifiable 
grounds affecting state security.1161 
 
It can therefore be argued that it is not sufficient to deport on criminality grounds if the 
State cannot particularly provide relevant and sufficient reason why deportation is for 
the prevention of disorder or crime. The argument is that deportation on the basis of 
criminal convictions alone may amount to double jeopardy. This is because the 
committing of criminal offences is not peculiar to non-nationals as nationals equally 
commit criminal offences and no further punishments are meted out to them. Pursuant 
to this argument, in Autronic v AG Switzerland1162, the court reasoned that the state 
requires factual evidence for believing that there was real danger to the interest, which 
the State claims to be protecting on the guise of pressing social need. Even though 
Autronic is not directly applicable to deportation proceedings, it might be reasoned that 
incontrovertible reasons are required by liberal democracies such as the United 																																																								
1157 Boughanemi v France  (1996) 22 EHRR 228, para 4 (Judge Martens) 
1158  ibid 
1159 Marie-Benedicte Dembour, ‘Human rights law and national sovereignty in collusion: the plight of 
quasi-nationals at Strasbourg’ (2003) 21 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 63, 64;  
1160 Uner v Netherlands (n1049) At the Comparative Law Section of this judgment, paragraph 39, it was 
reported that eight member States have provided in their laws that second-generation immigrants cannot 
be deported on the basis of their criminal record or activities: Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Iceland, 
Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Apart from Iceland and Norway, this protection is not confined to those 
who were actually born in the host country but also applies to foreigners who arrived during childhood 
(varying from before the age of three in Austria to before the age of fifteen in Sweden).  
1161  Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1504 (2001) para 7 and 11 (ii) (g) 
<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/EREC1504.htm> accessed 26 
October 2013 
1162 (1990) 12 EHRR 485 
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Kingdom to continue to justify the deportation of a migrant who has committed a 
criminal offence on the basis of the prevention of crime.  
 
In the light of the foregoing, I argue that deportation on criminality grounds is an 
extension of the policy of exclusion, which is against liberal ideals, anathema to the 
necessity in a democratic society nexus, which should have considered rehabilitation 
rather than deportation.1163   
 
Taking a purposive and teleological approach, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), 
quite recently, has considered the rationality of deportation of migrants. Expanding the 
concept of “the right to enter his own country” consistent with its Article 12 of the 
ICCPR1164 which provides that an individual should not be barred from entering his 
own country, the HRC held that this may include the country where the migrant was 
born and or had lived the majority of his life. Such was the decision on 18 July 2011 
when the HRC published its views in the case of Nystrom v Australia.1165 The facts are 
that a 30-year-old non-citizen had lived in Australia for 27 years. He was convicted of 
aggravated rape and armed robbery, which led the Australian government to cancel his 
visa to remain forcing him to move to Sweden. The HRC found that his deportation 
breached his right to enter his ‘own country’ as in this case, Australia where he 
developed special ties rather than Sweden being his country of nationality thus allowing 
his re-admittance to Australia in the light of sufficient ties accruing therefrom. This case 
has been seen as a springboard for the gradual broadenings of the scope of art 12(4) to 
cater for the unique factual circumstances of the relevant applicants thus significantly 
weakening the nexus previously required by the Committee between art 12(4) and 
nationality.1166 It could be suggested that the HRC may have been influenced by 
Autronic highlighted above in applying the factual evidences of the circumstances of 
Nystrom who even though does not hold Australian nationality but has remained in the 
country as a ‘citizen’ given the length of his stay and ties in the country. 
 
																																																								
1163 See Nicholas De Genova, ‘Inclusion Through Explosion: Explosion or Implosion’ (2008-2009) 1 
Amsterdam Law Forum 43, 48  
1164 ICCPR (n29) Art 12(4) provides that ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country’. 
1165 Nystrom v Australia, Communication No CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 Meeting of 18 July 2011 
1166 Devon Whittle, ‘Nystrom v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007’ (2012) 19 Australian 
International Law Journal 235, 237  
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Analytically, the common issue that emerges from our discussion on the ‘necessity in a 
democratic society’ nexus is that of proportionality between the legitimate aim of 
deportation on the one hand and that the means to achieve it on the other hand. This 
becomes very pronounced when the reason for deportation is laced with criminal 
conviction, which raises a spectrum in the determination of liberal democracies to 
deport migrants regardless of their level of integration in the host country sufficient to 
qualifying them as nationals that are usually immuned from deportation. 
 
5.7 The Contrivance of Deportability and Removability 
 
The contrivance of deportability and removability for our purpose finds expression in 
the legislative and judicial architecture being that deportation in the United Kingdom is 
unarguably constructed by a combination of legislative and judicial actions. This part 
argues that legislation associated with deportation and/or removal are constantly and in 
an unrestrained manner enacted, revised and re-enacted to enhance and achieve actual 
removal in contrast to the doctrine of legitimate expectation encapsulated under the 
principle of legal certainty. It further opens a vista of argument that deportability and/or 
removability is a state contrivance which commences from the very point the migrant 
enters the territory of the state whether regular or irregular and such can be articulated 
through the interplay of policy encumbered by legislative and judicial architecture. 
 
5.7.1 Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectation 
 
The rule of law requires that the law must be accessible and so far as possible 
intelligible, clear and predictable.1167 This invites its conformity and adherence to the 
principles of legal certainty.1168 Legitimate expectation in the immigration context was 
first applied in Schmidt v Home Secretary1169 in 1969 to differentiate aliens [migrants] 
facing removal as a result of expired leave and those whose leave were terminated or 
curtailed prematurely. For Lord Denning, the latter not the former had a legitimate 
expectation, considered unfair to deprive them of such rights without a right to fair 
																																																								
1167 Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (Centre for Public Law Lecture Series, 16 November 2006) < 
http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/past_activities/the_rt_hon_lord_bingham_the_rule_of_law.php> accessed 
05 April 2012 
1168 Koffi Annan, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post Conflict Societies’ UN Doc S/2004/616 (2004) 
1169 [1969] 2 Ch 149 
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hearing.1170 In Abdi and Nadarajah v SSHD1171 the court described legitimate 
expectation as a requirement for good administration that fosters confidence in the 
administrative authorities. 
 
In essence, when a law is procedurally and legally transparent, predictable and legally 
certain, arbitrariness is avoided given that certain laws may still be legal but arbitrary. 
Persons who are subject to the law must be able to explicitly predict the law, as the law 
should be adequately accessible in order to help them regulate their conduct.1172 This 
means that the law must, as much as possible, allow a person subject to it, the latitude to 
predict or foresee within reasonable circumstances the consequences of any action 
before taking it.1173 The accessibility rule, in the opinion of Wadham, aims to counter 
arbitrary display of power by the provision of a restriction that is unjustifiable even if 
authorized in domestic law unless there is publication of the rule made in a form 
accessible to those to be affected by it.1174 In the phone tapping cases of Malone v 
United Kingdom1175 and Govell v United Kingdom1176 the ECtHR agreed that internal 
guidelines from State departments or agencies do not fulfill the accessibility 
requirement unless when published. In Malone, the court held that the tapping of the 
applicant’s telephone by the police, which at the time was governed by internal 
regulations, not made public, was not in accordance with the law therefore an 
interference with his right to private and family life.  
 
The certainty rule on its part is intended to enable individuals likely to be affected by 
the restriction of their rights to understand the circumstances giving rise to the 
imposition of such a restriction and to enable individuals foresee with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy the consequences of their actions.1177 Nonetheless, what is 
sufficiently certain is at times a product of circumstances given that absolute certainty 
may be unrealizable as it may come with excessive rigidity.1178  
 
																																																								
1170 Ibid [Lord Denning MR] 
1171 [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 
1172 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251, for full details and discussions on the rule of law, 
see chapter 2, section 2.7.3 of this Thesis. 
1173 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, para 49 
1174 John Wadham and others, Blackstone’s Guide To The Human Rights Act 1998 (OUP 2007) 31 
1175 (1984) 7 EHRR 14   
1176 [1999] EHRLR 121   
1177 Wadham and others (n1174) 31 
1178 See Sunday Times v UK, (n1173) para 49 
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Drawing from an institutional background, Sales opined that the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation operates as a control over the exercise of the public authority’s 
discretionary powers which ensures that they are judiciously exercised having due 
regard to the particular circumstances of individual cases before the decision maker.1179 
This is particularly so given the fact that Parliament could not have predicted all 
circumstances of the matter at the time of passing the legislation. Bradley and Ewing on 
their part describe legitimate expectation as an aspect of legal certainty where an 
individual is said to hold a public authority accountable to its words and actions and the 
extent where the public authority cannot be allowed to change its mind having led the 
individual to believe that a certain decision would be made.1180  
For our purpose, legitimate expectation has been captured in four main situations 
notably:  
(a) where the public authority [Home Office] has made a decision affecting a 
migrant which it later seeks to replace with a fresh decision1181; (b) the Home 
Office gives an assurance that certain procedures or policies will be applied in a 
matter affecting the migrant but then acts differently1182; (c) without any 
assurance given, the Home Office had followed a consistent practice (course of 
dealing) which led the migrant to believe that the practice will continue in the 
absence of notice that it has been changed1183; (d) finally the Home Office 
makes public the policy it will follow in a matter but changes that policy before 
deciding the migrant’s case thereby making a different decision from that which 
the migrant had expected.1184  
 
In Re Findlay1185, the Home Secretary changed the policy on the granting of parole to 
convicted criminals that caused some ineligibility of certain prisoners for parole earlier 
than expected under the former policy. The court held that their legitimate expectation 
would be that their cases would be decided individually in recognition of a policy that 
would have made them eligible for early release than for a latter release. 
 
Legitimate expectation may be substantive or procedural. Procedural legitimate 
expectation comes into being when as in (b) above, a public body led an individual to 
believe that he will have a particular procedural right over and above the general 
																																																								
1179 Philip Sales and K Steyn, ‘Legitimate Expectations in English Public Law: An Analysis’ (2004) 
Public Law 564 
1180 A W Bradley and K D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (14th edn, Pearson 2007) 753 
1181 R v SSHD ex p Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906; see also Associated Provincial Pictures Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corporation [1984] 1 KB 223 
1182 R v SSHD ex p Khan [1981] 1 WLR 1337 
1183 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p Preston [1985] AC 835 
1184 Bradley and Ewing (n1071) 754 
1185 [1985] AC 318 [338] 
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requirement of the principles of fairness and natural justice.1186 On the contrary, if an 
individual had been made to believe that he would receive a substantive benefit, then 
this will be protected by substantive legitimate expectation.1187 As Forsyth stated, a 
substantive expectation arises where a favourable decision is expected.1188 In A-G of 
Hong Kong v Ny Yuen Shiu1189 the basic concept is that of legitimacy where the 
applicant expects a favourable decision. Nevertheless, whether legitimate expectation is 
substantive or procedural, may be insignificant. What is important is the duty of good 
administration where public authorities are held to their promises that may undermine 
the law if was not insisted that any failure to comply is objectively justified as 
proportionate measure in the circumstance.1190 
 
Cartwright finds a similarity between public law doctrine of legitimate expectation and 
the private law doctrine of estoppel.1191 To him, the paradigm of each case involves a 
clear unambiguous promise in the form of undertaking or representation by one party, 
which creates in the other party an expectation of belief for the happening of an event, 
which the other party relied on.1192 In R (Bibi) v Newham LBC1193, it was held that the 
reason for the enforcement of legitimate expectation is anchored on the broader 
principles of fairness and the prevention of abuse of power similar to detrimental 
reliance under estoppel.1194 In R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex 
p Begbie1195 detrimental reliance was identified as an important factor in substantive 
legitimate expectation claims.  
 
The Court of Appeal in R v North and East Devon HA ex p Coughlan1196 seized the 
opportunity to clarify the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The applicant and others 
having been displaced in a road accident was placed in the care of a local health 																																																								
1186 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell) 13 
1187 Craig, ibid 
1188 C Forsyth, ‘Wednesbury protection of legitimate expectation’ (1997) Public Law 375, 376 
1189 [1983] AC 629 Lord Fraser opined that legitimate expectation includes all expectations that go 
beyond enforceable rights on the proviso that they have some reasonable basis. 
1190 Abdi and Nadarajah v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 [68] (Laws LJ) 
1191 John Cartwright, ‘Protecting Legitimate Expectation and Estoppel in English Law’ (2006) 10 (3) 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, 6 
1192 Cartwright ibid 
1193 [2002] 1 WLR 237 
1194 ibid [29-31] see similarly CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 In this case Lord 
Roskill captured legitimate expectation as a “manifestation of the duty to act fairly”; R v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners ex p Unilever [1996] S.T.C 681 [690] per Bingham MR where he stated: “the categories 
of unfairness are not closed and that precedent should act as a guide and not a cage”; R v SSHD ex p Khan 
[1984] 1 WLR 1337 
1195 [2000] 1 WLR 1115 [1124] 
1196 [2001] QB 213 [4] [52-71] 
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authority on the assurance that they could live there (Mardon House) as long as they 
choose but the local authority thereafter closed Mardon House and transferred the 
applicant and others to a local authority home. Upon their judicial challenge, the Court 
held that the applicants had a clear promise that Mardon House would be their home for 
life, finding that, if a public body induced a legitimate expectation of a substantive 
benefit, any frustration of that benefit might be unfair, unjustifiable and sufficient to 
amounting to an abuse of power.  
 
Similarly in R (Rashid) v SSHD1197 the claimant was an Iraqi Kurd who sought asylum 
in the United Kingdom on 4 December 2001 but his asylum application was refused. He 
argued that if the Home Office had applied their asylum policy between his arrival and 
March 2003, he would have been granted asylum, a subsequent change in asylum policy 
made his claim unsuccessful. In the protracted case, the key question for the Court of 
Appeal was whether the Secretary of State’s decision was “invalid on grounds of 
unfairness”. The court referring to Bibi above stated:  
 
In all legitimate expectation cases, whether substantive or procedural, three 
practical questions arise. The first question is to what has the public authority, 
whether by practice or promise, committed itself; the second is whether the 
authority has acted or proposes to act unlawfully in relation to its commitment; 
the third is what the court should do.1198  
 
The court then concluded that it was clear that the Secretary of State committed himself 
to applying his policy during the period December 2001-March 2003 and that must 
follow from the existence of the policy itself. The argument therefore is that those who 
rely on published guidelines by public authorities are obviously entitled to expect them 
to be followed.1199 By extension, public authorities are duty bound to adhere to their 
own policies whether or not there is reliance or application of that policy.1200 If 
anything, good administration requires that public authorities adhere to policies they 
promulgate and equality of treatment requires that like cases are treated equally.1201 The 
rationale behind the expectation that public authorities adhere to their policies can be 
																																																								
1197 [2005] EWCA Civ 744  
1198 ibid [46]; (Schiemann LJ) [29] in reference to R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2002] 1 
WLR 237  
1199 Richard Clayton, ‘Legitimate Expectation, Policy and the Principle of Consistency’ (2003) 62 (1) 
Cambridge Law Journal 93, 102 
1200 Yoav Dotan, ‘Why Administrators should be Bound by their Policies’ (1997) 17 (1) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 23, 24 
1201 Richard Clayton (n1199) 103 
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explained within the remit of the application of the principle of consistency.1202  Steyn 
stated:  
 
The requirement of consistency is deeply rooted in English law. The rule of law 
requires that laws be applied equally, without unjustifiable differentiation. The 
courts of equity have long since embraced the principle that decisions must not 
vary “like the Chancellor's foot” and the law of precedent seeks to ensure, inter 
alia, that like cases are treated alike. Inconsistency is one of the most frequent 
manifestations of unfairness that a person is likely to meet.1203 
 
As the court stated in R v SSHD ex p Urmaza1204 the idea is that consistency follows the 
pattern and assumption that a public authority will follow his own policy and will in 
turn view inconsistency as inkling towards manifest absurdity and Wednesbury 
unreasonableness.1205  
 
In the light of the foregoing, it is argued that the contrivance of deportability or 
removability runs contrary to the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Evidence shows 
that ninety statements of changes in Immigration Rules have been laid before 
Parliament since May 2003-2013.1206 This excludes Immigration Acts, Statutory 
Instruments and policies.  The said Immigration Rules is a product of the negative 
resolution procedure of Parliament consistent with the Immigration Act 1971 section 3 
(2) that enables the policy content of the rules to be considered in either House, chosen 
in the interest of flexibility.1207 This flexibility with little parliamentary scrutiny allows 
the Home Secretary to change policies, as she may consider necessary in the light of the 
government’s agenda given that recent government policies set targets for the 
deportation and removal of migrants.1208  
 
The obvious implication of this constant inconsistency and unfairness is that even 
during the currency of the migrant’s leave to remain, constant changes of the 																																																								
1202 Karen Steyn, ‘Consistency-a Principle of Public Law’ (1997) 2 (1) Judicial Review 22, 22 
1203 Steyn ibid; See also Matadeen v Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98  
1204 The Times 11 July 1996 (QBD); [1996] COD 479 
1205 See similarly CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, ‘the Wednesbury case 
established a high threshold for review of actions of public authorities, which was reinforced by Lord 
Diplock in formulating his “rationality” test’, see also Lord Carnwath, ‘Judicial review in a changing 
society-From Rationality to Proportionality in the Modern Law (UCL-HKU conference, Hong Kong 
University, 14 April 2014) 
1206 Home Office UK Border Agency, Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules  
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/statementsofchanges/> 
accessed 13 November 2013 
1207 HC Deb 16 June 1971, vol 819, cols 482-483 
1208  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Highly Skilled Migrants: Changes to the 
Immigration Rules (Twentieth Report)(2006-07, HL 173, HC 993) 16 
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immigration rules and policies create deportable status as the migrant may not be able to 
meet up the new requirement of the rules some of which were not in place at the time of 
the initial grant of leave. The consequence of the inability to renew leave due to 
inconsistency of the law, abrupt change of policies, and detrimental reliance on previous 
published rules is that the migrant becomes deportable or removable. It is therefore the 
legitimate expectation of a migrant that the law, which regulates his conduct, is not 
devoid of legal certainty, accessibility, and predictability consistent with international 
human rights standards. While it is accepted that the State enjoys the discretion or 
prerogative to deport migrants that violate the State’s immigration laws, the issue of 
constant changes breed uncertainty, uncertainty breed unpredictability leading to 
unaccountability.1209 This is due to the fact that the history of immigration laws on 
deportation and/or removal is possessive of intricate and calculated interventions, which 
are a function of a by-product of presumed action and agenda, therefore ‘the law serve 
as instruments to supply and refine parameters of discipline on the one hand and 
coercion on the other hand’.1210  
 
As Foucault observes “the existence of legal prohibition creates around it a mass field 
of illegal practices”.1211 The argument is that in order to effect deportation, the deportee 
must have been put in a deportable state through the instrumentality of the law of the 
State. Therefore migrant irregularity is produced and sustained as an effect of the law 
within the realm of discursive formation and lived through a palpable sense of 
deportability and removability.1212  
 
In my view, the contrivance of deportability and/or removability is adumbrated by the 
legal production of migrant irregularity exemplified by inconsistent and uncertain laws. 
In the words of Calavita ‘There may be no smoking gun, but there is nonetheless a lot of 
smoke in the air’.1213  It could therefore be argued that irregularity-giving rise to 
deportability and/or removability is a creation of immigration laws because it 
																																																								
1209 Emmanuela Paoletti citing Alice Edwards (n1071) 
1210 Nicholas P. De Genova, ‘Migrant “Illegality” and Deportability in Everyday Life’ (2002) 31 Annual 
Review of Anthropology 419, 425 
1211 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (Random House 1979) 280 
1212 De Genova (n1210) 431, 439; see also Jacqueline Maria Hagan, Deciding to be legal: a Mayan 
Community in Houston (Temple University Press 1994) 79 who opined that the U.S immigration laws 
beginning in 1965 have been instrumental in producing migrant illegality [irregularity] in its 
contemporary configuration 
1213 Kitty Calavita, ‘Immigration, law and marginalization in a global economy: notes from Spain’ (1998) 
32 (3) Law & Society Review 529, 557 
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constructs, differentiates and ranks various categories of migrants, which entails an 
active process of inclusion through irregularisation.1214 The difficulty is that 
inconsistency and unfairness fuelled by constant changes of the immigration rules and 
policies during the currency of the migrant’s leave to remain creates deportable status. 
In essence, unfairness, inconsistency and detrimental reliance function to feed the 
infraction of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which in totality instigates and 
contrives deportability and/or removability. 
 
5.7.2 Legitimate Expectation, Article 8 ECHR and ‘Belonging’ 
 
It might be expected that migrants having established a web of social, personal and 
family ties with the host State while estranged from their country of nationality, 
regardless of their conduct such as criminality, would be saved from deportation-as an 
interference with their right to private and family life. But as it stands, the ECtHR 
applies no identifiable spectrum in deciding whether deportation will be 
disproportionate against them despite their length of stay in the host State.1215 Rather 
than treat long-term migrants as a special category of aliens whose expulsion would 
require thorough and weighty reasons, the ECtHR prefers the application of individual 
circumstances in each case with different outcomes.1216 As discussed above, Judge 
Martens in Boughanemi v France described this approach as a ‘lottery’ and ‘a source 
embarrassment’ for the ECHR.1217 Judge Marten opined that the embarrassment arises 
since it makes it impossible for the court to make comparisons between the merits of 
cases before it and those already decided.1218  
 
In her reconstruction, Dembour opined that such a fluctuating approach does not allow 
for legal certainty, consistency and precision, which should be a parameter of measuring 
the rule of law but the court, has adopted different standards thus culminating in 
different findings since 1991.1219 Steinorth in her study reported that in the decade 
between 1991 and 2001, more than 10 cases came before the ECtHR concerning the 
expulsion of long-term migrants where in some cases violations were found, while in 																																																								
1214 De Genova (n1210) 439 
1215 For a full discussion on this, see ‘Necessity in a democratic society’ section 5.6.3 above 
1216 Charlotte Steinorth, ‘Uner v The Netherlands: Expulsion of Long-term Immigrants and the Right to 
Respect for Private and Family Life’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 185, 186  
1217 (1996) 22 EHRR 228, para 4 (Judge Martens) 
1218  Boughanemi v France ibid  
1219 Marie-Benedicte Dembour, ‘Human rights law and national sovereignty in collusion: the plight of 
quasi-nationals at Strasbourg’ (2003) 21 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 63, 64 
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others no violations were found.1220 This inconsistency has led to the argument whether 
it will not be preferable for the ECtHR to take a clear stand on either the giving of 
primary consideration to the legitimate expectation of long-term residents or over the 
legitimate interests of States in securing their supposedly public order.1221 Narrating this 
inconsistency, Mole opined that there remains an imprecise boundary between positive 
and negative obligations but a fair balance must be struck between the interest of the 
individual and the interest of the community.1222 After all, the conviction for a criminal 
offence itself should not necessarily warrant deportation, as this may not adequately 
address the issue of criminality given that the wrong doing of a foreigner is not greater 
than that of a citizen.   
 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR in Uner v the Netherlands1223 concluded that regardless of the 
non-national’s strong residence (long term residence) and degree of integration, they 
cannot be equated with that of a national when it comes to the power of the host State to 
expel them. Mole observed that despite this position, several ECtHR judges have 
continued to hold dissenting opinions against the majority in insisting that long term 
resident migrants residing lawfully in the host State should be accorded the same fair 
treatment and a legal status as close as possible to that of nationals.1224 
 
The above illustrates that the dichotomy between the legitimate expectation of long 
term residents and nationals remains wide. According to Gibney, the boundary between 
legitimate expectation and deportation power can be narrowed down to ‘who belongs’ 
in the liberal state.1225 For Gibney, ‘the idea of who belongs chimes with recent writing 
by scholars from several perspectives who stressed the moral claims to citizenship and 
protection against deportation of long-term non-citizen residents’.1226 They argue that 
																																																								
1220 Charlotte Steinorth (n1216) in this, Steinorth reported the following cases where the ECtHR found no 
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Belgium (2001) 32 EHRR 19, Boulchekia v France (1998) 25 EHRR 686, El Boujaidi v France (2000) 30 
EHRR 223, Boujlifa v France (2000) 30 EHRR 419, Dalia v France (2001) 33 EHRR 26 and Baghli v 
France (2001) 33 EHRR 32. In contrast to the above, the ECtHR found in the following cases a violation 
of Article 8 by virtue of their long-term residency- Moustaqium v Belgium (1991) 13 EHRR 802, 
Beldjoudi v France (1992) 14 EHRR 801, Nasri v France (1996) 21 EHRR 458, Mehemi v France (2000) 
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Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Basic Books 1983); R Baubock, Stakeholder Citizenship: An idea Whose 
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these moral claims grow out of the liberal and democratic ideal of congruence between 
the contours of State’s coercive power and the boundaries of its membership. They 
reasoned that an expansive conception of membership-guaranteeing membership for 
long-term resident non-nationals, which protects them from deportation, is also 
consistent with more communitarian ideas of State.1227 This expanded concept of 
belonging is gaining weight with international human rights instruments. By applying 
Article 12 of the ICCPR, which states that an individual should not be arbitrarily 
deprived of “the right to enter his own country” the Human Rights Committee found in 
Nystrom v Australia1228 that States are under obligation not to deport or expel certain 
categories of long term resident non-nationals.1229  
 
As discussed at chapter 3 of this thesis and as Gil-Bazo noted, ‘the UN Human Rights 
Committee had had cause to consider extensively the relationship that exists between 
individuals and States other than nationality, particularly the legal relevance of such 
significant attachments other than nationality’1230 which in my view, has not been given 
sufficient consideration and nuance by liberal democracies in deportation matters. 
 
5.7.3 Legitimate Expectation, Deportation, Removal, HSMP Forum1231 and the 
Pankina1232 String of Cases 
 
The recurring decimal in the HSMP Forum and the Pankina string of cases is the issue 
of legitimate expectation and the exercise of power within the confines of 
unreasonableness. The underlying argument as highlighted above is whether the State 
can depart from its published policy [law] relied upon by migrants during the currency 
of their leave to remain- heightened by the fact that such departure would inadvertently 
create an unfavourable immigration situation culminating in deportation and/or 
removal.   
 																																																																																																																																																																		
Time Has come? (Migration Policy Institute 2008) and A. Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship 
and Global Inequality (Harvard University Press 2009) 
1227 Matthew Gibney, ibid 
1228 Communication No CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 Meeting of 18 July 2011 
1229 For a full discussion on this case, see above the ‘Necessity in a democratic society’ section of this 
chapter 
1230 Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, ‘Refugee Protection under International Human Rights Law: From Non-
Refoulement to Residence and Citizenship’ (2015) 34 Refugee Survey Quarterly 11, 33-34; see also 
chapter 3.2 of this thesis. 
1231 [2008] EWHC 664 (Admin) 
1232 Pankina & Ors v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 719 
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In the HSMP Forum Ltd v SSHD1233 the UK government introduced a policy allowing 
individuals to come to the UK under the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (“HSMP”). 
The Home Office issued a guidance containing sufficient details for self-assessment 
enabling prospective applicants to determine their likelihood of success in the 
application for leave to enter the UK. Some 49,000 migrants entered the UK under this 
scheme.1234 The Home Office reserved for itself the power to review the policy (through 
changes to the Immigration rules)1235 stating that qualifying criteria might be adjusted 
from time to time. Three reviews were made in 2003-2006 but in 2007 the Home office 
tagged the review “new scheme”. The new scheme changed the criteria for extensions 
and settlements made applicable to new entrants as well as migrants already in the 
UK.1236  
 
The HSMP Forum challenged this new scheme by way of a judicial review as being 
unfair, unlawful and unreasonable and a breach of their right to legitimate expectation. 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee that conducted an inquiry found that the new rules 
were retrospective in effect and could not be justified as proportionate given that HSMP 
individuals have taken a number of steps to establish their home in the UK.1237 But the 
Secretary of State argued that the rule was not retrospective in effect stating that the 
only expectation which the applicants should have is that the rules and policies in force 
at the time of their applications, will be applied correctly to them. The court however 
held that the legitimate expectation of migrants at the time of their application was that 
the criteria of extensions of their leave to remain would not change from what was 
obtainable and that the revision of the scheme should not affect those already on the 
scheme.  
 
The court found that conspicuous unfairness was involved when migrants were 
encouraged to sever links with their home country and the court also found abuse of 
power in frustrating the path to final settlement in the UK for these migrants. In short, 
their only legitimate expectation was that their applications would be judged on the 
basis of the rules and criteria under HSMP in force at the relevant time, which if not 
applied will make it impossible for some of them to remain. The implication of the 																																																								
1233 HSMP Forum (n1231) 
1234  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Highly Skilled Migrants: Changes to the 
Immigration Rules (n1208) 10 
1235Parliamentary Joint Committee, ibid 
1236 HSMP Forum (n1231) [5] 
1237 ibid [21]  
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above is that had the court not given judgment in favour of the HSMP individuals, these 
49,000 persons may have been subject to deportation and/or removal (for purported 
breach of conditions or overstaying their leave) when in actual fact it was the State that 
lured them into the country and during the currency of their leave decided to change the 
rules midway.  
 
This approach leads to inconsistency and unfairness in view of these migrants’ 
detrimental reliance on the State policies and laws, a breach of their right to legitimate 
expectation and consequently a latent contrivance of deportability and/or removability 
by the state in their initial inclusion and now what appears to be a calculated exclusion 
from the State. The retrospective effect of immigration laws as in this case, to say the 
least, is incompatible with international human rights law and cannot be said to meet the 
criteria of “in accordance with the law” requirement of Article 8 ECHR.1238 The 
argument is that had the Home Office made the new HSMP policies for new entrants 
rather than the existing beneficiaries, the change would have been prospective rather 
than retrospective and may not have affected the legitimate expectation of the affected 
migrants. Therefore it is this retrospective approach that has shattered the necessary 
foreseeability and predictability element considered an inherent requirement of the 
law.1239 In essence, the inclusive measures exemplified by the adoption of the HSMP 
programme and the exclusive measures exemplified by the rule change, which has the 
consequence of deportability and/or removability shows inconsistency and uncertainty 
that negates international human rights law. 
 
5.7.4 The Ratio of the Pankina String of Cases 
 
The facts of the Pankina case were that in 2008, the Home Office introduced an 
immigration rule that allowed graduates of approved United Kingdom institutions to 
remain in the country under the Tier 1 (Post Study work) migrant category.1240  The rule 
require that the applicant must meet amongst other requirements, a certain sum of £800 
in his/her bank account as explained in the Points Based System Policy Guidance. 
Migrants relying on the rules applied for leave to remain. The requirements of the rules 																																																								
1238 For a full discussion of the “in accordance with the law” element of Article 8 ECHR 1950, see ‘The 
ECtHR, legality, the rule of law and minimum procedural safeguards’ section of this chapter above 
1239 Parliamentary Joint Committee (n1208) 39 
1240 The affected rule is paragraph 245v of the Immigration Rules HC 607 laid before Parliament on 9 
June 2008 under section 3 (2) of the 1971 Immigration Act. 
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were in mandatory terms of which failure will result in the refusal of the application and 
consequent removal. The Immigration Rules provided that the said £800 pounds was to 
be held by the applicant prior to the application while the Policy Guidance was 
amended to provide that the money was to be held for three months prior to the 
application.  
 
The issue then was whether the applicant’s application was to be judged under the 
Immigration rules or under the Policy Guidance interpreting the relevant rules.1241 The 
court held that the three month requirement in the Policy Guidance did not form part of 
the rules and as it was not laid before Parliament. It reasoned that policy is precisely not 
a rule and is therefore required by law to be applied without rigidity. The court held that 
if the Home Secretary intends to make the rule black letter law, an established 
legislative route rather than the confusion it has generated must achieve this, the 
confusion generated being the unlawful incorporation of a document that had not been 
laid before Parliament.  
 
However, I contend that aside of the issue of legitimate expectation raised by the above 
case, transparency, predictability and legal certainty are equally turned on. As been 
highlighted above, a law may be legal but arbitrary in its intent and application. The 
affected migrants having relied on the rules were put in a deportable status by virtue of 
the refusal of their applications, a situation that was saved by the decision in Pankina. 
Prior to this decision, migrants were compelled to leave the UK and some were 
removed.1242   
 
Furthermore, at the heart of the matter is a further underlying issue where information 
can be amended, removed, or added to policy. This thus reflects the pressure and 
absolute whirlwind which litigants and judges are made to go through.1243 The 
consequences are in themselves ominous as will be discussed further.  
 
The Pankina decision was closely followed by R (English UK) v SSHD1244 where the 
issue was that one of the requirements for the award of points being that the course must 																																																								
1241 See also R v Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte Sutherland [1996] EWHC 208 (Admin)  
1242 Home Office UK Border Agency, ‘Points-Based System Maintenance (Funds): Policy Document 
(London 23 July 2013)  
1243 DP (United States of America) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 365 [14] 
1244 [2010] EWHC 1726 (Admin) 
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meet the requirements set out in the UKBA’s published sponsor guidance. However, the 
course level specified in the Guidance was then altered that specified a different level of 
course required as minimum. In following Pankina, the court stated that the ratio is that 
a provision which allowed a substantive criterion for eligibility of admission or leave to 
remain must involve Parliamentary scrutiny, therefore the change of approach in the 
new guidance operated to materially change the substantive criteria for entry of foreign 
students who wished to study English in this country.1245  
 
Similarly in R (Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants) v SSHD1246 the court had to 
consider applications under Tier 1 of the Points Based System vide a statement of 
proposed changes made to Immigration Rules HC 59.1247 The changes inter alia 
enabled a limit to be set on the number of grant of entry clearance or leave to enter to a 
particular route during the relevant allocation period. The Secretary of State promised to 
publish the interim limit on the website of the UK Border Agency (now UK Visas & 
Immigration) but failed to do so at the relevant time only to be published at a later date. 
The court held that the manner in which the limits were imposed was unlawful 
following the decision in Pankina and stated that the limit should have been subject to 
Parliamentary scrutiny, however minor. 
 
In 2012 in the case of R (on the application of Alvi) v SSHD1248 similar issues came up. 
Mr. Alvi, a citizen of Pakistan entered the UK as a student on 20 September 2003 with 
leave valid to 31 January 2005 subsequently renewing his leave as necessary. Prior to a 
later renewal of leave, the work permit regime has been replaced by the points based 
system, which came into effect on 27 November 2008. He applied for leave to remain 
on the points based system, his application was refused stating that he did not satisfy the 
requirements of the Immigration Rules because his job title as an assistant 
physiotherapist was not of the level of the skilled occupations required by the rules. He 
argued inter alia that the list of skilled occupations was not part of the Immigration 
																																																								
1245 R (English) v SSHD ibid (Foskett J) 
1246 [2010] EWHC 3524 (Admin); see also R (Ahmed) v SSHD [2011] EWHC 2855 (Admin); R (Purzia) v 
SSHD [2011] EWHC 3276 (Admin); R (New London College Limited) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 51 on 
the interaction between what was in the policy guidance and the Immigration Rules. 
1247 Home Office, HC 59-Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules Laid before Parliament on 28 June 
2010 under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971  
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/statementsofchanges/2010/hc
59.pdf?view=Binary > accessed 19 November 2013 
1248 [2012] UKSC 33; Munir and Rahman v SSHD [2012] UKSC 32- these two cases were heard together 
with common issues at stake relating to parliamentary scrutiny section 3 (2) of the 1971 Immigration Act. 
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Rules and the document containing the list had not been laid before Parliament under 
the negative resolution procedure consistent with the Immigration Act 1971, section 3 
(2). In short, that the Occupation Codes of Practice contain material which was not just 
guidance. Mr. Alvi sought a judicial review of the decision and permission was granted 
him to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The court allowed his appeal stating that the 
skilled occupation was not part of the Immigration Rules […]1249 The SSHD appealed. 
 
In upholding the case of Mr. Alvi, the court agreed that the information was not set out 
in the rules themselves and has therefore not passed the minute parliamentary scrutiny. 
The court pointed out the volume of rules being sent to Parliament under section 3 (2) 
of the Immigration 1971 Act appear to be voluminous to the extent that it is doubted 
whether Parliament would have subjected them to effective scrutiny before accepting 
them.1250 The court stated that the case illustrates the tension in public law decision-
making, between flexibility in the decision-making process and flexibility of its 
outcome, remarking that even though both are desirable objectives but achieving 
balance is often difficult.1251 Lord Walker stated that the pressure under which the 
present day immigration control operates, makes it appropriate and desirable that 
outcomes of decision-making should be very predictable; therefore the requirement for 
detailed consideration of individual cases should be reduced.1252  
 
In my view, the above cases have common ratios. The first is the ambulatory nature of 
the rules which appears to have been contrived to achieve a set standard inconsistent 
with the idea of Parliamentary scrutiny which is geared towards effective supervision 
even though no debates are usually held for passing Immigration Rules into law as they 
are made under the negative resolution procedure highlighted above. Secondly, as 
highlighted by Ian Dove J, the above cases raised a spectrum that operated to the extent 
that there lies a difference between the substantive requirements of the rules on the one 
hand and procedural requirement on the other hand.1253 The difficulty with this 
approach is that it does not allow for consistency, predictability and foreseeability, 
which have the consequence of creating deportability or removability by way of 
legislative architecture. The corollary is that legal certainty is compromised in that the 																																																								
1249 R (on the application of Alvi) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 681 
1250 Alvi v SSHD ibid [65] (Hope SCJJ) 
1251 ibid [111] (Walker SCJJ) 
1252 ibid [112] (Walker SCJJ) 
1253 R (Purzia) v SSHD [2011] EWHC 3276 (Admin)  [17] (Dove J) 
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migrant cannot foretell the consequence of his/her application for leave to remain made 
in good faith. 
 
In addition, the addition of extraneous materials as in the case of Alvi and Pankina 
illustrates abuse of power where a public authority can without the consent of 
Parliament add or remove at will, anything it considered necessary in order to probably 
achieve a high rate of refusal of migrants’ applications ultimately leading to removal. It 
is rather not surprising that the Merit Committee of the House Lords made an adverse 
comment as to why the actual limit of the Tier 1 during the relevant allocation period 
was not in the statement itself.1254  
 
At the rear of the cases discussed above, is the issue of unconstrained power, which is 
the very essence of arbitrariness. The Parliamentary Joint Committee stated with regrets 
that if the legal basis for the change in the rules is simply to give unconstrained power 
to the government to change rules with immediate effect thereby rendering people 
whom the Government has required to make their main home in the UK ineligible to 
stay in the UK, such an unconstrained power is the very essence of arbitrariness.1255 
Therefore legitimate expectation, as an aspect of legal certainty has been compromised 
with constant changes to the laws lacking intelligibility, clarity and predictability. The 
argument is that irregularity-giving rise to deportability or removability is a creation of 
immigration laws given that it constructs and differentiates migrants through the 
process of inclusion and in consequence creates exclusion leading to deportability 
and/or removability.  
 
5.7.5 ‘Crimmigration’-Widening the Gates 
 
A primrose path to the contrivance of deportability, which has opened the vistas, 
widened the gates, and heightened the velocity of deportation, is ‘crimmigration’.  
Crimmigration for our purpose is used to describe the ‘intersection of criminal and 
immigration law where criminal justice norms are imported into deportation or removal 
proceedings, whereas relaxed procedural norms of immigration proceedings are 
																																																								
1254 Merits of Statutory Instrument Committee, Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules (Fourth 
Report of Session) (2010-11, HL 17) paras 10-14 
1255 Parliamentary Joint Committee (n1208)  
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themselves imported into the criminal justice system’.1256 Crimmigration signposts the 
growing convergence of two critical regulatory regimes-criminal justice and 
immigration control where the two systems ‘intersect at multiple points notably at 
points that violations of the immigration laws trigger broader, harsher, and more 
frequent criminal consequences even leading to refugees being prosecuted for illegal 
[irregular] entry’.1257 Crimmigration exposes a common link, rooted in membership 
theory that has increasingly come to unite these two once discrete fields of law notably 
criminal law and immigration law.1258 It is therefore curious that State practice through 
legislation has steadily expanded the list of non-immigration-related crimes that trigger 
deportation and other adverse immigration consequences and in addition the plethora of 
deportations bordering on crime-related grounds have skyrocketed.1259  
 
The concomitant effect is that the underlying theories of deportation increasingly 
resemble those of criminal punishment to the extent that preventive detention and plea-
bargaining, known as longstanding staples of the criminal justice system, have 
infiltrated the deportation process.1260 Chacon on her part expresses that the State 
creates too many crimes about immigration that properly stated should not be crimes or 
if anything, stand as a ground for deportation.1261 In the opinion of Beale, ‘in a system 
characterized by over-criminalization [crimmigration], law enforcement operates with 
an undesirable degree of unchecked discretion, in such a manner that procedural 
protections are undercut leading to the misallocation of scare resources in crime control 
efforts’.1262 As a result, concerns generated by crimmigration in the light of its 
implication vide the extension of the power to deport against the principle of legal 
certainty are legion. These concerns are amplified by what has been referred to as ‘the 
selective convergence of criminal and immigration law’ argued to have contributed 																																																								
1256 Jennifer M Chacon, ‘Managing Migration Through Crime’ (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 
135, 136; crimmigration or over-criminalisation came into the lexicon of migration law through the 
contribution of American jurisprudence commentators as Chacon, Stumpf, Legomsky to mention but this 
few.  
1257 Nora V. Demleitner, ‘Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the 
"War" on Terrorism’ (2002) 51 EMORY Law Journal 1059, 1059; Daniel Kanstroom, ‘Criminalizing the 
Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th ‘Pale of Law’ (2004) 29 North Carolina 
Journal of Int'l Law and Commercial Regulation 639, 640 
1258 Juliet Stumpf, ‘The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and sovereign Power’ (2006) 56 
American University Law Review 367, 368 
1259 Stephen H. Legomsky, ‘The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal 
Justice Norms’ (2007) 64 Walsh and Lee Law Review 469, 470 
1260 Legomsky, ‘The New Path of Immigration Law’ ibid 
1261 Jennifer M. Chacon, ‘Overcriminalizing Immigration’ (2012) 102 The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 613, 614 
1262 Sara Sun Beale, ‘The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to 
Overfederalization’ (2005) 54 American University Law Review 747, 749 
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immeasurably to a subtle violation of broader international human rights violations 
impinging on fairness, equal dignity, discrimination and proportionality to legitimate 
aim of immigration control.1263  
 
The palpable tension generated by crimmigration have led scholars to query the 
rationale behind the importation of criminal justice norms into the domain of 
immigration, which according to them was originally conceptualized as civil where 
inter alia; States applying the citizenship and non-citizenship dichotomy map the 
exclusionary effects of criminalization of immigration law.1264 From a symbiotic 
perspective, it appears that criminal law and immigration law serve the sole function of 
excluding individuals from the society and for determining when they could join or 
rejoin society.1265 Nevertheless, both play different roles: criminal law regulates conduct 
within a community whereas immigration law governs the entry and exclusion of 
individuals across borders.1266 Criminal law ‘functions to inflict punishment on those 
that committed offenses where temporal considerations play a part in the determinations 
of guilt because it focuses on a single moment in time: the moment of crime as against 
affiliation such as marriage, family, good moral conduct which may be irrelevant but 
forms a bulwark of considerations in the immigration context’.1267 
 
It is probable that the apparent rationale for using criminal law as a response to 
migration issues is the myth and stereotype of migrant criminality, which, according to 
Chacon are sometimes tinged with racism.1268 In a bid to attempt to address the litany of 
problems associated with irregular migration, States employ criminal law as a vehicle of 
exclusion thereby aligning itself with public discourse on migration resonating and 
dominated by a trope of criminality.1269  As Frey and Zhao argue, ‘the rise in the anti-
immigrant rhetoric, trumpeted and hyped by interest groups with a passionately 																																																								
1263 Barbara A. Frey and X Kevin Zhao, ‘The Criminalization of Immigration and the International Norm 
of Non-Discrimination: Deportation and Detention in U.S. Immigration Law’ (2011) 29 Law and 
Inequality 279 
1264 Stephen H. Legomsky, ‘The New Path of Immigration Law’ (n1259) 471; Nora Demleitner, 
‘Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentences Consequences’ (1999) 11 
Stanford Law and Policy Review 153, 158; Stumpf, ‘The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime and 
Sovereign Power’ (n1258) 369 
1265 Nora V. Demleitner, ‘Immigration Threats and Rewards’ (n1257) 640 
1266 Juliet P. Stumpf, ‘Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law 
Review 1705, 1708 
1267 ibid 1724 
1268 Chacon, ‘Overcriminalizing Immigration’ (n1261) 629 
1269 Jenifer M. Chacon, ‘Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National 
Security (2007) 39  (5) Connecticut Law Review 1827, 1832 
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sympathetic media have all doubled to cement the ideological construction of migrant 
irregularity with the moral stigma and stereotype accompanying the name’.1270 The 
consequence is that a state of self-perpetuating phenomenon is created which subject 
migrants to an ever-increasing criminal law sanctions and by so doing ironically 
validates previous unjustified posture concerning migrant criminality.1271 
 
In addition, Stumpf argues that crimmigration narrows the decision whether to exclude 
the migrant out of the State to a single moment in time-the moment of crime, 
compelling enough, to trigger the potential for deportation or detention for an 
immigration offense.1272 Therefore by expanding deportability grounds by way of 
contrivance especially through the expansion of migration related conduct that 
constitutes a crime, crimmigration excludes non-citizens by first incarcerating them 
followed by removal from the State.1273 In addition, by the creation of an enforcement 
process that provide fewer substantive and procedural protections for non-citizens than 
its citizens, the State through crimmigration excludes non-citizens from equal access to 
the protection of the judicial system.1274 That probably accounts for Kanstroom’s 
argument that ‘the deportation of migrants especially lawful permanent residents should 
be seen as punishment, and to that extent, substantive constitutional protections should 
apply to deportation proceedings’.1275  
 
In short, by the contrivance of deportability under the spectrum of crimmigration, the 
traditional boundaries between criminal and immigration sphere becomes blurred, if 
not, eroded making it easier for States to increase the deportation of migrants convicted 
of criminal offences. This is heightened and achieved by the increase of the number of 
immigration-related criminal offences as well as the severity of punishment attached. In 
addition, the State by way of contrivance expands the number of criminal offences for 
																																																								
1270 Barbara A. Frey and X Kevin Zhao, ‘The Criminalization of Immigration and the International Norm 
of Non-Discrimination: Deportation and Detention in U.S. Immigration Law’ (2011) 29 Law and 
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deportation purposes thereby creating targets for deportation, and through the arsenal of 
State resources, work to achieve it.1276 
 
5.7.6 The Factual Matrix of Crimmigration 
 
The phenomenon of crimmigration in the UK came into prominence with the seminal 
Immigration Act 1971 (“1971 Act”) followed by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 
(“1999 Act”) and the Asylum & Immigration (Treatment of Claimants Etc. Act) 2004 
(“2004 Act”). The 1971 Act created a whole spectrum of immigration offences with 
custodial sentences.1277 The 1999 Act and the 2004 Act on their parts created similar 
immigration offences in parallel terms with the 1971 Act.1278 These expansions 
especially with respect to the 2004 Act drew the ire of the Refugee Council who opined 
that the UK government decided to insert the section 2 of the 2004 Act to prosecute 
people who destroyed immigration documents on arrival in the country with the aim of 
increasing the rate of removal of failed asylum seekers.1279 But in R v Soe Thet1280 the 
court ruled that a conviction for the offence of failing to produce a passport at an 
immigration interview, or on arrival at a port of entry in the UK, under Section 2 of the 
2004 Act does not apply if the defendant travelled to the UK with a false passport or 
without a passport.  
 
The UK Borders Act 2007 (“2007 Act”) amplified the issue of crimmigration with its 
mandatory deportation under section 32 with exceptions under section 33.1281 
Consequentially, a direct link between deportation and the commission of a crime of the 
appropriate level of severity has been created which ultimately reduces the scope for 
challenging automatic deportation decisions through the appeals system.1282 The 
obvious implication is that Parliament lengthened the list of immigration related 
offences from the 1971 Act to a major ‘catch all’ law by the instrumentality of the 2007 
Act which rather than rely on immigration related offences alone but now relies on all 
																																																								
1276 Barbara A. Frey and X Kevin Zhao (n1270) 281  
1277 See Immigration Act 1971, s24.  
1278 See the Immigration Act 1999, s105 and s 35 of the 2004 Act. 
1279 Refugee Council, ‘Briefing’ 
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1280 [2006] EWHC 2701 (Admin) 
1281 See UK Borders Act 2007, s 32 and 33 
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offences carrying a sentence of more than 12 months. The reasoning is that any migrant 
convicted of any offence at all, is liable to deportation either under the ‘not conducive to 
public good grounds’ or by way of automatic deportation under the 2007 Act. By so 
doing, crimmigration justifiably implores the conduct of the migrant and the length of 
imprisonment to expand deportation categories.  
 
The section 33 exceptions of the 2007 Act as a counterpoise to deportation has not 
alleviated the potency of section 32 in automatic deportation cases thereby illustrating 
the effect of crimmigration as a contrivance of deportability.1283  It is typical of courts to 
find following a conviction that deportation was conducive to public good, even where 
families with children were involved, ‘the best interest of the child’1284 did not save 
their parent (s) from being deported.1285 As the court stated in Rocky Gurung v SSHD, 
"The Borders Act by s.32 decides that the nature and seriousness of the offence, as 
measured by the sentence, do by themselves justify deportation unless an exception 
recognized by the Act itself applies".1286 Therefore, without the application of a criminal 
conviction, deportation may not have been justified under this limb. 
 
Similarly in the United States, the crimmigration debacle has assume exponential 
dimensions in the light of evidence that over the past two decades, the U.S. Congress 
has through the accumulation of legislative Acts, steadily expanded the scope of 
criminal conduct which underlies deportation.1287  As Stumpf identifies, deportation 
based on the commission of aggravated felony has expanded from the original three 
grounds notably murder, drug trafficking and firearms trafficking to what she refers to 
as ‘an alphabet of crimes of lesser gravity’.1288 Therefore, through the instrumentality of 
legislation, immigration related conducted have been termed criminal with harsher 
sanctions for the violation of immigration law imposing incarceration as a ground for 
																																																								
1283 See UK Borders Act 2007 s 33 (2) Exception 1 is where removal of the foreign criminal in pursuance 
of the deportation order would breach—(a) a person's Convention rights, or (b) the United Kingdom's 
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1287 Legomsky, ‘The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice 
Norms’ (n1264) 482 
1288 Stumpf, ‘Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste’ (n1266) 1727  
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deportation.1289 The USA’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act 1996 
(“IIRIRA”)1290, allows retroactive punishment, by way of convergence to the UK 
Borders 2007 Act which in its Explanatory Note permits deportation of those already 
convicted prior to the coming into force of the law.1291  
 
Unlike IIRIRA and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 
(“AEDPA”) which allow cancellation of deportation under the defense of ‘exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship’ for the migrant’s family, the UK’s 2007 Act created 
exception to automatic deportation under its section 33 on grounds of breach of human 
rights or age of the offender.1292 But contrary to IIRIRA and AEDPA which specified 
all offences-aggravated felonies attracting deportation1293, the UK’s 2007 Act by way of 
divergence excludes all offences less than 12 months but such offences remains 
deportable offences under the “not conducive to public good” limb enshrined in the 
1971 Immigration Act.1294 The IIRIRA through its section 287 (g) generally referred to 
as ‘287 (g) agreements’ made provision authorizing state and local police to identify 
and turn over to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) any suspected 
criminal immigrant encountered during regular enforcement activities,1295 with 
convergent enforcement patterns in the UK.1296 These deportation enforcement practices 
in the UK and the U.S. are similar in style and approach to the extent that it could be 
termed a legal transplant or policy transfer.1297  
																																																								
1289 See the United Kingdom’s 1971 Act, the 2009 Act, the 2004 Act and the 2007 Act; Cf. the U.S.’s 
sections, 101 and 237 of the Immigration and the Nationality Act 2006 and section 108 of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act 1996.  
1290 IIRIRA increased deportations by the expansion of categories of migrants subject to deportation; see J 
Ryan Moore, ‘Reinterpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act’s Categorical Bar to Discretionary 
Relief for “Aggravated Felons” in Light of International Law: Extending Beharry v Reno’ (2004) 21 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 535, 537; see also Jacqueline Hagan, Brianna 
Castro & Nestor Rodriguez, ‘ The Effect of U.S. Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families and 
Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives’ (2009-2010) 88 North Carolina Law Review 1799, 1800 
1291 See the Explanatory Note to the UK Borders Act 2007, Part 5 
1292 See UK Borders Act 2007, s 33   
1293 See commentaries by Jacqueline Hagan, Karl Eschbach & Nestor Rodriguez, ‘ U.S. Deportation 
Policy, Family Separation and Circular Migration’ (2008) 42 International Migration Review 64,65; 
Nancy Morawetz, ‘Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of 
Proposed Reforms’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 1936, 1955;  
1294 See Immigration Act 1971, s 3 (5) (a) and the UK Borders Act 2007, s 32 (4) 
1295 Elizabeth C Borja, ‘Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security 2001 – 
2008’ (Homeland Security-History Office) <http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=37572 
>accessed 13 December 2013  
1296 See Home Office UK Border Agency, ‘Our work in your region’  
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/aboutus/your-region/ > accessed 13 December 2013 
1297 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, University of Georgia 
Press, 1993) 29 (Legal transplant- a movement of a system of law from one country to the other usually a 
diffused law); David Dolowitz, Stephen Greenwold and David Marsh, ‘Policy Transfer: Something Old, 
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Crimmigration, it is argued, exposes a malaise, which in adjudicative proceedings pays 
little or no attention to discretion not to deport,1298 with judges and officials lacking the 
authority to stay deportation in the face of separation of families that may lead to 
destruction of such families.1299 In short, the relationship between criminal law and 
immigration law has become so inextricably intertwined to the extent they switch roles 
implying that the decision to deport are indirectly made through criminal justice 
institution at the point of conviction while the actors, functions and institutions in the 
criminal justice system have shifted allowing immigration objectives to dictate criminal 
prosecution.1300 The point being made by these divergent and convergent practices as 
exemplified by some sort of policy transfer is that they accomplish enforcement goals 
accompanied through lack of attention to the rights of migrants,1301 which I argue is the 
behaviour and character of liberal democracies. As Markowitz posited, ‘migrants have 
no right to protection against retroactive changes in law and they can be deported for 
minor criminal and other offences at the pleasing of the State’.1302 
 
In Australia, the main legislation for the deportation of migrants is the 1958 Migration 
Act with its later amendments.1303 Section 12 of the Act contains broad discretionary 
powers exercised by the Minister to deport an alien [migrant] convicted of a particular 
crime or sentenced to imprisonment of one year or more. This provision is in identical 
terms with the UK Borders Act 2007- the identical decimal being criminal conviction, a 
product of ‘character test’ as in Australia.1304 It is crucial therefore to note that while 
section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 makes provision for automatic deportation of 
‘foreign criminals’ as discussed above, the Australian section 501 of the Migration Act 
on the other hand is used to deport those under the ‘character test’ regardless of their 																																																																																																																																																																		
Something New, Something Borrowed, But Why Red, White And Blue?’ (1999) 52 (4) Parliamentary 
Affairs 719, 720 
1298 Cf. section 33 of the 2007 Act with decisions in Rocky Gurung v SSHD, SS (Nigeria) v SSHD and AJ 
(Bangladesh) v SSHD (n1285) 
1299 Nancy Morawetz, ‘Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of 
Proposed Reforms’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 1936, 1943 
1300 Stumpf, ‘Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste’ (n1266) 1729; see also comments 
by Jennifer Chacon, ‘ A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment Rights’ (2010) 59 Duke Law Journal 1563, 1571  
1301Jennifer Lee Koh, ‘Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in 
Immigration Adjudication’ (2012-2013) 91 North Carolina Law Review 475, 481 
1302 Peter L. Markowitz, ‘Deportation is Different’ (2010-2011) 13 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law 1299, 1302 
1303 Section 12 of the Migration Act 1958 was amended by section 10 of the Migration Amendment Act 
1983.  
1304 Michelle Foster, ‘An “Alien” By the Barest of the Threads”-The Legality of the Deportation of Long-
Term Residents From Australia’ (2009) 33 Melborne University Law Review 483, 507 
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length of residence. It is therefore contended that this supposedly synergy of deportation 
practices in the form of convergence could not have been an accident. Using criminality 
as a springboard for deportation could better be explained as the exportation of the 
State’s problem elsewhere with no reasonable consideration of their human rights. 
 
In France, the deportation of migrants gained fervor with the 2003 legal reform centres 
de retention, which extended the maximum time of detention of migrants to 32 days 
thus providing an amphitheatre for large-scale deportation.1305 This was followed by the 
imposition of deportation quotas on prefets-law enforcement officers from several 
departments forcing them to increase the number of irregular migrants, charged with 
deportation and actually removed from the country.1306 Nonetheless, the French 
Immigration law prohibits expulsion in these limited circumstances,1307 and it appears 
that France has not made criminal conduct a major policy plank in the deportation of 
migrants by way of divergence but has made the use of quotas and targets as a 
convergent practice similar to the UK.  
 
The above illustrates that the deportation realities of the United States, Australia and 
France within the broader context of liberal democracies offer significant similarities 
with the UK, with specificity to crimmigration in particular and immigration 
enforcement and control in general, as a vehicle for enhancing and sustaining 
deportation of migrants which queries the liberal democratic ideals of fairness in 
particular and compliance to international human rights standards in general.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
Legality of deportation or removal of migrants must find expression in the concept of 
the rule of law depicted in the preamble of the ECHR and described by the ECtHR as 
part of the common heritage and fundamental principles of a democratic society [liberal 
democracy]. The laws on deportation and removal must be fair, precise, sufficiently 																																																								
1305 Clemence Richard and Nicolas Fischer,‘ A legal disgrace? The retention of deported migrants in 
contemporary France’ (2008) 47 Social Science Information 581, 590 
1306 Richard and Fischer, ibid  
1307 See Code de l’entrée et du sejour des etrangers et du droit d’asile [Code on the Entry and Stay of 
Foreigners and on the Right of Asylum] (France) art L521-3 [Nawaar Hassan trans] cited in Michelle 
Foster, ‘An “Alien” By the Barest of the Threads”-The Legality of the Deportation of Long-Term 
Residents From Australia’ (n1304); see also Cimade, ‘Centres et locaux de retention administrative, 
Rapport 2007 (2008) cited in Clemence Richard and Nicolas Fischer, ‘A legal disgrace? The retention of 
deported migrants in contemporary France’ (2008) 47 Social Science Information 581, 598 
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clear and proportionate to aims pursued. Even though the grounds for the deportation of 
migrants may be determined solely by the liberal State but the practice must not be 
abused against acceptable international human rights norms and the underlining matter 
is that the very notion of universality of human rights should shape the manner in which 
entry and exit norms are conceived.  
 
It has been shown that through its laws and practices, liberal democracies rather than 
comply with its commitments and obligations appear to wield absolute power against 
migrants, which provides a lynchpin in the justification of deportation-an exclusionary 
practice.  
                    
Criminalization, over-criminalization (crimmigration) is a recurrent decimal in the 
lexicon of deportation. Criminality should lie within the province of criminal policy and 
not by its use in immigration control. This is because punishment, functionally speaking 
is intended to deter others and for the prevention of re-offending, these should be 
achievable within criminal law and should not be pushed to immigration control. This 
chapter found that crimmigration heightened the velocity of deportation consequent 
upon the intersection of criminal justice and immigration control at multiple points- 
where violations of immigration laws trigger broader, harsher, and more frequent 
criminal consequences leading to conviction and thereafter deportation. Therefore by 
expanding deportability grounds by way of contrivance especially through the 
expansion of migration related conduct that constitutes a crime, crimmigration excludes 
non-citizens by first incarcerating them and thereafter creating a suitable avenue for 
their deportation. The issue is that a direct link between deportation and the commission 
of a crime of the appropriate level of severity has been created which ultimately reduces 
the scope for challenging deportation decisions through the appeals system and even if 
challenged, success is a mirage. 
 
The issue of setting deportation targets raises crucial questions for the legality of 
deportation as carried out by the United Kingdom as a liberal democracy. When 
deportation rates become targets coupled by policy transfer that exist between and 
amongst liberal states, with respect to techniques and exchange of ideas and 
information, then the issue becomes that of illiberal democracy rather than liberal 
democracy. This is particular so given that when deportation targets are not met and 
deportation becomes impossible due to logistics and difficulties resulting from receiving 
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states, the State creates a precarious situation for migrants by refusing to grant them 
leave even when circumstances cannot warrant their removal. Curiously, deportation 
styles, conditions and practice have assumed exponential dimensions of coercion and 
seeming brutality in an attempt to facilitate deportation. This, as we stated suggests an 
adamant intention to deport whether or not such practices are incongruence to liberal 
democratic ideals of which some had resulted to death of deportees.  
 
On deportation gaps, the study found that there is a huge the gap between ‘deportables’ 
[potential deportees] and the actual number of deportees. The inability to deport on its 
own and the lack of refusal to grant leave to remain further puts the migrant in a 
precarious position which hitherto damages the liberal philosophy of fairness. 
Inhibitions against deportation in terms of costs and return agreements exist but despite 
these inhibitions, deportation is still carried out even with strength and vigour.   
 
The chapter argued that the continuous pursuit of deportation of migrants in the face of 
possible violations of international human rights law coupled with the above practical 
constraints are anathema to liberalism. The reasoning is that all migrants are subject to 
an ever increasing and shifting pattern of retroactive deportation laws that violates the 
basic principles of human rights norms. The salvo is further fired by recent deportation 
laws across liberal democracies which are either discretionary or couched in rigid terms, 
referred to as a seemingly “antiseptic uniformity” leaving less chance for compassionate 
considerations. 
 
Furthermore deportation is constructed in the United Kingdom by a combination of 
legislative and judicial actions given that legislation associated with deportation are in 
an unrestrained manner constantly enacted and revised to achieve deportation in 
contrast to the doctrine of legitimate expectation. In essence, the more complex the 
laws, the easier it becomes to attract violation thereby creating a deportable or 
removable status.  
 
Put differently, in order to effect deportation, the deportee must have been put in a 
deportable state through the instrumentality of the laws of the State. The argument is 
that deportability and/or removability is State contrivance, which is easily 
choreographed and articulated through the interplay of policy encumbered by legislative 
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and judicial architecture regardless of whether or not they comply with international 
human rights obligations. 
 
 It is posited that State contrivance of deportability violates the legitimate expectation of 
migrants within the purview of legal certainty. As the HSMP Forum, Pankina, English 
and Alvi string of cases have shown, legitimate expectation as an aspect of legal 
certainty, have been compromised with constant changes to the laws lacking 
intelligibility, clarity and predictability. The implication is that irregularity-giving rise 
to deportability is a creation of immigration laws given that it constructs and 
differentiates migrants through the process of inclusion, and in consequence creates 
exclusion, leading to deportation through arbitrariness. Therefore if the legal basis for 
the change of the law is simply to give unconstrained power to the government to 
change rules with immediate effect thereby rendering migrants deportable or removable, 
such unconstrained powers are arbitrary. It follows that the inclusive measures 
exemplified by the adoption of the HSMP programme and the exclusive measures 
exemplified by arbitrary changes in the laws which encourages and heightens 
deportability and/or removability, queries the rationality of this new legal framework of 
State power. 
 
It has equally been argued that liberal states by way of convergent and divergent 
practices as exemplified by either legal transplant or policy transfer accomplish 
deportation enforcement goals. The Study found that while section 32 of the UK 
Borders Act 2007 makes provision for automatic deportation of ‘foreign criminals’ as 
discussed above, the United States uses the IIRIRA 1996-aggravated felonies- to 
expand the vistas of deportability of migrants regardless of their length of residence. 
The Australian section 501 of the Migration Act on the other hand applies the ‘character 
test’ to deport migrants regardless of their length of residence. This leads to the 
contention that the supposedly synergy of deportation practices by these liberal states in 
the form of convergence could not have been by accident but suggests either a legal 
transplant or policy transfer. In essence, through the display of keenness in meeting 
deportation targets and quotas by the indulgence in arbitrary changes of laws in 
disregard to its international human rights obligations, the source and rationality of this 
new legal framework of State power is accordingly queried.  
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In short, decisions taken by a liberal democracy involving the restriction of a right must 
be strictly necessary otherwise the State will be in clear violation of its international 
obligations as well as its status as a liberal democratic state. It could be reasoned that 
the United Kingdom’s deportation regime as a liberal democracy is unlawful because it 
is shrouded in the cloak of illegitimacy, disproportionate, not necessary in a democratic 
society, procedurally defective, and adjudged below acceptable standards of 
international human rights law. 
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Chapter 6. Research Findings and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Opening Remarks 
 
The notion that every State by reason of its territorial supremacy is competent to 
exclude non-nationals partly or wholly from its territory is supported by international 
law. In essence, a fundamental principle of State sovereignty is that States enjoy the 
discretion over the admission, residence and expulsion of non-nationals from the State-
exercising jurisdiction.1308 Nonetheless, in the exercise of such discretion, States are 
subject to a cluster of international law/international human rights law (IHRL) and 
treaty obligations in upholding acceptable principles and standards in the exercise of 
sovereignty thus inviting a reconciliation of sovereignty with universality of human 
rights law. 
 
The main question that this thesis sought to examine is whether the UK complies with 
its substantive and procedural obligations in the deportation and removal of migrants 
and ancillary to the above is whether the UK complies with its treaty obligations under 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) in the detention of migrants for the purpose of 
deportation and/or removal. Therefore, the standards established by IHRL for the 
protection of the rights of individuals in the State’s territorial jurisdiction with 
specificity to detention, deportation and/or removal was employed to measure the UK’s 
compliance with its obligations as represented by treaties, conventions, case law and 
soft law. The emphasis was laid on the safeguards provided by these international legal 
instruments vis-à-vis the rights of migrants and extending to the right of legitimate 
expectation.1309  
 
In its problem statement, the research engaged the discussion that the growing 
popularity of exclusionary measures against migrants in liberal states is common.1310 
Therefore, the research examined whether contemporary deportation and/or removal 
regime in the United Kingdom is the emergence of a new legal framework of State 
power.1311  																																																								
1308 See chapter 2.1 of this thesis 
1309 See chapter 2.2-2.4 of this thesis for details on norms and character of IHRL with respect to 
deportation and chapter 5.7.1 on legitimate expectation. 
1310 An idea first canvassed by Gibney and Hansen, see chapter 1.3 of this thesis 
1311 See chapter 1.2 of this thesis 
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In order to address this issue and for connected purposes, the thesis is divided into six 
chapters which developed the following interlinked research questions: 
 
1. Does the United Kingdom comply with its treaty obligations under International 
human Rights Law (IHRL) in the deportation and removal of migrants? 
 
a. Does the United Kingdom as a liberal democratic state comply with its substantive 
and procedural obligations in the deportation and removal of migrants? 
 
b. Are immigration laws in the UK constructed in an unconstrained manner, which as a 
consequence enhances deportation and/or removal? 
 
2. Ancillary to deportation and removal is the power to detain. Does the United 
Kingdom comply with its treaty obligations under International Human Rights Law in 
the detention of migrants for the purpose of deportation and/or removal? 
 
a. Are the United Kingdom detention practices at variance with its liberal democratic 
ideology of fairness? 
 
b. Can necessity of detention be defined devoid of rationality and due diligence? 
 
The following paragraphs will elucidate a sequential analysis of what has been 
discussed and evaluated and by so doing, the law will be stated and key arguments 
emphasized. 
 
6.2 Migration within the Context of International Human Rights Law  
 
Conclusion One: The thesis concluded that that where the detention and/or detention 
pending deportation and/or removal of a non-national will trigger the breach of his/her 
rights even outside the UK, provided such consequences are attributed to the UK, it 
follows that the UK will be in breach of its obligations under IHRL. In reaching this 
conclusion, the thesis examined the role played by the UDHR and other applicable 
international instruments, emphasizing that the UDHR remains a blue print for human 
rights development and a primary source of global human rights standards. In situating 
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the right of migrants within the international arena vide the obligations of States in 
IHRL, it was noted that obligations of States under IHRL do also apply extraterritorially 
and the determination of whether such obligations apply to a particular area usually 
require questions of subject matter of the obligations and the State’s connections in 
meeting the responsibility norms. This, as has been argued, is very relevant in the 
deportation and/or removal context due to the underlying fact that the deportation 
and/or removal of migrants have international destination implications.  
 
6.2.1 Liberal Democratic Ideals and the Rule of Law 
 
Conclusion Two: The thesis concluded that liberal democracies emphasize the 
importance of the rule of law and sees itself as inseparable from international human 
rights with the aim of applying the rights effectively and properly. In arriving at this 
conclusion, the thesis at chapter two contextualized liberalism and liberal democracy 
with a view to reaching the standard required for the categorisation of the United 
Kingdom as a liberal democracy and by so doing measure its compliance to the 
demands, salient features and values of a liberal democracy. By way of purposive 
application, the thesis showed that liberalism retains the fundamental idea that 
individuals have equal ethical standing and is society’s fundamental ethical unit and that 
liberal democracies exist primarily to discover and establish public values such as 
human rights, which defines the democratic character of States.1312Applying this 
standard, the United Kingdom was adjudged a liberal democracy. 
 
Conclusion Three: The thesis also concluded that concluded that liberal democratic 
states operate on the principle of humanitarianism with an implied obligation to assist 
migrants given the liberal democracy’s membership in ‘a single human community’ 
philosophy. This philosophy include the respect of international human rights law, the 
equality of treatment-save for objective differences, the respect for the rule of law that 
includes legitimate expectation and legal certainty, accountability, transparency and the 
avoidance of arbitrariness. 
 
The thesis concluded that the rule of law requires that public officials at all levels must 
exercise the powers conferred on them reasonably and in good faith for the purpose for 
																																																								
1312 See chapter 2.5 of this thesis for general discussions on liberal democracy 
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which the law was made without exceeding their authority or the limits of such powers. 
In contextualizing the rule of law, it was shown that the rule of law is the life-blood of 
any liberal democratic State and becomes the vehicle for guaranteeing the protection of 
human rights.1313 In reaching this conclusion, the thesis examined the rule of law 
generally and specifically in the migration context and argued that the rule of law 
requires that the laws of the land should apply equally to all save to the extent that 
certain objective differences justify such differentiation-the citizen and non-citizen 
dichotomy.  
 
6.2.2 The Liberal Democratic Paradox 
 
Conclusion Four: The thesis has shown that the tension between the law of inclusion 
and politics of restriction is best understood as a reflection of a deeper tension between 
liberal and democratic values in a liberal democracy. The thesis concluded that the 
relationship between sovereignty and external legal commitments for a liberal 
democracy should lie in a continuum which demands that the UK’s laws and practices 
especially in the area of immigration control will be measured against its compliance to 
international human rights obligations with the spectacle and ambiance of the rule of 
law. In arriving at this conclusion, the thesis expanded the liberal democratic paradox 
argument, which it explained as the analysis of tension between respects for 
international human rights on the one hand, and the protection of citizenship on the 
other hand which places the liberal state in a difficult position to make decisions 
between the respect of public opinion against the deportation of aliens [migrants] and 
due process.1314 Therefore the challenge faced by liberal democratic states is therefore 
how to reconcile liberal principles and identities that transcend the state with competing 
principles or sources of authority.  
 
6.2.3 Immigration control in the United Kingdom 
 
Conclusion Five: The research found that measures controlling the movement of aliens 
[migrants] were often connected with hostilities with other countries; such hostilities led 
to expulsion of aliens vide the issuance of a proclamation order.1315 This historical 																																																								
1313 See chapter 2.5.1 of this thesis on the rule of law 
1314 See chapter 2.5.2 of this thesis 
1315 See chapter 3.5 of this thesis 
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proclamation order is a precursor to deportation order, later entrenched in the 1905 
Aliens Act that statutorily opened the vistas for deportation. This conclusion was 
reached by the analysis of the patterns of immigration control from the point of 
citizenship and interplay of sovereignty to the regime of Parliamentary scrutiny. In 
analyzing immigration control, this study identified that immigration laws are now 
passed without much parliamentary scrutiny inter alia as evidenced by the Human 
Rights Act 1998, s 19 (“HRA 1998”), the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002 and the Treatment of Claimants Act 2004 Act, which were passed without crucial 
parliamentary scrutiny for compatibility with human rights. This is in contrast to the 
Aliens Act 1914 s 27, where parliamentary scrutiny was a key issue that disallowed 
executive deference in the form of discretion or policies.  
 
6.2.4 Convergence and trends 
 
Conclusion Six: The study enumerated the revolving issues and trends, divergence and 
convergence of immigration policies in three other selected liberal democratic states 
such as the United States of America, Australia and France whose immigration reality 
offers significant similarities with the UK with a view to situating the analysis of 
immigration issues in the UK within the broader context of other liberal democracies. 
By way of convergence and trends, the research has shown that while the UK’s 1971 
Immigration Act later became the cornerstone of all immigration laws in the UK, about 
the period between 1971-1999, similar immigration patterns were in operation in the US 
and France that relieves the argument whether such practices were simply co-incidental, 
a trend amongst liberal democratic states or mere convergence.  
 
This argument was further cemented by the finding that while the UK used ‘not 
conducive to public good’ term as a ground for deportation and automatic deportation of 
‘foreign criminals’, the USA facilitated the deportation of criminal aliens by expanding 
the definition of aggravated felony to include crimes carrying a prison sentence of one 
year or more rather than time served. At the time, France used the Pasqua laws to 
expand the deportation regime through the grant of special powers to immigration 
officers to detain and deport aliens and Australia applied the ‘character test’ as a 
yardstick for deportation. This is with a further finding that the use of discretion rather 
than law became prominent in the UK and Australia, which queries their coincidence, 
transplants or diffusion that raise fundamental questions as to whether the form and 
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pattern of immigration control in liberal democratic states is a new legal framework of 
state power.1316  
 
6.2.5 The Precarious Migrant 
 
Conclusion Seven: The thesis found that the preamble to the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act (2008 Act) by its wording created a ‘legal limbo’ or ‘precarious status’ 
for migrants. In arriving at this, the 2008 Act was examined alongside the issue of 
temporary admission that removed all legal rights to remain of persons convicted of 
criminal offences but who cannot be deported for certain legal reasons, thereby putting 
them in a legal limbo. The grant of temporary admission, it was found, does not remove 
this ‘limbo’ status given that temporary admission does not permit work nor State 
support in the form of public benefits, thus the limbo status remains indefinitely until 
reversed or the migrant, deported. Precarious migrants are highly vulnerable to 
deportation or/removal and have no capacity to regularize their immigration position 
while residing unlawfully in the State.1317   
 
The thesis further expanded the concept of a firewall or bifurcation argument originally 
canvassed by Carens who stated that States should guarantee that individuals should be 
able to pursue their human rights without being exposed to apprehension and 
deportation.1318 It was then concluded that States should build a firewall or bifurcate 
between immigration law enforcement on the one hand and the protection of basic 
human rights on the other hand emphasizing that the mere fact of migrant irregularity 
should not justify the precarious status-rights protected must be ‘practical and effective’ 
rather than ‘theoretical and illusory’.1319 
 
6.3 The legality of detention-Detention under Common law and Strasbourg 
Jurisprudence 
 
Conclusion Eight: The study found that common law principles in immigration 
detention in the UK presupposes that the State must engage the issue of necessity, 
reasonableness, due diligence and proportionality as in the case of Hardial Singh and ex 																																																								
1316 See chapter 3.14 of this thesis 
1317 See chapter 3.5 of this thesis 
1318 Joseph Carens, ‘The Rights of Irregular Migrants’ (n637) 166 
1319  Airey v Ireland [1979] ECHR 3 
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parte I string of cases.1320 At variance with this position is the decision in Saadi v UK 
where the court refused to accept that necessity was required for immigration detention, 
which has been concluded as excessive executive deference by the ECtHR. The result 
of the study supports the conclusion that Strasbourg court seems to have thrown 
proportionality to the winds by its decision in Saadi v UK despite the fact that 
proportionality is in essence a balancing exercise underpinning the ECHR in Art 8-11 
ECHR with the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test. This is because a restriction 
cannot be regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ unless it is proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued. Strasbourg jurisprudence is challenged by its latter decision 
in Rusu v Austria where the court surprisingly abandoned its previous stance in Saadi v 
UK and accepted the necessity adjunct but did nothing to incorporate it into its 
interpretation of Art 5 (1) (f) on detention. The thesis therefore concluded that the right 
to liberty might have been compromised regardless of the UK’s Home Office policies, 
which mirror an amalgam of the common law principles requiring necessity in 
detention, but actual practice with respect to the liberty rights of migrants remains a 
mirage.  
 
6.3.1 Prolonged or Indefinite Detention 
 
Conclusion Nine: The thesis concluded that prolonged detention-indefinite detention- 
as practiced by the United Kingdom is at variance with its status as a liberal democracy. 
In doing so, the thesis situated the legality of detention within the remit of liberal 
democracies and chapter four sought to highlight the test for the legality of detention in 
the light of the principles of necessity, due diligence, arbitrariness and proportionality in 
addition to substantive and procedural requirements. In this connection, the research 
then examined the recent position of the HRC on the United Kingdom which expressed 
concern that no fixed time limit on the duration of detention in immigration removal 
centres has been established and advised that a statutory time limit on the duration of 
immigration detention be established while ensuring that detention is a last measure of 
resort and is justified as reasonable, necessary and proportionate. Furthermore, the 
UNHCR with specificity to asylum seekers in particular and relevant to detention in 
general which emphasized that the detention of asylum seekers is inherently undesirable 
and only accepted if it is brief, absolutely necessary and implemented where other 
																																																								
1320 See chapter 4.3.1 of this thesis 
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options have been exercised leaving detention as the last resort. But this is not the case 
with detention practices in the United Kingdom that allows for prolonged detention 
spanning several years.  
 
To add vent to the conclusion is the underlying fact that there are two limbs with respect 
to Article 5 ECHR, notably the test for the legality of detention on the one hand and a 
set of procedural rights for detainees on the other hand. It was contended that detention 
may be substantively legal but the procedures for safeguarding those rights may be 
otiose and hence unreachable. The findings of this study supports the conclusion that it 
is regrettable that wider rights under Article 5 (3) ECHR are afforded to criminal 
suspects allowing them to apply to the court for the review of the desirability of 
detention pending trial while same does not apply to immigration detainees that are not 
charged with criminal matters. 
 
6.3.2 Necessity and Proportionality 
 
Conclusion Ten: The research concluded that there was no rational basis for the 
rejection of the requirements of necessity and proportionality by the ECtHR in detention 
while accepting due diligence or reasonable time into its lexicon of arbitrariness. In that 
connection, it was emphasized that it is inconceivable that the EU threshold of 
proportionality meets international human rights law standards as depicted by its 
applicable Directives on detention which confirms that detention should be employed 
when it proves necessary whereas the standards of Strasbourg are at variance with it.1321  
 
Pursuant to that, the study queried the rationale behind detention as a measure taken to 
facilitate expulsion where evidence has shown that expulsion figures are dropping as 
against increasing detention. Therefore, it is concluded that the necessity of detention 
cannot be defined, devoid of rationality and due diligence which leaves the research 
with the conclusion that detention in the United Kingdom raises questions of legitimacy 
and is not eloquent of its status as a liberal democracy. In reaching this conclusion, the 
research showed that detention might be lawful but arbitrary. The reasoning is that an 
assessment of legality of detention should encompass amongst others a broader test of 
substantive arbitrariness to include decisions, which are unreasonable, unjust, bad faith, 
																																																								
1321 See chapter 4.5.2 of this thesis 
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delayed, and unpredictable. It is therefore submitted that an unreasonable decision, 
delayed decision or where the State’s laws are imprecise and unpredictable is an affront 
on the rights of migrants as arbitrariness cannot be well defined without the requirement 
of necessity.  
 
6.3.3 Detention and Bail 
 
Conclusion Eleven: The thesis concluded that the processes and procedures in bail 
hearings have a multiplier and cumulative effect on its outcome and by extension on the 
right to liberty. To arrive at this conclusion, chapter four examined procedural barriers 
and reiterated that there is also a connection between quality representation and 
successful bail applications. It was found that 50% of the applicants in the bail 
applications examined were not legally represented and none of the cases without legal 
representation were successful.1322 Aside the seemingly inability to access quality legal 
representation, detainees face an uphill task. A case in point is the introduction of the 
policy ‘hub and spoke’ in 2009 by HM Prison designed to increase the speed and 
efficiency of removals where male foreign prisoners can be removed quickly from the 
UK which arguably affect their chances to be granted bail.1323 In the light of the above, 
it was argued that the United Kingdom’s detention practices is incongruent with its 
status as a liberal democracy on the one hand and at variance with its treaty obligations 
under IHRL on the other hand with specific reference to procedural legality. 
 
6.4 The Legality of Deportation and Removal 
 
Conclusion Twelve: The study has shown that through their laws and practices, liberal 
democracies rather than comply with their commitments and obligations appear to wield 
absolute power against migrants. The research reached this position by examining the 
historical dimensions of deportation and/or removal, grounds and rationale for 
deportation and trends and turns in contemporary deportation regimes, noting that the 
very notion of universality of human rights should shape the manner in which entry and 
exit norms are conceived. In its discussion at chapter five, the study considered the role 
of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in deportation and then concluded that 																																																								
1322 Bail for Immigration Detainees and the Refugee Council, Immigration bail hearings by video link: a 
monitoring exercise (March 2008) 6 
1323 See chapter 4.5.2 of this thesis 
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liberal States as in the instant case, the United Kingdom, using the MoU instrument, 
continue to deport migrants to such countries irrespective of whether those states will 
eventually violate them.1324 
 
In their determination to deport and/or remove, liberal States set deportation and/or 
removal targets. The research has shown that the issue of setting deportation and/or 
removal targets raise crucial questions for the legality of deportation and removal as 
carried out by the United Kingdom. This is embedded in the fact that when deportation 
and/or removal rates become targets coupled by policy transfer that exist between and 
amongst liberal states, with respect to techniques and exchange of ideas and 
information, then the issue becomes that of illiberal democracy rather than liberal 
democracy. It has therefore been concluded that when deportation and/or removal 
targets are not met and actual removal becomes impossible due to logistics and 
difficulties resulting from receiving states, the State creates a precarious situation for 
migrants by refusing to grant them leave even when circumstances cannot warrant their 
removal.  
 
And closely connected to the above are deportation and/or removal gaps. On 
deportation gaps, the study found that there remains a huge gap between ‘deportables’ 
[potential deportees] and the actual number of deportees. The quarterly statistics 
produced by the Home Office on deportation only indicates the number of enforced 
removals as against the number of deportation orders or removal directions issued.1325 It 
is submitted that the inability to deport or remove on its own and the lack of refusal to 
grant leave to remain further puts the migrant in a precarious position which hitherto 
damages the liberal philosophy of fairness.  
 
Conclusion Thirteen: On inhibitions against deportation and/or removal, the research 
has shown that the inhibitions against deportation or removal in the context of non-
refoulement obligations with specific reference to medical cases under the ECtHR is 
problematic and unclear and has not provided the necessary panacea against 
deportation. It concluded that in reshaping non-refoulement obligations in the medical 
cases, the ECtHR is undermining the absolute nature of Art 3 ECHR with the 
																																																								
1324 See chapter 5.5.1 of this thesis 
1325 ibid 
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unfortunate creation of uncertainty due to the Court’s inconsistency leaving deportees 
helpless, without knowing on what side the pendulum will swing. 
 
6.5 The Contrivance of Deportability and Removability 
  
Conclusion Fourteen: The study concluded that deportation and/or removal is 
constructed in the United Kingdom by a combination of legislative and judicial actions 
given that legislation associated with deportation and removal are constantly enacted 
and revised to achieve deportation and/or removal in contrast to the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation. The discussion on the contrivance of deportability and 
removability raised the query as to whether legislation associated with deportation and 
removal are in an unconstrained manner, constantly enacted, revised and re-enacted to 
achieve deportation and/or removal in contrast to the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
encapsulated under the principle of legal certainty.  
 
Legitimate expectation was also discussed within the remit of Article 8 ECHR. The 
study therefore found that the earlier Immigration Acts have been amended by a vast 
accretion of other Acts, with some provisions re-enacted, enlarged and some, 
consolidated which as a consequence enhances deportation and removal. This means 
that the more complex the laws, the easier it becomes to attract violation, therefore a 
deportable and removable status has been created vide the instrumentality of the laws of 
the State.  
 
The research further concluded that State contrivance of deportability and removability 
violates the legitimate expectation of migrants within the purview of legal certainty. 
Relying on the HSMP Forum, Pankina, English and Alvi string of cases, it showed that 
legitimate expectation as an aspect of legal certainty, have been compromised with 
constant changes to the laws lacking intelligibility, clarity and predictability. It 
reiterated that irregularity-giving rise to deportability or removability is a creation of 
immigration laws given that it constructs and differentiates migrants through the 
process of inclusion and in consequence creates exclusion leading to deportation 
through arbitrariness. The research concluded that if the legal basis for the change of the 
law is simply to give unconstrained power to the government to change rules with 
immediate effect thereby rendering migrants deportable, such unconstrained powers are 
arbitrary. It therefore argued that the inclusive measures exemplified by the adoption of 
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the HSMP programme, its corollaries and the exclusive measures exemplified by 
arbitrary changes in the laws which encourages and heightens deportability and/or 
removability, queries the emergence and rationality of this new legal framework of 
State power.  
 
With respect to legitimate expectation and Article 8 ECHR (right to private and family 
life) it has been submitted that the ECtHR applies no identifiable spectrum in deciding 
whether deportation or removal will be disproportionate against migrants regardless of 
their length of stay in the host State. Rather than treat long-term migrants as a special 
category of aliens whose expulsion would require thorough and weighty reasons, the 
ECtHR prefers the application of individual circumstances in each case with differing 
outcomes. This approach has been described as a ‘lottery’. Therefore the boundary 
between legitimate expectation and deportation and/or removal power can be narrowed 
down to ‘who belongs’ in the liberal state. The study has thus revealed that the concept 
of ‘who belongs’ has been expanded and that this expanded concept of belonging is 
gaining weight with international human rights instruments.1326 The issue then is that 
when decisions are taken by a liberal democracy that involves the restriction of a right, 
that restriction must be strictly necessary; otherwise the State will be in clear violation 
of international obligations as well as its status as a democratic state. The test is a 
rigorous test that requires the assessment of a ‘pressing social need’ as against the 
disproportionate restriction of the individual’s right even as the ECtHR had affirmed 
that proportionality is the most crucial element of the necessity test that requires the 
application of a fair balance between competing interests i.e. between the requirements 
of the general interest of the community versus the requirement for the protection of 
human rights.1327 
 
6.5.1 Contrivance of Deportability and Crimmigration 
 
Conclusion Fifteen: The research identified that criminalization is a recurrent decimal 
in the lexicon of deportation but submits that criminality should lie within the province 
of criminal policy and not by its use in immigration control. Using crimmigration as the 
springboard for construction of deportability, the study reached the conclusion that 
crimmigration heightened the velocity of deportation consequent upon the intersection 																																																								
1326 See chapter 5.7.2 
1327 See chapter 5.6.2 
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of criminal justice and immigration control at multiple points- where violations of 
immigration laws trigger broader, harsher, and more frequent criminal consequences 
leading to conviction and thereafter deportation. It espoused that by expanding 
deportability grounds by way of contrivance especially through the expansion of 
migration related conduct that constitutes a crime, crimmigration excludes non-citizens 
by first incarcerating them and thereafter creating a suitable avenue for their 
deportation. The consequence of the above, as has been submitted is that, a direct link 
between deportation and the commission of a crime of the appropriate level of severity 
has been created which ultimately reduces the scope for challenging deportation 
decisions through the appeals system and even if challenged, success is a mirage. 
Deportation on criminality grounds, it is submitted, an extension of the policy of 
exclusion, which is against liberal ideals and anathema to the necessity in a democratic 
society nexus. The research therefore concluded that the contrivance of deportability 
vide crimmigration is not eloquent of the United Kingdom’s liberal democratic status.  
 
In the light of the above conclusions, the thesis has been able to prove its hypothesis- 
problem statement, that the growing popularity of exclusionary measures against non-
citizens in United Kingdom is common. This is reflected in the State practice regarding 
deportation and/or removal as found by this study, negating as it did, its liberal 
democratic principles of fairness and contrary to acceptable standards established under 
international human rights law. 
 
The questions as to whether the United Kingdom’s detention practices pending 
deportation or removal is at variance with its liberal democratic ideology of fairness has 
been answered even as it has been shown, following the results of the study, that 
necessity of detention cannot be defined devoid of rationality and due diligence. This is 
particularly important as expulsion figures are dropping as against increasing detention, 
thereby raising questions of legitimacy. 
 
In addition, the question as to whether the United Kingdom as a liberal democratic state 
complies with its substantive and procedural obligations in the deportation and removal 
of migrants has been answered in the negative following the conclusions reached by this 
study and the further question as to whether immigration laws in the United Kingdom 
are constructed in an unconstrained manner, which as a consequence enhances 
deportation and/or removal has been answered in the positive. State practice regarding 
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deportation and/or removal encumbered by the interplay of unmet deportation and/or 
removal targets resulting in the creation of precariousness or limbo status of non-
citizens has been shown. This practice, lying in continuum with the contrivance of 
deportability, exemplified by crimmigration in part, is anathema to liberal philosophies.  
 
The summary is that through its laws and practices, the United Kingdom, rather than 
comply with their commitments and obligations as a liberal democracy and under 
acceptable international human rights standards, appear to wield unrestrained power 
against migrants. Therefore, the source and rationality of this new legal framework of 
State power is accordingly queried. 
 
6.5.2 Summary of Conclusions and Proposals for Change of Law 
 
 
In the light of the above conclusions, the thesis has proved that the growing popularity 
of exclusionary measures against non-citizens in United Kingdom is common. This is 
reflected in the State practice regarding deportation and/or removal as found by this 
study, negating as it did, its liberal democratic principles of fairness and contrary to 
acceptable standards established under international human rights law. 
 
The questions as to whether the United Kingdom’s detention practices pending 
deportation or removal is at variance with its liberal democratic ideology of fairness has 
been answered even as it has been shown, following the results of the study, that 
necessity of detention cannot be defined devoid of rationality and due diligence. This is 
particularly important as expulsion figures are dropping as against increasing detention, 
thereby raising questions of legitimacy. Since no power is unfettered and every power is 
fettered, it is proposed that the United Kingdom should set up a maximum time in 
detention by way of legislation given that the right to liberty is a fundamental right. As 
has been found by this study, under common law, there is a presumption of liberty 
owing its origin to the Magna Carta 1215 and there exist similar obligations under 
international human rights law as captured in relevant in international instruments 
dealing with detention. The concept of necessity, proportionality, due diligence and the 
use of alternatives to detention has been raging issues. It is therefore proposed that 
detention should be subjected to the test of necessity and proportionality culminating to 
a fair use of detention spaces. There is no justification for detaining a person for 6 years 
and others for longer period ranging from 1-3 years as found by this thesis. 
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It is further proposed that detention in the United Kingdom should return to the 
standards laid down under common law as captured in the Hardial Singh principles 
which amongst others enunciated that the powers to detain must be exercised in 
accordance with the purpose-for the purposes of removal and/or deportation, reasonably 
necessary. Therefore, when it becomes clear that the purpose of detaining the individual 
cannot be achieved, release should be automatic. To do otherwise is to continuously 
erode or distort the character of a liberal democracy that emphasis the respect of the rule 
of law against all forms of arbitrariness.  If the thread that runs through a liberal 
democracy is the respect of international human rights law, the equality of treatment 
save for objective differences, the respect of the rule of law in the form of transparency, 
legitimate expectation, legal certainty and avoidance of arbitrariness, including 
providing a mechanism to challenge unfair decisions within the remit of equality of 
arms, it is proposed that this should be reflected in the corpus of laws of the United 
Kingdom regarding the detention pending deportation of migrants. This is important 
because this study has shown that detention can be legally permitted but arbitrary or 
both arbitrary and unlawful. 
 
The question as to whether the United Kingdom as a liberal democratic state complies 
with its substantive and procedural obligations in the deportation and removal of 
migrants has been answered in the negative following the conclusions reached by this 
study. It is proposed that all deportation cases should have suspensive effect in order to 
allow migrants the effective use of the right to effective remedy because ‘rights should 
be practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory’.  
 
State practice regarding deportation and/or removal encumbered by the interplay of 
unmet deportation and/or removal targets resulting in the creation of precariousness or 
limbo status of non-citizens in an unconstrained manner, which as a consequence 
enhances deportation and/or removal, has been shown. This practice, lying in 
continuum with the contrivance of deportability, exemplified by crimmigration in part, 
is anathema to liberal philosophies. It is therefore proposed that the United Kingdom 
should refrain from creating deportation targets and to moderate its import of 
crimmigration as a cornerstone of its immigration law. The use of deportation targets 
and crimmigration ridicules its liberal democracy’s principles of transparency and 
fairness. 
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